Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
Chinese Tor-M1 derivative HQ-17 spotted in Algerian camouflage colours
2026-09-25
Photos circulating on Chinese social media (Weibo) show a Chinese HQ-17 short-range air defence system painted in a camouflage pattern matching Chinese-made vehicles already in Algerian service, Defence Blog reports. Chinese sources claim the system is headed to Algeria; an OSINT account that flagged the photos noted the match but also a small possibility of an export order for a Sahel country using similar camouflage. Neither Algeria nor the manufacturer CASIC has confirmed a sale, and quantity and delivery timeline are unknown.
The HQ-17 is China's development of the Russian Tor-M1: China bought 27 Tor-M1 units from Russia under contracts in 1996 and 1999 before building its own derivative. Each launch vehicle carries its own electronically scanned, jam-resistant radar and eight missiles, can operate independently or take external cueing, and engages aircraft, helicopters, drones, cruise missiles and guided munitions at 1.5–20 km range and up to 10 km altitude (missile speed Mach 3). The PLA fields the tracked HQ-17 and the wheeled 6x6 HQ-17A, which can fire on the move; the export version HQ-17AE (cleared in 2021, four simultaneous targets) serves with Serbia and reportedly Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan.
Algeria's air defence has long relied heavily on Russian equipment — its inventory reportedly includes S-300PMU-2, S-400 and Buk-M2 alongside the Chinese HQ-9 — and Russia supplied the original Tor-M1 from which this system derives. If confirmed, the HQ-17 would take the point-defence tier of that network, a segment traditionally supplied by Moscow. The deal remains unconfirmed.
The Russian milblogger channel Rybar reports that Ukrainian forces resumed strikes on Russia after about a day of relative calm, launching at least 594 UAVs according to the Russian Ministry of Defence. It mocks the Ukrainian delegation in the United States for having called for a ceasefire. Rybar says most drones were shot down, but some industrial sites were hit. In Ulyanovsk, it says, the 'Iskra' electronics plant was damaged and drones also hit residential buildings, wounding eight people. It adds that a passenger train was damaged in Ulyanovsk oblast near the border with Samara oblast, with no passengers hurt but train schedules to be adjusted. A refinery in Perm krai was attacked, killing one person, and in Voronezh the 'Voronezhsintezkauchuk' plant, which makes synthetic rubbers and thermoplastic elastomers, was hit.
Rybar calls the new raid expected. It claims Russian strikes had destroyed some Ukrainian workshops and production capacity, causing problems with storing and assembling drones, so Ukraine now has to build up resources for massed attacks. According to the channel, much of Ukraine's weaponry comes directly from Europe, and cargo flights, including to Lviv, have increased over the past two weeks. The channel also notes that, for the first time in a long while, authorities in the affected Russian regions stopped blaming fires and impacts on 'debris'. It welcomes this, arguing that stock phrasing cannot hold up against the photos and videos Ukrainian channels publish, and that plainly admitting damage can restore public trust. Finally, it claims Russia's own strike campaign has already hurt Ukraine's economy and paralysed shipping, but says attacks must continue and sometimes be adjusted to achieve a strategic effect.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal/editorial Telegram channel (Rybar). It does not represent the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the ministry. The claims have not been independently verified.
На Северном флоте отрабатывали защиту от беспилотников
2026-09-25SINGLE SOURCE
According to the Northern Fleet press service, units responsible for guarding and defending Northern Fleet basing points in Murmansk Oblast held an exercise on repelling a UAV attack on military facilities. In the scenario a fleet facility came under simulated air attack, and personnel practised detecting, suppressing and engaging low-flying aerial targets.
Electronic warfare crews jammed and suppressed the control links of small UAVs, while mobile fire groups and air observation posts practised detecting aerial objects and employing weapons against them. The press service stressed that this was a planned exercise, not a report of a real attack. The article links it to earlier Ukrainian threats of sabotage against Russian Navy infrastructure, including nuclear submarines and missile carriers, and says the military continues to improve air-defence and counter-sabotage protection of basing points, with particular attention to countering various drone types. It names no specific units, bases, ships or weapon systems.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Topwar, a Russian pro-government military news site relaying Ministry of Defence information; it has not been independently verified.
«Мы не убегаем от FPV-дронов, мы на них охотимся»: мобильная огневая группа «БАРС-Курск» (группа Араба)
2026-09-25SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
WarGonzo highlights a mobile fire group (MOG) of the volunteer brigade 'BARS-Kursk' (Group North) commanded by Yevgeny Lobaev, call sign 'Arab'. He is the son of the arms designer Vladislav Lobaev and originally joined the brigade as an instructor. The group operates on what it calls one of the hottest stretches of the Kursk border area. Its task is to shoot down Ukrainian FPV drones and other UAVs that hit transport routes, infrastructure and civilians. The linked Kurskaya Pravda feature (25 September) says the group has set a brigade record for drones downed over the past two months. No figures are given.
According to the post and the article, the group differs from other BARS-Kursk MOGs in rarely using pickups and machine guns. It moves on foot, sets ambushes along known drone flight corridors and relies on automatic small arms. It has largely abandoned 12-gauge shotguns because it engages FPV drones at 200–250 m. The deputy platoon commander ('Russkiy') gives the reason: Ukrainian FPVs now carry directional-fragmentation charges, like a directional mine, with a roughly 50 m fragment spray, so range and reaction time are critical. Detection relies on video-interception receivers, which reportedly pick up drones before they can be heard and show drone type, distance and even operator call signs. The group also posts observers ('eyes') along ammunition-supply and evacuation routes to hunt loitering 'waiter' drones. A former competition sniper serves as senior shooter and instructor. Engagements are filmed for after-action review. The article describes a fast cat-and-mouse cycle. When the group starts downing fibre-optic drones, Ukrainian operators switch to analogue links. When those are jammed with EW, they move to digital links. They then attack in pairs or threes, from the flank and at very low altitude. One fighter recounts an FPV coming for the group via a detour about 20 minutes after it had downed another drone.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal/editorial Telegram channel (WarGonzo), which relays a feature from the Kursk regional newspaper Kurskaya Pravda. It does not represent the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the ministry. The claims have not been independently verified.
Zelensky says Trump has made a 'final decision' to license Patriot interceptor production to Ukraine; Poland offers to host the plant
2026-09-25
On 25 September 2026 President Volodymyr Zelensky told journalists, in a voice note, that Donald Trump had personally assured him during their meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York that Ukraine will receive licences to produce Patriot interceptor missiles. He quoted Trump as saying: "Yes, I have made a final decision. Ukraine will receive licences for the production of Patriot missiles". Zelensky added that "there are specific agreements in place", but gave no timeline and did not say which interceptor is covered. Kyiv has been negotiating with both RTX/Raytheon (maker of the PAC-2 GEM-T) and Lockheed Martin (maker of the PAC-3 MSE). PAC-2 missiles are built in the US and under licence in Germany, while the more advanced PAC-3 MSE is built only in the US and Japan. The claim follows months of back-and-forth. In July Trump called a licence "pretty cool", but on 31 July he said Washington was undecided and had to be "very careful" with the technology. In early September Secretary of State Marco Rubio said talks were continuing and warned that production would take years to set up. According to Reuters figures cited by Militarnyi, mass production of components could take 3 to 7 years after a licence is granted.
Washington has not confirmed the decision. On 26 September CNN asked Trump directly. He said the two leaders had discussed "a lot of different subjects" with "very strong agreement", then switched to urging Zelensky to "make a deal" with Russia. He did not address the licence, and the White House has made no statement. On 27 September Polish Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka proposed that, if Ukraine gets the licence, the factory be built in Poland rather than Ukraine, so that it would sit on "safe territory" out of reach of Russian strikes. She added: "We'll see if that happens."
This matters because Patriot is one of the few systems in Ukraine's inventory that can reliably intercept Russian ballistic missiles. This applies above all to the hit-to-kill PAC-3 MSE, and to a lesser degree the GEM-T. Kyiv faces an acute shortage of these interceptors: supplies were diverted after the US and Israel entered the conflict with Iran in February 2026, and Zelensky has asked for 5% of US Patriot interceptor output to get through the winter. Even if a licence is approved, licensed production would not ease the shortage this winter. It is a medium- to long-term way to depend less on US deliveries.
