Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
««„Браунінг“ може виїхати і патрулювати, чекати розсіювання» — поблизу Гуляйполя ворог ховає техніку в туманах» (ArmyInform: ''The Browning can drive out and patrol, waiting for the fog to lift': near Huliaipole the enemy hides vehicles in fog')
2026-10-29SINGLE SOURCE
Mykola Zinko, deputy commander of the unmanned systems battalion of Ukraine's 5th Separate Kyiv Assault Brigade, told Suspilne that Russian forces on the Huliaipole axis keep sending small infantry groups forward. They do so especially in fog and rain, when cars, motorcycles and heavy armoured vehicles also move. The most recent such vehicle push in the brigade's sector came about two weeks ago, also under fog. According to Zinko, the fog lifted suddenly while the vehicles were still crossing and had not yet reached the Ukrainian forward line, and Ukrainian drones destroyed several of them.
Zinko expects the weather to shape the coming months. Impassable mud would cut mobility and lead to far fewer assaults. Dry, frosty conditions with even light fog would bring many assaults. To counter this, the brigade relies on remote mining and armed UGVs: a UGV company with combat modules can send a .50-cal 'Browning' to patrol a sector and wait for the fog to lift, engaging anyone who tries to move through. The article describes a Russian practice of using poor visibility to cover vehicle movements against Ukraine's drone surveillance.
Single source: ArmyInform is a Ukrainian (MoD/defence) outlet; claims are not independently verified.
Russia's 90th Tank Division was apparently meant for the Druzhkivka axis, but a Ukrainian push near Velyka Novosilka drew most of it south, says observer cited by ISW
2026-10-26
Euromaidan Press, drawing on the Institute for the Study of War's (ISW) assessment of 25 October and on Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, reports that Russia moved part of its 90th Tank Division into the Velyka Novosilka sector, although the division was apparently intended to reinforce the offensive toward Druzhkivka in Donetsk Oblast. According to Mashovets, only some of its units appeared on the Druzhkivka axis, while a larger part ended up defending in the south. ISW has previously tracked elements of the 90th Tank Division in several directions, including near Sumy as recently as September.
The redeployment follows Ukrainian gains along the Mokri Yaly River: Mashovets says Ukrainian units pushed Russian troops out of Perebudova, Komar and Fedorivka after weeks of fighting (Russian infantry still holds a few houses on Perebudova's northeastern edge), came within 3.1 km of Skudne southwest of Vesele, and advanced 1.5–2 km on average and up to 3.3 km between 12 and 24 October. He also writes that elements of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) had to defend near Oleksandrivka instead of attacking at Huliaipole, a move he calls "clearly unplanned". ISW assesses that further Ukrainian advances could threaten the Huliaipole–Velyka Novosilka road, a supply route for Russia's 36th and 5th Armies supporting the drive toward Orikhiv.
Mashovets himself cautions that the Ukrainian advance has slowed to a minimum and that limited forces will likely require a pause or regrouping. The claims about the 90th Tank Division's intended destination rest on a single Ukrainian observer's assessment, relayed by ISW, and have not been independently confirmed; Russian attacks near Oleksandrivka and Huliaipole on 24–25 October made no confirmed advances, according to ISW.
«What Is Currently Known About russia's 2S38 Derivatsiya-PVO Anti-Aircraft Artillery System and Its Capabilities Against UAVs?» (Defense Express)
2026-10-23SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express wrote this explainer after a photo of the Russian 2S38 Derivatsiya-PVO self-propelled anti-aircraft gun appeared online, reportedly taken during the Center-2026 exercises in early October 2026. The author, Ivan Kyrychevskyi, is a serviceman in the 413th Raid Regiment of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and a weapons expert at Defense Express. He finds it striking that Russian propaganda has said so little about a system it calls "unique", given that it has yet to prove itself in Ukraine.
According to the article, a prototype on the BMP-3 chassis was first shown in 2017 as a planned replacement for the Soviet ZSU-23-4 Shilka and 2S6 Tunguska. It carries a 57 mm 2A90 gun, described as a development of the Soviet S-60. The announced figures were 120 rounds per minute, 148 rounds on board, an effective range of about 6 km against aerial targets and a maximum engagement altitude of about 4.5 km. The system was still in development in February 2022. In April 2024 the state corporation Rostec announced that work had been completed and that the system was ready for use against Ukraine. In autumn 2025 a prototype was shown to Vladimir Putin, which according to the author changed nothing about the project's status.
The author argues that if Russia could mass-produce the 2S38, it could pose a significant threat to all types of drones used by Ukraine's armed forces. He adds that there is still no information that Russia is ready to start serial production. This is a single source: Defense Express, a Ukrainian defence outlet (here an analysis by a serving Ukrainian soldier); the claims have not been independently verified.
«Украинские дроноводы снова отлупили танковую бригаду НАТО» (WarGonzo: 'Ukrainian drone operators have thrashed a NATO tank brigade again')
2026-10-22SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
WarGonzo reports that during exercise Combined Resolve 26-07 in Germany, Ukrainian UAV operators played the opposing force against the US 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. According to the channel, Ukrainian drones accounted for 70% of the notional losses in the first three days. The Americans then changed their tactics, dispersing vehicles, improving camouflage, cutting radio traffic and making more active use of electronic-warfare means, after which the share of losses caused by drones fell to 30%.
The channel places this in a series: in spring, at exercise Aurora 26 in Sweden, Ukrainian operators notionally hit 28 of 32 vehicles in a mechanised-attack episode, forcing a restart of the scenario; a year earlier, at exercise Hedgehog in Estonia, ten Ukrainian operators notionally destroyed 17 British armoured vehicles in half a day and made around 30 further strikes on other targets. WarGonzo says this is the third time Ukrainian drone operators have 'failed' NATO troops on modern tactics.
The channel cautions that it would be wrong to conclude drones have made tanks obsolete, since the US episode shows adaptation reduces losses, but argues that Russia and Ukraine have the most practical experience of drone-dominated warfare and that real combat offers no time to adapt. This is a single source: WarGonzo, a pro-war Russian military Telegram channel writing in its own editorial voice, not the position of the Russian MoD; the exercise figures are relayed without a cited source and have not been independently verified.
«О безэкипажных танках» (Rybar: 'On uncrewed tanks' — Deputy Defence Minister Yevkurov says uncrewed tank units may appear in the Russian armed forces)
2026-10-21SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Rybar reports that Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has said units of uncrewed tanks may appear in the Russian armed forces, and that the vehicles were tested at a range in Chelyabinsk region. Rybar does not quote Yevkurov directly or say where or when he said this; the original statement could not be traced in other sources. The channel assumes it refers to the recent exercise footage of remotely controlled 'assault' T-72B3 tanks with a shortened gun and the Arena-M active protection system against drones, which it says has already been used in the war zone. That matches the Shturm robotic system that appeared at Tsentr-2026 at the Chebarkul range, where Yevkurov was in overall command of the exercise (see entries e-20261004-07 and e-20261006-s04).
Rybar acknowledges that frontline soldiers criticised these vehicles as poorly adapted to modern combat, but calls the general design direction right. It argues that the future of tanks and armour in general lies in uncrewed systems and that uncrewed tank companies will soon be as ordinary as UAV units are today. It calls communications the key issue, saying such tanks and IFVs cannot be taken into battle properly without 'Rassvet' (apparently a reference to a Russian satellite communications/data system), and says they should eventually become almost fully autonomous, moving and fighting with minimal operator involvement. If the design relies as much as possible on commercial components, mass production would become possible, which the channel says could bring tanks 'another renaissance'.