Ukraine hits two Russian missile-component plants in two nights: Almaz-Antey's Iskra in Ulyanovsk (Kh-59, Pantsir parts) and the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant, which leaked files tie to at least seven missile programs including Kh-101 and Oreshnik
2026-09-25
Ukrainian long-range drones struck JSC NPP 'Iskra Plant' in Ulyanovsk overnight on 24–25 September 2026, as part of a wider drone barrage on Russia. The plant belongs to the Almaz-Antey defence conglomerate and makes semiconductor devices, microwave components and electronics. According to Militarnyi and an identification by the independent Russian outlet ASTRA, it supplies components for Kh-59M2/M2A air-launched guided missiles (via the Yaroslavl Radio Plant) and diodes used in Pantsir-S1 air defence systems. Ulyanovsk governor Alexei Russkikh confirmed the attack, reporting damage to industrial and civilian infrastructure and eight people injured, including a child.
On the night of 26 September Ukraine hit the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant (AOMZ) in Azov, Rostov Oblast, which President Zelensky and the General Staff confirmed. The plant is part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV) and makes opto-mechanical and optoelectronic equipment and electronics for artillery, missile and anti-tank weapons. According to the SBU, its Alpha special group and the Navy used Neptune cruise missiles and Ruta, Palianytsia and Bars jet-powered drone-missiles. The SBU said the strike started a fire at the foundry and damaged equipment in five production buildings, including optical production, an assembly section, an electroplating workshop and a printed-circuit-board facility. OSINT and NASA FIRMS fire data indicated a fire near the site. The same night Ukraine also hit the Ilsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai. After the strike, the private analytical group Dallas Analytics published internal AOMZ, KTRV and supplier correspondence, state-contract data and cooperation schedules covering April 2023 to March 2025. According to these files, the plant is part of the production chains of at least seven missile programs. For the Kh-101 cruise missile it makes the Otblesk navigation lidar, which fixes the missile's position when satellite navigation is jammed, and the flight-control automation unit, for which no alternative supplier reportedly exists. The files also list guidance elements for the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, seekers for the Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, and electronics and seekers for the R-74 air-to-air missile. For the R-37M air-to-air missile the plant makes power, switching and battery-activation units, harnesses and housings. It also makes flight-control automation for the Kh-35U, Kh-59 and Kh-69 missiles, plus seekers for the Kh-38ML missile and the KAB-250L guided bomb. A March 2025 request asked whether the plant could supply 500 sets of electronic components and 1,000 housings a year from 2026, as the Aerospace Forces sought larger deliveries.
The two strikes show Ukraine targeting the electronics and seeker supply chain behind Russian missiles and air defence, not only launch platforms and fuel. The Azov documents suggest single points of failure, notably for the Kh-101. The damage claims rest on Russian regional officials, statements from the SBU and the Ukrainian military, and OSINT indicators. The leaked documents come from a Ukrainian-aligned private group and have not been independently authenticated. The extent of production disruption has not been independently verified.
Update 7 October: Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint, that satellite images have revealed the consequences of the 25 September attack on the Zavod Iskra research and production company in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk. According to the analyst, most of the strikes hit the building's facade rather than the roof. As a result, around 80% of the strikes were not captured by the satellite: only two of the 11 confirmed strikes caused visible damage in the imagery. Dnipro Osint believes that facade hits could cause significantly more serious internal damage than roof hits, particularly if production facilities and equipment are located behind the walls. This is the analyst's assessment; the extent of internal damage is not confirmed.
Russian drones crash and explode in Moldova and Romania through 1 October, including a Geran-4 jet drone blast beside a highway in Orhei district and a strike on a telecom mast; ISW links incursions, Polish Starlink sabotage and Berlin airport halt to one pattern
2026-09-24
During a Russian attack on Ukraine overnight into 24 September 2026 (Ukraine's Air Force reported 282 drones plus ballistic and other missiles), drones strayed into Moldova and Romania. Moldova's Defence Ministry reported four drone incursions and partially closed its northern airspace. Near Cernița (Florești district) a drone hit a tree, fell into a field beside a farm and exploded without casualties; police preliminarily identified it as a Gerbera, a low-cost Russian drone widely used against Ukraine, and the first found in Moldova. A second explosion near Vadul Rașcov is under investigation. President Maia Sandu counts 39 Russian drone incursions in 2026, against 17 in all of 2025. In Romania, radar tracked a target entering northern airspace; two F-16s were launched and residents received emergency phone alerts. The drone stayed about four minutes before crashing near Solca, without casualties or damage; Romanian officials did not confirm its origin, while ISW-based reporting describes it as a camera-equipped Gerbera, one of four over Bukovyna (Ukraine says it shot down three). Poland's Operational Command scrambled fighters twice and activated ground-based air defence and radar.
The incidents continued. On 26 September an unidentified drone crossed Moldovan airspace between 11:16 and 11:18, from the direction of Stepanivka (Odesa Oblast) past Novokotovsk in breakaway Transnistria. That evening, after residents alerted the authorities, Moldova's Border Police found debris of an unidentified drone outside Volintiri (Ștefan Vodă district, near the Ukrainian border), cordoned off the area and contacted the Ukrainian authorities; type and origin had not been officially identified by 27 September. Romania reported an unidentified object in its airspace overnight into 26 September, and allied fighters were scrambled. On the night of 28-29 September Romania again scrambled jets for an aerial asset near its airspace, though no violation was officially reported. On 29 September Romania's Defence Ministry said debris of an object, presumably a drone, had fallen on farmland on Great Brăila Island in Brăila County, reported by a local resident during the night. He said a fire broke out after the crash but went out by itself, with no casualties or damage. Interior Ministry units and the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) cordoned off the site and the pieces will be sent for expert examination; type and origin were not stated (Ukrainska Pravda via European Pravda). Police had already found drone fragments near Chișinău on 18 September. On 30 September, during another Russian mass attack on Ukraine, Kyiv Independent reported a drone crashing in Moldova (only the headline was available to us). According to Euromaidan Press, a Russian drone exploded near Hîrbovăț against a civilian mobile operator's mast, leaving blast marks over about 12 metres of the structure; service stayed up. (Euromaidan Press placed the village in Transnistria; Ukrainska Pravda, citing Moldova's General Police Inspectorate, puts it in Anenii Noi district and says the drone exploded about 40 m above the ground after striking the mast.) A second, jet-powered drone was detected at 10:26 heading toward Soroca in the north, and flights over northern and central Moldova were suspended. Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu said Russia would answer for its war crimes. That evening a third incident followed: according to Moldova's Defence Ministry and General Police Inspectorate (via Newsmaker, European Pravda and Ukrainska Pravda), a drone entered Moldovan airspace at around 20:45 and exploded after colliding with trees in a tree line right next to a highway near Brănești in Orhei district, in the centre of the country. Shortly before midnight police said it had features typical of a jet-powered Geran. On 1 October they reported a main crater of about 50 cm across and 30 cm deep, damaged trees and traces of shockwave and heat within up to 30 m, two smaller craters (about 50 and 30 cm) on the roadside some 15 m away, and fragments scattered over roughly 120 m, including rear wing sections marked 'Geran-4', electronic modules and propulsion parts, among them a heat-damaged jet engine. No casualties were reported.
ISW links the 24 September crashes to two incidents on 23 September. The first was a fire that destroyed the power system and backup generator of a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska, Poland. Deputy PM Krzysztof Gawkowski called it sabotage aimed at Ukraine's military internet access, though no perpetrator has been officially named. The second was a 45-minute halt at Berlin-Brandenburg airport after an unconfirmed drone sighting. ISW assesses that intentional and accidental Russian drone incursions are likely part of a Kremlin effort to normalise airspace violations by making them more frequent. It also says growing Western intelligence warnings suggest Moscow is diversifying its means of attack, citing Lithuanian reports of possible container-launched Gerberas in the Mediterranean. Euromaidan Press adds a political angle: on 29 September 46 opposition lawmakers filed a motion to suspend pro-EU President Maia Sandu (67 of 101 votes needed, then a referendum within 30 days). Ukrainian analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko argues the timing is deliberate, a pro-Russian destabilisation campaign; this is his assessment, not an established finding.
russia May Have Moved 51P6A Launchers From Kapustin Yar Test Range to Launch RM-48U Missiles From S-400 Systems
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express discusses a theory from the OSINT analyst AS-22, posted with imagery on X. The theory holds that Russia took 51P6A launchers from the Kapustin Yar test range and uses them to fire RM-48U missiles from S-400 systems against ground targets in Ukraine. It builds on a report from Ukrainian Defence Intelligence in August 2026, which said up to 17 S-400 launchers had been adapted to fire the RM-48U. The article says 30 51P6A launchers were at Kapustin Yar in early 2022 and only 14 by early 2025, but it does not say where these counts come from. It also says 51P6A launchers were seen exercising near the Ukrainian border without their radars, and that footage from autumn 2023 shows launches from 51P6A launchers at Kapustin Yar.
The 51P6A is a heavy S-400 launcher built for the long-range 40N6 interceptor, which has a stated range of 380–400 km. It can be told apart from the standard S-400 launcher by its chassis: the Belarusian MZKT-7930 instead of the Russian BAZ-64022. Defense Express describes the RM-48U only as an operational-tactical missile for the S-400, first announced by Russia in autumn 2023, and gives no range or other specifications. The article hedges throughout ('may have moved', 'may indicate'). Defense Express calls the theory 'reasonable' but does not present it as confirmed.
This is a single-source report from the Ukrainian outlet Defense Express, a party-aligned source, and has not been independently corroborated.
Ukrainian drones hit oil depot in Rostov region and industrial facility in Krasnodar Krai
2026-09-24
Ukrainian drones struck targets in Russia's Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai on the night of 23–24 September 2026. Rostov governor Yuri Slyusar said air defences shot down drones over the city of Taganrog and over the Kagalnitsky and Neklinovsky districts. He said office buildings at an oil depot in Kagalnitsky district were damaged by what he called falling drone debris, with no fire and no casualties.
In Krasnodar Krai, the regional emergency headquarters reported a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in Dinsky district after drone debris fell on it. No casualties were reported. Russia's Defence Ministry said it shot down 40 Ukrainian drones overnight across Russian regions and occupied Crimea.
The strike is part of Ukraine's ongoing long-range drone campaign against Russian fuel and industrial infrastructure in the south. Ukrainska Pravda notes a Ukrainian claim that more than 45% of Russia's oil refining capacity had been knocked out as of 21 September, following a recent strike on the Moscow refinery. That figure has not been independently verified. The damage reported this night was limited.
Казахстан проводит масштабные стратегические учения «Батыл Тойтарыс – 2026»
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoye Obozreniye reports that CSTO member Kazakhstan is holding the strategic command-staff exercise 'Batyl Toitarys 2026' in September. Around 7,000 troops and some 2,000 weapons and vehicles are said to take part. The exercise has four components: land ('Aibalta 2026'), air ('Ashyk Aspan 2026'), naval, on the Caspian ('Khazar'), and territorial/inter-agency ('Beket 2026'). According to the outlet, the CSTO Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian region are running a linked exercise, 'Rubezh 2026', with about 1,500 troops, more than 300 vehicles and 115 UAVs.
The article describes the exercise as heavily shaped by lessons from the Ukraine war. At the Sary-Shagan range, units practised repelling massed air attacks. The drills covered layered air defence, air-defence ambushes, external target cueing, rapid relocation and countering several types of drone. Radars and EW systems were linked into a single reconnaissance picture, in effect an air-defence 'system of systems'. The drone element had two parts: using the army's own UAVs and FPV drones, and defending against enemy ones with EW, air defence, camouflage, field fortifications and manoeuvre. At the Matybulak range, troops practised small-group and trench combat and reinforced trenches and shelters against drones. The article also mentions ground robotic systems (earlier trialled at the 'Shaiqas' event), a digital headquarters, and AI-assisted automated command systems for decision support.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a Russian outlet and has not been independently verified. The figures and exercise details have not been checked against Kazakh MoD or CSTO statements.
Як працює 413-й полк «Рейд»: Євген Карась про знищення С-400 та діпстрайки по росії
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
In a radio interview on Army FM on 23 September 2026, Yevhen Karas (callsign "Vortex"), commander of the 413th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment "Raid" of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, said the regiment destroyed a Russian S-400 air defence system together with four missiles that had been used against Kyiv, adding that many had doubted such a system could even be found. He also claimed that one Ukrainian crew destroyed four Buk air defence systems in a single day, but said repeating such results has become harder because Russia now positions its systems farther apart.
According to Karas, the regiment operates at ranges "from zero to two thousand" kilometres with long-range strike drones, operational-depth drones, reconnaissance platforms, bomber drones, FPVs, interceptor drones and long-range reconnaissance-strike complexes; some operators are qualified on around 30 systems. He said the 413th pioneered systematic long-range strikes into Russian territory and was reorganised to expand that capability, and that the resulting kill zone forces Russian units to keep equipment 50 km or more from the front in some areas.
This is a single-source report from the Ukrainian MoD outlet ArmyInform, based on claims by a Ukrainian commander (a party to the conflict), and has not been independently corroborated.
Danish-Ukrainian startup BlueShadow plans armed sea-drone swarms to shoot down Russian attack drones over Odesa
2026-09-23
BlueShadow, a Danish maritime-defence startup, is building a system called BlueDragon to protect Odesa against Russian attack drones. Euromaidan Press, citing Defender Media, reports that BlueDragon would use autonomous swarms of armed sea drones to shoot down Russian attack drones. The company also says it has built an open software platform that can help intercept Shahed-type drones. BlueShadow's core software pulls together data from maritime sensors, commercial feeds and open sources, merges it into a single operational picture, and uses AI to detect threats. The report does not explain how the sea drones would actually engage aerial targets, such as their sensors, weapons or how they would coordinate with Ukrainian air defence.
BlueDragon is not in service. It is a prototype in testing. The company is aiming for Ukrainian Defence Ministry certification in late 2026 and plans to deploy it in spring 2027. BlueShadow's other product, BlueSentry, is a separate system for protecting ports, offshore wind farms, undersea cables and maritime borders against hybrid attacks. The company plans to launch BlueSentry in the Baltic and North Seas in October 2026.
Founder Charles Maher is a former US Navy officer who commanded a nuclear-powered submarine. According to the report, almost his entire engineering team works in Ukraine and uses more than 15 Ukrainian suppliers. The Ukrainian fund Resist.UA has signed a letter of intent to invest an undisclosed sum in BlueShadow's €2 million pre-seed round. This summer, Resist.UA launched Resist 2.0, an Estonia-based fund that aims to raise €50 million for Ukrainian defence-tech companies. The same article also reports that FPV drone maker TAF Industries plans to start co-production in Denmark with Upteko. The article presents both deals as ways to get Ukrainian technology into allied markets while Ukraine's own arms-export procedures remain slow.
Belarus launches combat readiness inspection of its Air Force and Air Defence Forces
2026-09-23
Belarus has begun an operational (combat) readiness inspection of its Air Force and Air Defence Forces, according to Alexander Volfovich, State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council, as quoted by TASS on 23 September 2026. The inspection was ordered by President Alexander Lukashenko and is part of a series of checks across the security apparatus: the Ministry of Internal Affairs was inspected recently, and the week before a tank battalion of a mechanised brigade underwent a surprise inspection, which Volfovich said it passed 'quite well'.
Volfovich stressed the significance of this inspection, saying the Air Force and Air Defence Forces are on combat duty and protect not only Belarus's air borders but also the outer perimeter of the Russia-Belarus Union State. They must be ready for unexpected tasks and for defending critical infrastructure, he said. The results will be analysed and reported to the president. No details were given on the scale, the units involved or the duration.
The source is Russian state news agency TASS quoting a Belarusian government official; the information has not been independently verified.