The post adds a statement attributed to a senior defence official to a debut that earlier reporting described as troubled: the Shturm repeatedly lost its radio link to its control vehicle at Tsentr-2026, and a driver on board drove it for Putin's demonstration. Whether Yevkurov announced concrete plans for units, or only a possibility, cannot be determined from the post. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
«Гусеницю збито. Рух неможливий» — бійці 225-го полку дев’ять годин витягували підбитий Т-72 (ArmyInform: ''Track shot off. Movement impossible': 225th Regiment troops spent nine hours recovering a damaged T-72')
2026-10-20SINGLE SOURCE
The recovery platoon of Ukraine's 225th Separate Assault Regiment spent about nine hours pulling a drone-damaged T-72 tank out of its position, according to ArmyInform and Defense Express. Both outlets base their reports on video the regiment published. The tank had been damaged by enemy drone attacks, Defense Express specifies FPV drones. When the recovery team reached it, they found that the track on one side would not turn at all, so the multi-ton vehicle had to be towed with the running gear locked on one side. The date and location were not disclosed.
The crew used a WZT-3, a Polish-built armoured recovery vehicle on a T-72 chassis that has been accepted for service in the Ukrainian armed forces. The regiment credits the crew and a skilled driver-mechanic: 'thanks to the crew and a good driver, the task was completed and the tank was evacuated.' The T-72 is now under repair and is due to return to service.
The episode shows what armour recovery involves in the drone-saturated front zone. Recovering a tank that can no longer move under its own power can take a recovery vehicle many hours near the front line, which exposes it to the same drone threat. For Ukraine, it is a way to put damaged armour back into service instead of writing it off. This is a single source: ArmyInform, the news agency of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, and the Ukrainian outlet Defense Express, both relaying the regiment's own account and video; the details have not been independently verified.
Ukraine's Raid drone regiment strikes rare Russian BREM-1 armoured recovery vehicle in Zaporizhzhia Oblast despite EW and anti-drone cages
2026-10-20
Drone operators from the 2nd Battalion of the 413th Regiment of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, known as Raid, have struck a Russian BREM-1 armoured recovery vehicle in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing the regiment's Telegram channel and a published video. The date of the strike was not disclosed. According to Raid, the Russians had tried to protect the vehicle 'as much as possible', fitting it with electronic warfare equipment and welding anti-drone cages (described in Ukrainian reporting as 'hedgehogs') onto the hull, but the drone still hit it.
The BREM-1, built on a T-72 chassis, is used to recover disabled tanks and other heavy vehicles from the battlefield and to repair them in the field. Raid claims such vehicles are in short supply in the Russian army and that, although Russia produces large numbers of tanks, it struggles to support their maintenance and recovery. Ukrainska Pravda notes as background that Russia has presented an upgraded BREM-80 recovery vehicle and claims serial production and deliveries have begun.
The strike illustrates a recurring pattern: Ukrainian drone units deliberately target the recovery and repair chain, since every lost recovery vehicle means damaged armour is less likely to return to service. It also shows again that improvised passive protection plus a vehicle-mounted jammer does not guarantee survival against FPV-type drones. The claim and the scarcity assessment come from the Ukrainian unit and have not been independently verified; the video shows a hit, but not the extent of the damage.
Ukrainian 'Nemesis' drone detachment caused about 70% of a US armored brigade's early casualties at Hohenfels, brigade commander writes
2026-10-20
Ukrainian drone operators playing the enemy in a US Army exercise caused about 70% of an American armored brigade's casualties in the first three days, according to an article in Military Review, the US Army's professional journal, reported by Defence Blog. The authors are Col. Michael Ziegelhofer, commander of the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division ("Greywolf"), and six of his officers. They describe Combined Resolve 26-07, held in spring 2026 at the Hohenfels Training Area in Bavaria, where the opposing force was reinforced by a detachment of the 412th Regiment "Nemesis" of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces. Over the roughly 10-day rotation the opposing force initiated contact with drones more than 750 times, either striking troops directly or spotting for artillery. By the end of day three the share of drone-caused casualties had fallen below 30%, without the enemy easing off: "Greywolf changed how it fought".