Russia adapts to Ukraine's middle-strike drone campaign with mobile fire groups, Rubicon interceptors and Starlink jammers
2026-09-23
According to a Kyiv Independent field report from the southern front, Russian forces have adapted to Ukraine's expanded "middle strike" campaign. That campaign uses drones against targets from roughly 35 km (the end of FPV range) out to about 300 km behind the line. Within weeks of the campaign being scaled up in the south, Russia changed logistics routes and fielded new countermeasures. Columns carrying high-value cargo are now often escorted by mobile fire groups, some riding on the vehicles and some posted at intervals along key routes such as the E58 highway to Crimea. Russia's elite Rubicon drone unit has also published dozens of videos of its interceptor teams downing Starlink-equipped Hornet drones and other middle-strike drones. The commander of Ukraine's 422nd Unmanned Systems Regiment, Mykola "Tyson" Kolesnyk, said these measures now bring down "a certain percentage" of Ukrainian drones but have not critically changed his unit's work. He also said that moving Rubicon's interceptor teams to the rear to guard the highways has let more Ukrainian fixed-wing drones cross the front uncontested.
The report also describes Russian efforts to take away Ukraine's Starlink advantage. Starlink was cut off for Russian forces in early February 2026 after mandatory terminal registration through Ukraine's Diia app was introduced. Since then, Russian fixed-wing drones, from the tactical Molniya to the long-range Geran class, have increasingly been fitted with decentralized mesh radio modems to keep their links and video feeds under Ukrainian EW. Russia has announced its own satellite internet system, Rassvet, but its rollout has suffered setbacks, including a satellite that reportedly fell from the sky and others that did not reach their intended orbits. Russia is also testing several Starlink jammers. The most prominent is the Peresvet-M, which according to Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskretnov floods the terminal's uplink channel. Beskretnov said it can deny Starlink over about 20 km² and has been deployed to protect key targets in Crimea.
Kolesnyk said his regiment, working with the SBU's Alpha centre, destroyed a first Russian Starlink jammer on 14 June 2026 and has since helped destroy at least five such systems. He described them as bulky and vulnerable because of their large power needs. About two weeks before the interview, according to Kolesnyk, Russia began running the jammers from the electricity grid instead of generators. He said the unit felt their effect only once and that it is still unclear whether Russia will scale the jammers up or whether they are mainly an information operation. The regiment says it struck a substation in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast that powered radars, EW equipment and Starlink jammers, and that Russian air defence downed two of the four Zozulia drones sent. All these claims come from a Ukrainian unit that is a party to the conflict and have not been independently confirmed.
Ночью сбито 514 БПЛА; сотни беспилотников шли на Москву
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The Russian milblogger channel Dva Majora reports on the Ukrainian drone attack on Russia in the night of 22 to 23 September. In a first post it states that 'hundreds of drones' were heading for Moscow, and that the men of the mobile fire groups stood between the UAVs and 'our homes'; the post is accompanied by a video and gives no further details on the Moscow direction.
A later post repeats a claim by the Russian Ministry of Defence that 514 fixed-wing UAVs were shot down overnight over the Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, Voronezh, Oryol, Kaluga, Lipetsk, Tambov, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Smolensk, Saratov, Samara, Ulyanovsk and Rostov regions, Krasnodar Krai, Crimea, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, and over the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The figure of 514 is therefore an MoD claim relayed by the milblogger, not the channel's own count. The geographic spread, from the border regions to the Volga and the Urals foothills, points to a very large, wide-front attack if the claim is accurate; the posts say nothing about damage or casualties.
This is a single-source report from the Russian milblogger channel Dva Majora, partly repeating a claim by the Russian MoD as a warring party; it reflects a personal/editorial Telegram voice, not itself a position of the Russian MoD, milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the figures are not independently corroborated.
«Паук» слушает небо: акустическая система обнаружения БПЛА
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoe Obozrenie (Topwar), in a piece by Kirill Ryabov, describes 'Pauk' ('Spider'), a Russian acoustic system for detecting drones. It is a domestic development by a resident company of the 'Ushkuynik' science and industry centre; the company itself is not named. The system was first reported by the Russian daily Izvestia on 22 September. Instead of radar, Pauk uses a network of small modules with microphones, a processor and a radio link; the modules pick up the characteristic noise of a UAV, recognise it with neural-network algorithms and pass the data to an operator console.
According to the developer, a module can hear a small FPV drone at about 200 m, while larger drones with petrol engines are detected at more than 1 km. The modules come in three housings: a rectangular one for fixed placement, a dart-shaped one that can be dropped from the air, and a spherical 'hedgehog' with spikes for placement in vegetation. They run for 3 to 30 days depending on the battery, and solar-powered versions are said to run almost indefinitely. The recommended layout is a checkerboard pattern with modules tens of metres apart and overlapping zones, so that long perimeters can be monitored.
The author stresses that the claimed performance still has to be confirmed in independent trials and that Pauk has yet to find a customer, so there is no indication that it is in service or in use in Ukraine. The system fits a wider trend of cheap, passive acoustic sensor networks against low-flying drones, which Ukraine has also used at scale. This is a single-source report from Voennoe Obozrenie (a Russian military news site, relaying Izvestia and developer claims), not independently corroborated.
Ukrainian expert: Russia's best missile defences ring Moscow, leaving other strategic sites exposed to Ukraine's emerging ballistic missiles
2026-09-23
Vadym Kushnikov, a military analyst with the Ukrainian defence portal Militarnyi, argued on Ukrainian Radio (reported 23 September 2026 and picked up by Ukrinform, UNIAN and Euromaidan Press) that Russia cannot protect all of its strategic sites against Ukrainian ballistic missiles. In his assessment, Russia does have systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles — S-300, S-400 and the newer S-500 "Prometey" — but it has concentrated the most capable ones around the capital. He said the most modern S-500 complexes, with 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 interceptors derived from the Soviet-era A-135 Moscow missile-defence system, are deployed in Moscow Oblast.
Elsewhere, Kushnikov said, Russia suffers a shortage of air-defence complexes, including S-300 and S-400, relative to the size of its territory — a gap he said is visible in satellite imagery, although exact inventories are not public. According to UNIAN's account, he also pointed to Russia having spent down its interceptor stocks, and concluded that even a strong air defence cannot cover every strategic object across such a vast country, leaving regions outside Moscow more exposed to massed and combined Ukrainian strikes. This matters as Ukraine's deep-strike arsenal shifts from foreign-supplied to domestic weapons: alongside the Neptune and Flamingo cruise missiles, Ukraine now fields the Sapsan, an Iskander-class ballistic missile with a range of about 500 km that President Zelenskyy confirmed in combat use in late 2025. A domestic ballistic missile would allow deep strikes into Russia without Western approval.
Kushnikov was frank about the constraints on the Ukrainian side: production sites, many of them in eastern Ukraine, are direct targets of Russian strikes, and key components — notably solid-fuel rocket motors and guidance for a warhead travelling at over five times the speed of sound on a ballistic trajectory — are hard to manufacture; scaling up production is a separate challenge. He gave no concrete timeline for when Ukraine's ballistic missiles will be available in quantity. This is an expert opinion from a Ukrainian analyst, not an official assessment, and the claims about Russian deployments and shortages have not been independently verified.
RUSI Reports That Ukraine Uses PC-9 Aircraft Armed with Miniguns to Shoot Down Shahed Drones
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express, citing a RUSI commentary by senior research fellow Justin Bronk, reports that a Ukrainian volunteer group operates at least one Pilatus PC-9 turboprop trainer fitted with pods carrying 7.62mm Minigun machine guns to intercept Russian one-way attack drones. According to RUSI the aircraft has shot down several jet-powered Geran-3/Geran-4 drones, in daylight and at night, although its limited performance forces it to dive to reach sufficient speed; the operators reportedly regard about 300 knots as the minimum needed to reliably catch the jet-powered models, which cruise at roughly 350–500 km/h.
The RUSI piece uses this case in a wider argument for a NATO multinational drone-interception squadron that can counter jet-powered Gerans at night, in poor weather and under GPS denial without expending fighter jets and costly air-to-air missiles; Bronk favours the L-39NG over slower turboprops such as the A-29 Super Tucano. Defense Express adds that the PC-9 (max speed about 600 km/h, six hardpoints) is flown by Croatia, Ireland and Slovenia and may be relatively easy to obtain second-hand, and notes that no public evidence of Ukrainian PC-9 use exists beyond RUSI's claim.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express, a Ukrainian defence outlet, relaying a RUSI report; the details have not been independently confirmed.
Unidentified drone loitered near NATO's Aegis Ashore site at Redzikowo; guard unit called Poland's 112 emergency line
2026-09-22
On 15 September 2026 surveillance systems detected a drone about half a kilometre from Redzikowo in northern Poland, home of the US Navy's Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence installation that forms part of NATO's missile shield. According to Euromaidan Press, citing the Polish outlet Onet, the drone operated near the base for roughly five minutes and the military unit guarding the site followed a set procedure that included a call to 112, Poland's civilian emergency number, rather than engaging it. The Polish Defence Ministry says it established where the operator was flying from and notified the relevant services, including the police, but declined on security grounds to say whether any attempt was made to neutralise the drone or whether counter-drone systems were activated.
The origin of the drone is not established. The article itself refers to an "unknown drone" and names no one responsible; the headline's link to Russia rests on the comparison with September 2025, not on any attribution of this incident. The fact that the ministry traced the operator's launch position suggests a locally operated drone rather than a long-range Russian strike drone, but that is not stated explicitly. Euromaidan Press contrasts the episode with September 2025, when around 19 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace and Polish and allied F-16s and F-35s shot down only four of them, and with Ukraine's reported interception rate of 87.4% against Russian long-range drones.
The incident fits a wider concern about the protection of high-value NATO sites against small drones in peacetime, where guard units appear to depend on civilian police procedures rather than on an immediate engagement option. It came two days before Prime Minister Donald Tusk told parliament on 17 September that, according to NATO, Ukrainian and US intelligence assessments, Russia's plans include drone and missile strikes on countries backing Ukraine, Poland among them, possibly staged to look "accidental".
Unknown North Korean KN-23 Variant Can Reach 60–70 km Altitude, Posing New Challenge for Patriot Systems
2026-09-22SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express analyst Ivan Kyrychevskyi, citing Janes, reports that North Korea launched two KN-23 ballistic missiles on 20 September 2026. The first flew 440 km and reached an altitude of about 60 km; the second flew 590 km and peaked at about 70 km. Janes assessed that this may be a new KN-23 variant, possibly with a changed flight trajectory or warhead.
According to Defense Express, earlier KN-23 tests typically reached ranges of up to 690 km at maximum altitudes of roughly 37–60 km, while a test on 12 August 2026 went as high as about 90 km. The outlet interprets the current experiments with flight altitude as an attempt to make the missile harder for Patriot systems to intercept. That matters for Ukraine because Russia has fired North Korean KN-23s at Ukrainian targets, and Patriot is Ukraine's main defence against ballistic missiles.
Defense Express also argues that the KN-23 relies heavily on Russian technology and documentation, calling North Korea's defence industry effectively a 'branch' of Russia's military-industrial complex, and refers to a 2024 RUSI study on Russian deliveries of materials, components and blueprints for KN-23 production. The link to Patriot evasion is the outlet's own analysis, not a stated North Korean aim. This is a single-source report from Defense Express (a Ukrainian defence outlet, i.e. a source from a warring party, drawing on Janes), not independently corroborated.
Українські захисники з початку року знешкодили понад 350 тисяч ворожих дронів
2026-09-22SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform, citing Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, reports that units of the Ukrainian Defence Forces have neutralised more than 350,000 Russian drones since the start of 2026. According to the ministry, more than 320,000 of them were fixed-wing and multicopter drones downed by the Defence Forces' unmanned systems units: about 220,000 fixed-wing drones ('wings') and 100,000 multicopters.
In addition, unmanned systems units, mobile fire groups and army aviation together shot down 31,000 Shahed-type drones. The ministry says all kills were recorded on video in the DELTA battle-management system and verified by the Brave1 defence-innovation cluster. The same article also repeats Ukrainian claims of wider Russian losses since the full-scale invasion, including more than 1.5 million personnel killed and wounded.
The breakdown is notable because it indicates that most drone kills are now made by Ukraine's own drone units (for example with interceptor drones) rather than by classic air defence, and that fixed-wing reconnaissance and strike drones make up the largest share. The figures cannot be checked independently, and it is not clear whether 'neutralised' includes electronic-warfare effects. This is a single-source report from ArmyInform relaying Ukrainian MoD claims (a party to the conflict), not independently corroborated.
Moldova logged 39 Russian drone incursions in eight months of 2026, versus 17 in all of 2025; Lithuania hardens new substation near Kaliningrad against Shahed strikes
2026-09-22
After a meeting of Moldova's National Security Council on 21 September 2026, President Maia Sandu said the country had recorded 39 Russian drone incursions into its airspace in the first eight months of 2026, against 17 in the whole of 2025. Euromaidan Press lists recent cases: on 8 September a drone tracked over Moldova held up seven flights, including Volodymyr Zelenskyy's aircraft leaving for King Harald V's funeral in Norway; in August a blast near the village of Talmaza marked the third airspace breach in nine days; and on 18 September a loud explosion near Chișinău was followed by police finding drone wreckage. The sources do not say whether the drones strayed from Russian strikes on Ukraine or were aimed at Moldova.
Sandu described Moldova's means as portable anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft machine guns and electronic-warfare equipment, capable mostly of protecting individual pieces of critical infrastructure, and said "three decades of ignoring air defense will not be paid off in five" years. Moldova has received €120 million from the EU to buy a medium-range air-defence system, is still building an MD-Alert public warning system (costed at €5 million), and is pursuing data-sharing with neighbours and energy-infrastructure protection. Unlike Poland and Romania, which scramble fighters (Romanian F-16s have downed drones over the Danube delta), Moldova has neither an alliance behind it nor interceptor aircraft.
The same pressure is visible further north on the flank. According to Ukrainska Pravda, citing Reuters via European Pravda, Lithuanian grid operator Litgrid is designing its new Gizai substation, about 30 km west of Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, with reinforced-concrete structures to shield transformers from drone strikes, a fence able to withstand an explosives-laden lorry and sensors to detect tunnelling. CEO Andrius Šemeškevičius said the site is designed "for a new reality", including protection against multiple Shahed drones carrying 100 kg of explosives; Lithuanian armed forces are advising Litgrid. Where Moldova counts incidents it cannot intercept, Lithuania is building passive protection into infrastructure in anticipation of them, against the backdrop of Tusk's warning that intelligence points to Russian plans for hybrid attacks on Ukraine's backers.
Засіб проти КАБів: ефективніше збивати не бомби, а літаки, які їх запускають
2026-09-21SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform, the information agency of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, reports comments by Colonel Artem Skuratovskyi, head of the air defence department of Ukraine's 7th Rapid Response Corps, made on Radio NV on 21 September 2026. He argued that the most effective answer to Russian guided glide bombs (KABs) is not to intercept the bombs but to shoot down the aircraft that release them.
According to Skuratovskyi, Russia uses KABs intensively against infantry positions, and in one month it directed about 120 KABs at the Sumy direction alone. In his view the situation will only improve once Ukrainian aviation can hit Russian aircraft at ranges comparable to the KAB release distance. For that, Ukraine needs long-range air-to-air missiles such as Meteor (for the Gripen), AIM-120 (for the F-16) and MICA (for the Mirage).
The argument reflects a long-standing Ukrainian view: glide bombs are released far outside the reach of most ground-based air defence, and the bombs themselves are hard and costly to intercept, so the carrier aircraft is the more practical target. The article gives no new data on intercepts or aircraft losses. This is a single-source report from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD media, i.e. a party to the conflict), not independently corroborated.