According to the authors, roughly 60% of the brigade-level counter-drone fight is fieldcraft and drills. The brigade's counter-drone/EW systems jammed control links in protective bubbles up to 2 km wide, but had to be set up at fixed sites and moved forward in bounds, leaving units exposed on the move, and were less effective against the smaller number of unjammable fiber-optic drones. More than half the formation relied on cover, concealment, dispersion, smaller routes and fast battle drills. Survival had a price: crews switched off Blue Force Tracker, cut radio use and even dropped Starshield satellite links to reduce their electronic signature, and resupply took twice as long as planned because the enemy hunted supply lines. On the offensive side, the brigade brought in the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (then an experimental drone battalion) and used more than 700 drones from platoon to brigade level; with relay drones, nearly all could fly 25-40 km, covering the whole ~14 x 27 km training area. That abundance initially overwhelmed the headquarters: collection-planning tools, the operations floor and per-drone airspace management could not keep up, and the staff never had a full picture of how many drones were airborne. The brigade adapted by giving drone units priorities and letting them hunt within the commander's intent, moving the coordinated fire line forward, making enemy drone ground control stations a top target and holding drone munitions in reserve; it ended the rotation with two simultaneous breaches about 6 km apart that the opposing force failed to stop.
The officers recommend multifunctional drone strike troops in armored brigades (long-range surveillance to at least 40 km, medium/heavy bomber drones, strike drones with relays), one common operational picture for all drones modelled on Ukraine's Delta system, and counter-drone defences that work on the move, from hard-kill protection on every vehicle to brigade-level radar and defeat systems. This is a different, earlier exercise than the Stork and MV7 trials covered previously; it is one of the clearest first-hand accounts of how a NATO heavy brigade fares against Ukrainian-style drone TTPs, which mirror what Russian forces face and increasingly employ themselves. The figures come from the brigade's own after-action account and concern a training environment.
«"Птичка" в воздухе – "глаза" воина» (Krasnaya Zvezda: 'A "little bird" in the air is the warrior's "eyes"')
2026-10-19SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Ministry of Defence newspaper, profiles a contract soldier with the call sign 'Skif', a technical specialist supporting multirotor drone crews in the 10th Guards Tank Regiment of the 'Yuzhnaya' (South) Group of Forces. Before enlisting he studied information security, worked for an internet provider and repaired phones; he first served as an assault infantryman. The article recounts his first mission in summer 2024 in the southern Donetsk direction, when he and a comrade ('Capybara') evacuated two wounded soldiers by motorcycle from about 500 m from Ukrainian positions, under an active drone corridor, using a diversion in a neighbouring sector to move.
According to the paper, the unit's multirotor drones are used for reconnaissance, artillery fire correction, escorting assault groups, finding wounded and guiding infantry along safe routes. Skif assembles drop munitions of roughly 3–4 kg, described as effective against personnel and light vehicles, while lighter drones carry grenade-launcher rounds; he also maintains and repairs drones, including captured ones. The article says drop-type 'bombers' have lost importance and FPV drones, with their longer range, have become the main strike platform, and that crews adapt to Ukrainian EW with newer drone models and more jam-resistant communication protocols. It places the regiment's path through Novomikhailovka, Paraskovievka and Konstantinovka south-west of Donetsk, and says the unit now operates in the Druzhkovka direction. Skif is quoted that without the 'little bird' in the air troops would be 'without eyes'.
The article is promotional in tone and gives little operational detail. This is a single source: Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Ministry of Defence newspaper, and its claims have not been independently verified.
Rostec markets upgraded T-80BVM as a stealthy 'assassin' tank
2026-10-19
Russian state defence conglomerate Rostec has described its T-80BVM main battle tank as an 'assassin', claiming in a promotional statement that its quiet, powerful gas turbine engine and camouflage allow fast, unnoticed flanking manoeuvres, Defence Blog reports. Rostec presented the modernized tank in several roles: a 'steel battering ram' that breaks through defences while firing under swarms of FPV drones, a 'sniper' that works with a spotter drone to hit targets about 10 km away with a couple of shots, and a 'flying' tank, a reference to T-80 ramp jumps at Russian military shows that Rostec says reflects its mobility and speed on difficult ground.
The T-80BVM is an upgrade of the Soviet-era T-80BV, powered by a 1,250 hp GTD-1250 gas turbine and armed with a 125 mm 2A46M-1 smoothbore gun. Rostec listed a modernized fire control system, new all-round armour protection and gun-launched guided missiles among its main features, and said it would describe other features later. Defence Blog notes that the claim that the gas turbine is quieter than diesel engines is Rostec's own assessment, and that the T-80 family has long been criticized for high fuel consumption compared with the diesel T-72 and T-90. The indirect 'sniper' role, with drone-corrected fire beyond line of sight, has become common for both sides in Ukraine.
According to Oryx, which counts only visually confirmed losses, 1,311 T-80-series tanks have been destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured, including 264 T-80BVMs (150 standard, 114 of the 2022 model). Uralvagonzavod continues to upgrade stored T-80BV hulls to the BVM standard; Rostec has not said how many it has built. The 'assassin' and stealth claims come from promotional material of a Russian state-owned defence company and have not been independently verified.
«If russia Is Putting "Surplus" T-90M Tanks, BMP-3s, Giatsint-K Howitzers Into Storage, What Does It Mean?» (Defense Express)
2026-10-19SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express discusses a claim by the OSINT analyst Jompy that Russian forces have apparently begun accumulating relatively modern combat vehicles at their storage bases: T-90M and T-72B3 tanks, BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles, tracked 2S19 Msta-S and wheeled 2S44 Giatsint-K self-propelled howitzers. According to that account, Bases No. 80 and No. 374 near the Finnish border are accumulating 2S43 Malva and 2S44 Giatsint-K wheeled howitzers; Base No. 22 in Arkhangelsk region holds T-90M tanks, BTR-82As and BMP-3s; and Base No. 6018 near the border with Central Asia is gathering BMP-3Ms and BMD-4Ms. The outlet says no clear geographic pattern is yet visible, and a key unknown is whether the vehicles were withdrawn from active units or went straight from the factory into Soviet-era storage hangars.
The article weighs two readings. One is that Russia is shedding heavy armour it now sees as obsolete: armour historian Andrii Tarasenko claims the Russian military has apparently begun reducing its armoured units, although Janes reported in autumn 2025 that Russia was increasing the formal number of armoured units even as operationally available T-72B3, T-80BV and T-90M tanks declined. The other is a revival of the Soviet mobilisation system, in which storage bases held equipment for 'cadre divisions' to be manned in the third stage of mobilisation. If Russia is again stockpiling, the author argues, it may be preparing to recreate such cadre divisions that could be brought up to strength at short notice and potentially used against NATO countries in Europe.
The author, Ivan Kyrychevskiy, is a serviceman of the 413th Raid Regiment of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and a weapons expert at Defense Express. This is a single source: the Ukrainian defence outlet Defense Express, building on a social-media OSINT claim, and its claims have not been independently verified.
According to the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi, the Russian BTR-82A armoured personnel carrier is now being fitted with a factory-installed protection kit against FPV drones and debris. The kit was reportedly developed at the Arzamas Machine-Building Plant and was spotted during exercises in Belarus. It uses a reinforced frame carrying metal grilles over the turret, hull and troop compartment, rubber-fabric screens over the sides and undercarriage, and cabled chains around the hull. A protected space above the hull is provided for troops riding on top.
Militarnyi cites Ukrainian researcher Andrii Tarasenko, who says the design builds on protection concepts Russian forces tested in the field in 2025. The kit is said to add about 15% to the vehicle's weight, cutting top road speed to about 50 km/h and off-road speed to about 20 km/h, and to limit turret rotation to 270 degrees. The elements are meant to make an explosive charge detonate about 35 cm away from the main armour. The kit also offers some protection against anti-personnel and mixed mine-explosive obstacles, but not against anti-tank mines. Installation takes about 60 man-hours.