Vluchnyk unveils Zorelit v5 interceptor drone, claims 416 km/h against jet-powered Gerans
2026-09-21
Ukrainian company Vluchnyk (CEO Stepan Radiboh) has completed internal testing of the Zorelit v5 (also marketed as "Starship"), an interceptor drone purpose-built to down jet-powered Russian attack UAVs. Per Radiboh, the system "has completed all testing and is ready for military use"; Vluchnyk says it is open to direct contracts with military units and, once the drone receives official codification (a NATO Stock Number), will also list it in Ukraine's e-Points system, through which units earn points for confirmed strikes on Russian personnel and equipment.
The manufacturer states a top speed of 416 km/h and a range of up to 47 km on a single charge; at a cruising speed of around 200 km/h, endurance is roughly 17 minutes. The warhead weighs 300-600 g. An optional AI-based system provides automatic target detection/tracking with terminal guidance in the final approach, and the drone can be integrated with the SkyMap system for automatic navigation to the target area. Vluchnyk says it is designed to intercept Russian reconnaissance UAVs, Gerbera decoys, Geran-2, and the faster, jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 variants.
Zorelit v5 was developed from the earlier Zorelit v4, which the company says has already seen combat use, entered service, and received a NATO Stock Number. Price is listed at UAH 89,500 (about US$2,000). The unveiling adds to a growing roster of Ukrainian interceptor drones aimed at jet-powered Shahed/Geran threats (including the previously tracked STING S and an SBU counterintelligence-developed interceptor mentioned in the same reporting) — this is not a first-of-kind capability. Note: Zorelit v4's combat record and NATO Stock Number are company self-reports, not independently verified by any outlet, and no combat kill claim yet exists for Zorelit v5 itself — only completed internal testing.
Ukrainian forces strike Russian Kasta radar in Donetsk Oblast — second such hit in a month
2026-09-21
The Kasta-2E2 (39N6) is a mobile Russian radar system designed to detect aircraft, missiles and drones at low altitude, with a range Ukraine's General Staff puts at up to 150 km. It functions as part of Russia's early-warning and target-acquisition picture, feeding data to air-defence and strike systems, and is judged a high-value, capital-intensive asset — Kyiv put its cost at a minimum of US$60 million.
According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, on 20 September and the night of 20-21 September 2026, Ukrainian defence forces struck a Kasta radar station near the settlement of Pikuzy in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast. The same series of strikes also hit a Russian drone ground-control station near Dniproenerhiia (Donetsk Oblast) and a concentration of Russian troops near Staryi Khutir in Russia's Belgorod Oblast. The report does not specify whether the strike on the radar was carried out by drone, missile, or another munition, nor does it name the striking unit.
The General Staff frames this as the second Kasta radar hit within roughly a month, following a strike it confirmed in early September on a Kasta radar near Vyshneve, Zaporizhzhia Oblast — a different location in a different oblast. This means the "second time" framing most plausibly refers to a second Kasta-type radar being destroyed or damaged within a month, not confirmed repair and redeployment of the same physical unit; the article gives no evidence of repair or relocation between the two strikes. If accurate, the pattern still points to sustained Ukrainian targeting of Russia's low-altitude radar/ISR coverage. Cost figures and radar performance specs are Ukrainian government (General Staff) claims, not independently verified against Russian sources, and should be treated as claimed rather than confirmed.
Not Just More Drones: How Russia Is Changing Its Air Attacks With Jet-Powered Shaheds
2026-09-21SINGLE SOURCE
Russia has launched roughly 7,700 jet-powered ("reactive") Shahed/Geran drones since introducing the variant, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat said. In September 2026 Russia fired an estimated 1,800-1,900 jet-powered units, down from about 2,800 in July, but drones are now airborne nearly around the clock. Ihnat stressed the change is not just about growing volume but about employment: strike packages increasingly alternate or combine jet-powered Shaheds with conventional propeller-driven ones and other weapons rather than relying on a single type.
In early September, Russia reportedly launched several waves of large numbers of classic (propeller) Shaheds toward Ukraine's western regions via northern routes, preceded by heavy waves of jet-powered drones — a sequenced combination rather than simultaneous mixed use. Weather reportedly influences which drone variant Russia deploys on a given night, since conditions affect Ukrainian detection and engagement. Ukrainian forces report intercepting roughly 60% of jet-powered UAVs at various flight stages, with aviation playing a significant role, but Ihnat cautioned that not all current Ukrainian air-defense systems can effectively engage the faster jet-powered variant, and available interceptor missiles remain insufficient in quantity.
Ihnat said Ukraine needs manufacturers to deliver cheaper, more effective interception systems at scale, and faster warning from Western partners on missile launches to improve response time. This is a single-source report from a Ukrainian military-affiliated outlet, not independently corroborated, and the Ukrainian side has an interest in emphasizing the evolving and growing nature of the threat it is defending against.
Kalashnikov Unveils 'Zveroboy' Drone-Interceptor Air Defense Complex
2026-09-21SINGLE SOURCE
Kalashnikov Concern has publicly unveiled "Zveroboy" ("Beast-Hunter"), a dedicated counter-drone interception complex, at the Fourth All-Russian Weapons Forum in Moscow on 15 September 2026. Unlike passive armor add-ons, Zveroboy is an active air-defense system built specifically to intercept small reconnaissance/attack drones: it comes in stationary, trailer-mounted, and vehicle-mounted configurations, built around a remote-operated combat module. Detection and tracking use an electro-optical suite (TV, infrared, laser rangefinder) plus a retractable radar mast, feeding a remote operator console.
Rather than missiles, guns, EW, or nets, Zveroboy intercepts targets kinetically using small interceptor drones called "Kraken" — VTOL quadcopter-tailsitters carried in launch containers (reported as three containers of three Kraken each, nine per unit). A baseline camera-equipped variant and a thermal-imaging "Kraken-N" for night use are described. The system is pitched as specialized against slow reconnaissance drones (cited example: Ukraine's "Leleka," ~70-80 km/h) at short range, and reportedly less effective against faster attack drones above roughly 150 km/h. Status is prototype/testing per the source.
A companion Topwar piece claims "Western press" assessed the system and noted Ukraine has long fielded comparable interceptor systems — but this claim is unsourced: no specific outlet, article, or direct quote is cited, only a vague paraphrase. This should be treated as an unverified claim by the Russian outlet, not confirmed Western coverage. Both items are single-source reporting from a Russian military-enthusiast outlet, not independently verified, and Russian sources have an interest in presenting domestic drone-defense hardware favorably — including inflating claims of Western attention.
Norway's Nammo to develop engine for IRIS-T SLX air-defense missile
2026-09-20
IRIS-T SLX is the long-range variant of the German Diehl Defence IRIS-T SLM air-defense system already fielded by Ukraine. It roughly doubles the intercept range to about 80 km, targeting fighter jets, bombers, and long-endurance drones/support aircraft, and can be fired from the same launcher as SLM missiles for mixed loadouts, reusing existing SLM radar, tactical operations center, and software infrastructure.
Norwegian firm Nammo, at its Raufoss plant, has begun developing the SLX's new rocket motor — a "dual-pulse" design that splits the motor into two sections with a tailored thrust profile to extend range, described by Nammo as an essentially new development effort with little carryover from earlier motors. Diehl is targeting the first Safety Integrity Level (SIL) development firing test in 2027, with serial production planned to start around 2029.
Ukraine relevance: IRIS-T SLS/SLM systems already in Ukrainian service have reportedly destroyed over 1,000 Russian targets since 2022, with a claimed 95% hit rate against cruise missiles and drones. The longer-ranged SLX, once fielded, would extend that intercept envelope and could reduce Ukraine's/Europe's dependence on U.S. Patriot interceptors amid ongoing shortages — though fielding is still several years away. Note: the militarnyi.com article itself could not be directly fetched (Cloudflare protection); content was corroborated via Breaking Defense's reporting on the same Nammo/Diehl development, and the 1,000+ targets/95% hit-rate figures for Ukraine are as reported there, not independently cross-checked against a second primary source.
Сили оборони уразили ЗРК «Бук-М3», РЛС «Небо-У», виробництво БПЛА та пункти управління зс рф
2026-09-20SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform (a Ukrainian military outlet) reports on behalf of the General Staff that on 20 September a Buk-M3 air-defence system near Ukrainka (Zaporizhzhia region), a Nebo-U radar near Balka (Donetsk), a drone-production site in Severodonetsk (Luhansk), a command post near Zoriane and a UAV control centre near Staromykhailivka were struck. The source provides no independent imagery or damage assessment.