Tarasenko points to several weaknesses: fire risk from the rubber-fabric screens, poor protection for troops on the roof and the restricted turret traverse. He also argues that the outdated layout and thin armour of the BTR-80/82A family make it unsuitable for the current battlefield. The figures come from a Ukrainian outlet and a Ukrainian analyst and have not been independently verified. The move from improvised field cages to a factory kit does fit the wider trend of Russian armour being adapted against drones.
«Броня гуляє по 40 хвилин на полі бою»: у ДШВ попередили про загрозу на фронті (ArmyInform: 'Armour roams the battlefield for 40 minutes: Air Assault Forces warn of a threat at the front')
2026-10-14SINGLE SOURCE
According to Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi, head of communications of the 7th Rapid Response Corps of Ukraine's Air Assault Forces (DShV), speaking on Army TV, Russian forces are accumulating armoured vehicles on the Huliaipole axis. He said it is hard to say whether this is linked to covert mobilisation. Besides the 35th and 5th Combined Arms Armies, he said units of the 36th Army, the 68th Army Corps, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Special Purpose (Spetsnaz) Brigade operate on this axis, giving Russia an advantage of at least one to five on any sector of the Ukrainian front there.
Polevyi said Russian forces exploit poor weather: morning fog and grey skies help conceal movements. The most activity is observed in the delta of the Verkhnia Tersa river and along its tributaries, where there is green cover, and Russian troops try daily to infiltrate small infantry groups. He described the armour build-up as a separate threat: destroying one armoured vehicle can take up to 20 FPV drones, and it is impossible to keep that many in the air over one target simultaneously. Even with a 'carousel' of drones, that means an armoured vehicle can stay on the battlefield for half an hour to 40 minutes.
According to the spokesman, there is effectively no heavy crew-served weaponry in the grey zone because it is difficult to bring in; troops can carry at most a rifle and a drone controller. That is why armour that remains on the battlefield for a long time poses a serious danger. These are statements by a Ukrainian military spokesman, a party to the conflict. Single source: this is an article by the Ukrainian MoD news service ArmyInform that has not been independently verified.
«УВЗ: «Армату» дорабатывают с учётом опыта СВО» (Topwar: UVZ: the 'Armata' is being refined based on SMO experience)
2026-10-11SINGLE SOURCE
According to Topwar, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) director general Aleksandr Potapov said the T-14 Armata tank is being refined in light of experience from the 'special military operation' (the war in Ukraine), while simultaneously undergoing phased trial operation with the troops. He said an ammunition load with various types of rounds with improved characteristics has already been developed for the Armata. Potapov called the Armata a qualitatively new platform and a groundwork for the future, but acknowledged that the main wartime effort has gone into Russia's 'classic' tanks: the T-72, T-80, T-90 and even the T-62. The war, he said, sharply accelerated feedback from the military.
Potapov added that developing a new tank and launching series production is not enough: a supporting system of crew training, simulators and similar infrastructure has to be built, and work on this is under way. New vehicles are being created on the Armata base, and 'the Armata is not the limit', he said. Topwar recalls earlier reporting that UVZ had tested the T-14 in the war zone and claimed it was effective, yet the tank never entered series production; instead the decision was made to increase output of the cheaper T-72, T-90 and T-80.
The statement contains no figures on numbers, timelines or specific modifications, and confirms that the T-14 remains in trial operation rather than serial service. Single source: this is a report from Topwar, a Russian pro-government military portal, relaying claims by the head of a Russian state-owned manufacturer, and has not been independently verified.
The Franco-German MGCS next-generation tank programme has collapsed after Germany withdrew, French Chief of the Defence Staff General Fabien Mandon told parliament.
2026-10-09
The joint French-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), meant to produce a next-generation main battle tank, has failed because Germany withdrew from it. Militarnyi reports this, citing POLITICO. French Chief of the Defence Staff General Fabien Mandon said so at a parliamentary hearing. He admitted the programme had not met expectations, but argued it should not be seen as a complete failure, because both armed forces had done substantial work defining the concept for a future tank.
MGCS was intended to replace France's Leclerc and Germany's Leopard 2. It was planned as an integrated land combat system rather than a single vehicle. The industrial consortium included Thales, KNDS France, KNDS Germany and Rheinmetall. In recent years the programme was hit by repeated delays, industrial disputes and political tension between Paris and Berlin.