Note: this is a single-source report from a Ukrainian state-affiliated outlet (ArmyInform) and is not independently verified; the General Staff has an interest in reporting successes.
Large-scale Ukrainian drone strike on Moscow: Kapotnya refinery and Sofyino warehouses reportedly on fire; Zelensky announces new long-range operations
2026-09-19
In the night of 19-20 September 2026, Moscow and Moscow Oblast came under a large-scale drone attack. According to Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channels and Exilenova+ (via Ukrainska Pravda), the drones flew deep into Russian territory in groups heading for Moscow. A major fire reportedly broke out at the Sofyino logistics technopark outside Moscow and at the oil refinery in the Kapotnya district. Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said an attack by drones heading for Moscow had been repelled, that emergency services were working at sites where debris fell, and that Russian air defences had supposedly destroyed 151 drones in total. That figure is a Russian claim and has not been independently verified.
Based on photos and videos circulating overnight, Ukrainska Pravda, citing the Russian outlet ASTRA and Exilenova+, reports that the Kapotnya refinery is on fire and that the ELOU-AVT-6 unit may have been hit. These early assessments are preliminary. The refinery has a capacity of 11 million tonnes of oil per year and, according to the source, supplies about 40% of Moscow's fuel market and 70% of the Moscow region's demand for petrol and aviation fuel. The sources contain no official confirmation of the damage, the scale of the attack, or the effect on fuel supply.
Separately, Meduza (19 September, 23:23) reported that President Zelensky, after talks with Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi and Defence Minister Yevhen Khmara, authorised 'new long-range operations in response to Russian strikes', saying Ukraine is preparing to expand its long-range capabilities, without giving details. As context Meduza cites a 40-day campaign announced in June 2026, in which Ukraine reportedly hit about 20 Wildberries warehouses, 25 oil refineries and other energy infrastructure, and to which Russia responded with intensified ballistic missile strikes. The sources do not explicitly link the announcement to the Moscow attack.
What are the "S-300 Clone" and GAM-67 missiles in the US's new $2.68B Ukraine aid package?
2026-09-19
The US State Department approved a $2.68 billion aid package for Ukraine on September 18, 2026, financed through European partners and unused US military aid funding, per Defense Express. Two line items in the paperwork caught analysts' attention for their unusual names: "S-300 Clone" missiles and "GAM-67." The package also covers sustainment items — spare parts, consumables, software, repair/return support, and engineering, technical, and logistical services.
Experts cited by Defense Express and Defense Mirror argue the naming is misleading: despite the "clone" label, the missile is not a replica of the Soviet 5V55 used in legacy S-300 systems, but a new US development with enhanced characteristics and a more modern guidance principle, intended to be fired from Ukraine's existing Soviet-era S-300 launchers (which have plenty of launchers but a dwindling missile supply, since Russia will not sell more). GAM-67 likewise reuses the designation of an unrealized 1950s American anti-radar missile project, but is described as a new development intended for medium-range systems. Notably, the US government itself did not disclose the index, technical characteristics, or manufacturer of either missile in its official statement, so these identifications are analyst inference, not official confirmation. The article links this to a September 2024 statement by then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin about "designing and building a substitute" for the Soviet S-300 and the R-27 air-to-air missile.
For Ukraine's air-defense posture, this matters because it would extend the operational life of Soviet-legacy S-300 batteries by feeding them Western-made replacement rounds. Given the lack of official technical disclosure, this should be treated as informed speculation about weapon identity rather than a confirmed capability announcement.
Wild Hornets' STING S interceptor claims ~10 Geran-4 and several Geran-5 kills and heads for mass production; Geran-5 seen with internalised turbojet
2026-09-19
According to Militarnyi, a crew (call sign 'Rubin') of the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment shot down a Russian Geran-5 small cruise missile around 19-20 September with a new interceptor drone, the STING S, by direct collision; the video was published by manufacturer Wild Hornets. Euromaidan Press, citing a Wild Hornets representative interviewed by NV on 22 September, now reports that the STING S has destroyed about ten Geran-4 jet drones and several Geran-5s during limited deployment. Wild Hornets calls it an entirely new product rather than an upgrade of its existing STING, developed from early 2026 specifically for jet interception, and says it plans to begin mass production about a month after combat tests are completed. Detailed specifications and the airframe's appearance have still not been disclosed.
Wild Hornets has also developed a remote-control system, Hornet Vision Ctrl, that lets experienced pilots operate interceptors across several sectors at once; it assists operators rather than intercepting automatically — the company says it knows of no fully automatic interception system proven in combat — and acknowledges that some control aspects still need refinement for future targets flying at 700-800 km/h. Faster jet drones cut the reaction time of Ukrainian mobile fire groups from about a minute to as little as six seconds. President Zelensky has said 67 companies are working on interceptors, two of which have completed combat tests. The Geran-5 is described as a jet-powered drone-missile about 6 m long with up to 5.5 m wingspan, a ~90 kg warhead, a range of roughly 950-1,000 km, 450-600 km/h cruise speed and a ceiling of around 6 km, powered by a Chinese TELEFLY TF-TJ2000A turbojet (200 kgf) with a jam-resistant 12-channel Kometa antenna and 3G/4G modems.
A second Militarnyi report, based on SBU and Wild Hornets interceptor footage, says Russia has moved the Geran-5's turbojet from an external nacelle into an internal fuselage bay, which could raise speed and range but costs internal volume for fuel or payload. The kill tallies and footage are Ukrainian and manufacturer claims and have not been independently confirmed. The STING S is a separate system from the SBU's catapult-launched jet interceptor (e-20260920-02) and Vluchnyk's Zorelit v5 (e-20260922-02), both also aimed at jet-powered Gerans.
US Approves $2.68 Billion Air Defense Sale to Ukraine, Including S-300 Clone and GAM-67 Missile Systems
2026-09-19
The US Department of State on 18 September 2026 approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Ukraine worth an estimated $2.68 billion, covering what the State Department calls 'Air Defence Development Upgrades and related equipment and services.' Congress was formally notified late Friday, the standard step required before such a sale can proceed, giving lawmakers a statutory window to object.
The package includes S-300 Clone missiles, GAM-67 missiles, Range-Extended Air Defence Laser Guided Rocket (ADALGR) missile systems, Improvised Transporter Erector Launcher (ITEL) 1.5 units with mobile launching system modification kits, and RPS 202 counter-drone radars, alongside spare parts, technical assistance and contractor logistics support. Notably, it does not include Patriot interceptors or NASAMS systems, which have featured in separate, earlier US notifications, including a Patriot launcher upgrade and sustainment package approved in November 2025.
Financing would combine European contributions with US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds appropriated under the Biden administration; the FMF portion would count as a US capital contribution to the Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on a 1:1 reimbursement basis — the fund created under the 2025 US-Ukraine minerals deal. The sale underscores Washington's continued reliance on Ukraine-funded, rather than US-gifted, arms transfers and on the reconstruction fund as a financing vehicle, as Ukraine braces for another winter of Russian strikes on its power grid and air defence network.
Ukraine unveils SBU jet-powered interceptor drone and reports kills on jet-powered Geran drones; Russian jet drone crashes near Chisinau
2026-09-18
On 19 September 2026 President Zelensky announced that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) has developed a new interceptor drone, already successfully deployed against jet-powered Shahed-type drones. According to Militarnyi, which picked up the report, the aircraft has delta-shaped wings and is launched from the ground by catapult. It would be the second publicly shown Ukrainian interceptor against jet drones, after the Alexa Spatium; four designs were reportedly field-tested by late August 2026.
Militarnyi reports that the interceptor downed a small Geran-5 cruise-missile-like system. Pravda reports that a second Russian jet-powered drone was shot down the same day, which Zelensky described as the second time in one day. These are Ukrainian claims; the sources contain no independent confirmation. Militarnyi describes the Geran-5 as roughly 6 m long, with a warhead of about 90 kg, a range of up to about 1,000 km, a cruising speed of 450-600 km/h and an altitude of up to 6 km. It is said to be based on the Iranian Karrar design, first documented in January 2026 and less numerous than the Geran-4.