Germany's exit follows the abrupt end of the Franco-German FCAS fighter programme. Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Emmanuel Macron stopped it after concluding that Dassault and Airbus could not reach a compromise. With MGCS gone, France's Ministry of the Armed Forces plans to choose a model for a new tank as early as 2026, as an interim successor to the Leclerc. The aim is to keep equipment replacement on schedule despite the delays and the cancellation. Losing two flagship joint programmes is a major setback for Franco-German defence-industrial cooperation.
Russia's top tank maker takes on T-90 repairs as new builds strain
2026-10-08
According to Defence Blog, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) in Nizhny Tagil, Russia's main tank manufacturer and the only plant building new T-90M tanks, is now carrying out major (capital) repairs of T-90Ms badly damaged in Ukraine. Photos circulating on social media this week show a train with heavily damaged T-90Ms on rail cars heading to the plant. Analysts note that such repairs were traditionally handled by the military's armored repair plants (BTRZ) and now compete with the factory's production of new tanks.
Armored vehicle analyst Andrei Tarasenko attributes this to the breakdown of the BTRZ repair network, adding that a repair under factory conditions costs about as much as a new tank. Oryx lead analyst Jakub Janovsky warned that some organizations may count factory repairs and upgrades as "new production", blurring estimates of Russia's actual output. He added that recoverability depends on where a tank is hit: vehicles disabled in the contested gray zone are usually destroyed before they can be recovered, while those damaged further back can be retrieved with far less effort.
Analysts link the shift to pressure on the tank industry from Western sanctions and labor shortages. Some T-90Ms leaving UVZ reportedly use refurbished hulls from older T-90As rather than newly built ones; in 2024 the company itself publicized restoring a T-90M in four weeks after it had been hit by 26 drones. UVZ still delivers vehicles: this week it reported another batch (number not given) of T-90Ms and upgraded T-72B3Ms with extra anti-drone protection, and some T-90Ms now carry the Arena-M active protection system, which Russian forces demonstrated against drones during Tsentr-2026. The interpretation of the photos rests on analysts' assessments and has not been independently confirmed.
Ukrainian FPV commander recalls drone kill on Russian UR-77 mine-clearer carrying over two tons of explosives
2026-10-07
"Skipper", an FPV company commander in Ukraine's 413th Raid Unmanned Systems Regiment, told Army TV that his proudest strike was destroying a Russian UR-77 mine-clearing vehicle with a cheap FPV drone during Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive. According to his account, the vehicle detonated after a second hit, and the blast was so large he thought it was "a small nuclear blast". The strike itself is therefore not new; the account appears in an Euromaidan Press interview piece published on 8 October 2026. The regiment now operates on the Zaporizhzhia front.
The UR-77 ("Zmiy Horynych") dates from the 1970s and is built on the chassis of the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer. It fires a rocket-propelled line charge that reportedly contains more than two tons of explosive, clearing a lane about six metres wide and setting off anti-personnel mines across a band of up to 15 metres. Citing Militarnyi, the article notes that although the system was designed to open routes for fast tank advances, Russia now more often uses it as an assault weapon against Ukrainian fortifications, using the line charge to flatten defensive positions.
The account rests on the commander's own description and has not been independently verified; the article gives no location or exact date for the strike.
«Сквозь дым – к опорному пункту противника» (Krasnaya Zvezda: Through the smoke – to the enemy strongpoint)
2026-10-07SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda reports that assault units of the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division (1st Tank Army, Group of Forces "West") went through intensive combat training at a range in the rear area of the war zone. According to the paper, the troops practised dismounting from BTR-82 armoured personnel carriers, laying smoke screens, firing their standard weapons (AK-74M rifles), using grenade launchers and rocket-propelled assault grenades against simulated armour and fortifications, close-quarters fighting among mock-up buildings, and tactical first aid.