Separately, Militarnyi reported on 18 September that a Russian jet drone crashed in a suburb of Chisinau, Moldova. The article text could not be retrieved; that item rests on the headline alone, so type, origin and cause are not established.
Russia demands Japan remove US Typhon missile systems deployed during Orient Shield
2026-09-18
According to Militarnyi, Russia has formally protested the temporary deployment of US Typhon missile systems in Japan during the Orient Shield exercise (8-24 September 2026, involving the US, Japan and Australia). Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova reportedly called the systems a threat to Russian security and the deployment absolutely unacceptable. Russia warned of compensatory countermeasures. The protest followed a visit by Putin to occupied islands that Japan claims as its Northern Territories.
The deployment took place on Japanese territory, including Hokkaido near the Russian Far East. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed it is purely temporary, with the systems redeploying to a US base by mid-October. It is the third Typhon deployment to Japan; earlier ones took place in 2025. China likewise condemned the deployment as evidence of Japan's accelerated remilitarization.
The Mobile Rapid Deployment Typhon (MRC Typhon) battery has four launchers with four cells each, able to fire subsonic Tomahawk cruise missiles for land strikes or SM-6 long-range air-defense missiles, packaged in standard shipping containers. The Russian position is a political claim; the source reports no concrete Russian military measures.
Poland Joins Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition for Ukraine
2026-09-18
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on September 18 that Poland has joined the anti-ballistic missile coalition supporting Ukraine. He made the announcement at a joint press conference with President Zelensky, held on the sidelines of a summit of the new eight-country Carpathian grouping in western Ukraine. 'From today, Poland is part of this major project... we have agreed on the forms and frameworks of this cooperation,' Tusk said, making Poland the coalition's eleventh member.
The coalition was formed in mid-July 2026 by Ukraine together with Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Its goal is the joint development of a new, cheaper air-defense system against ballistic missiles, intended as a complement to or alternative for the US-made Patriot system, on which Ukraine and many European states currently depend for American supplies. A prototype, codenamed Freyja, is expected in the first half of 2027. Zelensky stressed that Ukraine has developed unique wartime technologies it is prepared to share with partners.
Poland was notably absent from the original July announcement, which drew domestic criticism at the time; Tusk described this as 'a certain misunderstanding' that has now been resolved. For the tracker, this development matters as part of the broader European response to the sustained Russian ballistic-missile threat against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, and signals a shift toward European (co-)production of air-defense capability alongside continued reliance on US-supplied systems.
Russia ramps up ballistic strikes on Ukraine using converted S-400 missiles
2026-09-18
Russia has driven its ballistic missile campaign against Ukraine to record intensity through mass use of the RM48U — a converted training/target missile originally built on decommissioned S-400 interceptor missiles (48N6DM family) and used to train air-defence crews — according to a Reuters exclusive based on official Ukrainian data. The missiles are now fitted with warheads and fired from S-400 launch systems on a high, ballistic trajectory toward ground targets. The RM48U is less powerful and less accurate than Russia's primary short-range ballistic missile, the Iskander, deviating from intended targets by roughly 300 meters on average.
The scale is substantial: RM48Us made up more than half of the 228 ballistic and hypersonic missiles fired at Ukraine in July and early August 2026, and the tempo has since increased further. Ukraine estimates Russia's stockpile at around 400 RM48Us against only about 100 Iskanders, and Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) reports Russia plans to raise RM48U production to 480 units in 2026, up from 200 in 2025. A RUSI analyst notes this lets Russia conserve its scarcer precision weapons — Iskanders, KN-23s, and Zircons — for winter use.
The shift has had measurable consequences, including a deadly strike on a railway platform near Brovary in early August that forensic analysis attributed to an RM48U, while Russia's defense ministry claimed a different target. Ukraine's stock of Patriot interceptors — its only system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles — is nearly exhausted, and July 2026 saw the highest monthly civilian death toll since the start of the full-scale invasion. Reuters was unable to independently verify Ukraine's forensic findings, and Ukraine's air force has stopped publishing regular interception statistics since August, citing concerns about aiding enemy propaganda.
Ukraine Receives Australian Slinger 30mm Anti-Drone Systems
2026-09-17
Ukraine's armed forces have received Slinger anti-drone modules from the Australian company Electro Optic Systems (EOS), based in Canberra. The system is a remotely operated weapon station built around the 30 mm Bushmaster M230LF cannon, purpose-built to detect and destroy low-flying drones ranging from FPV kamikaze drones to reconnaissance UAVs.
Slinger pairs an Echodyne 4D radar with active electronic beamsteering to a 4-axis optoelectronic sighting unit that tracks independently of the gun in both elevation and azimuth, aided by an integrated wind sensor for precision. The fully stabilised mount, weighing under 400 kg, can track and engage moving drones beyond 800 metres using specialised 30x113mm ammunition fitted with radio-frequency proximity fuzes, allowing effective kills against small, fast-moving targets without requiring a direct hit.
In Ukraine the modules are being mounted on pickup trucks to form mobile counter-drone fire teams, and the system is also designed for integration onto light armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. The delivery is part of a broader 2023 agreement covering 160 units, with 110 intended for integration onto M113 APCs and 50 ordered by the company Praktika. The systems add a mobile, precision-guided layer to Ukraine's counter-UAS defenses against the ongoing Russian drone and Shahed threat.
Ukraine strikes 2 S-400 launchers in Russia's Bryansk Oblast, General Staff claims
2026-09-17
Ukraine's General Staff claims that overnight on Sept. 16-17, 2026, it struck two Russian S-400 launchers in the Vygonychi district of Bryansk Oblast. This claim has not been independently confirmed — no satellite imagery or other external verification is available — and the General Staff did not specify the extent of the damage to the launchers or the weapons or means used in the strike.
The target carries strategic weight: the S-400 is Russia's most advanced long-range air defense system, introduced in 2007, with an estimated cost of $500 million per system and a maximum range of roughly 400 kilometers. According to the article, Russia is increasingly using S-400 systems to launch ballistic missiles against Ukraine, straining Kyiv's limited stock of Patriot interceptors — which is why President Zelensky has prioritized strikes on Russian missile launchers.
The claim is part of a broader set of strikes the General Staff reported the same day, including a drone base, military warehouses in Donetsk Oblast, and troop concentrations in Kherson and Luhansk oblasts. The article also notes that international air-defense interceptor deliveries to Ukraine have dropped threefold compared with 2025 levels, underscoring the significance of any successful strike on Russian air-defense and missile-launch capability.
Ukraine's hidden RAM-2X strike drone: maker claims over 350 Russian systems destroyed
2026-09-17
Ukrainian manufacturer Ukrspecsystems, also known for its SHARK reconnaissance drones, has unveiled the RAM-2X after keeping it secret for two years: a loitering munition specifically employed against Russian S-400 and S-300 air defense systems and Iskander ballistic missile launchers. At its 2024 combat debut the drone had a range of about 140 km; this has since grown to 180 km, with 230 km achievable under optimal conditions and a recorded maximum range of 215.5 km. A single operator can fly it from anywhere in Ukraine, and an estimated 100 units and 250 trained teams field the system, often paired with SHARK-M reconnaissance drones for target designation.
The secrecy served two purposes, according to the maker: letting crews complete their operations before the adversary knew what was hitting them, and preventing Moscow from studying the weapon and developing countermeasures. Disclosure only followed after downed units fell into Russian hands and surfaced on social media; the system was then officially unveiled at the MSPO defense expo in Kielce, Poland.
The claim of more than 350 Russian systems destroyed since 2024 comes from Ukrspecsystems deputy director Andrii Rymaruk, who cites a current destruction rate of 50 to 60 pieces of equipment per month. This is a one-sided claim by the manufacturer itself, not independently confirmed by open sources. Defender Media separately reported a higher figure of over 1,000 targets struck over two years, but that count too traces back to Ukrainian/manufacturer reporting rather than independent OSINT verification.