The drill described goes like this: assault groups ride on top of the BTR-82s, jump off while the vehicles are still moving a few hundred metres from the line of contact, and then advance on a mock "enemy" strongpoint. Smoke pots are placed according to wind direction to hide movement onto the assault line and to cover the evacuation of wounded. In the final combined exercise, assault groups backed by BTR-82 fire suppress firing points, take and hold positions and set up a defence, using ravines, tree lines and hills as cover. A platoon commander with the call sign "Fantom" stresses small-group action and mutual cover in built-up areas. Medics say tourniquets, bleeding control and casualty evacuation, including with improvised stretchers, are drilled until they become reflexes.
The article is a training report with propaganda framing and contains no figures on unit strength, losses or where the division is deployed. It does show the MoD portraying mechanised assault with APC support, alongside the small dismounted assault groups common on the front. Single source: this is a Russian Ministry of Defence (Krasnaya Zvezda) report that has not been independently verified.
Ukrainian artillery reportedly kills Major Alexei Karavaev, commander of Russia's 11th Tank Regiment, on the Kharkiv axis
2026-10-07
Militarnyi reports that Major Alexei Karavaev, call sign "Father", commander of Russia's 11th Tank Regiment, was killed by Ukrainian artillery during the night of 3-4 October 2026. According to the Russian Telegram channel Severny Kanal (linked to Russia's North grouping), Karavaev was travelling to the front line to inspect Russian positions when he was killed. The article gives no more precise location than the Kharkiv direction, where the regiment is currently operating.
The death was first publicised by the Ukrainian OSINT project X from Above OSINT, which found an obituary on a Russian website; Militarnyi also cites the outlet ASTRA. The 11th Tank Regiment belongs to the 18th Motor Rifle Division of the 11th Army Corps, with a permanent base in Gusev, Kaliningrad Region. The regiment previously suffered losses near Kozacha Lopan, when Ukraine's 425th Assault Regiment engaged its personnel during a border-crossing attempt.
Militarnyi says Karavaev is believed to have previously served in the 82nd Motor Rifle Regiment of the 69th Motor Rifle Division, 6th Army; phone contact records refer to "Battalion Commander Sasha Volchansk" and "Father, Special Military Operation, 82nd Regiment, 1st Battalion", suggesting a possible 1st Battalion assignment. That regiment was stationed at the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant, where war crimes occurred in 2024. The death rests on Russian-sourced reports and an obituary as relayed by Militarnyi; no official Russian confirmation is cited.
Taliban Mounts BM-27 Uragan MLRS on BMP-2D Chassis, Did russia Help With This Upgrade? (Defense Express)
2026-10-07SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express (author: Ivan Kyrichevskyi, a serviceman of the 413th SBS "Raid" regiment and Defense Express expert) reports that the Taliban released video of military drills showing a BM-27 Uragan 220 mm multiple rocket launcher mounted on a BMP-2D tracked chassis. The article notes that the Taliban earlier showed BM-21 Grad systems placed on abandoned American Navistar trucks. According to the author, the logic of the conversion is understandable: the standard Soviet wheeled chassis is complex to maintain, while the tracked armoured vehicle is a more versatile, all-terrain platform.
The article then asks whether Russia could have helped. Arguments for, per the author: the Taliban have restored non-functional T-62 and T-55 tanks, and Soviet tactical missile systems Luna-M and Elbrus were reportedly returned to service in 2022, which might have required outside specialists. Arguments against: the Taliban independently converted numerous BM-21 systems onto American trucks, the Uragan conversion appears to be a single instance, and they restored roughly six UH-60 Black Hawks and ten MD 530F helicopters without apparent external guidance.
The author's conclusion is cautious: the single Uragan modification could well have been done by Taliban engineers on their own, though Russian technical support cannot be definitively ruled out. No evidence of Russian involvement is presented.
Single source: this is a Ukrainian Defense Express report that has not been independently verified.
«От тактики роевого применения дронов до атак безэкипажных танков» (Krasnaya Zvezda: From swarm drone tactics to uncrewed tank attacks — Tsentr-2026 wrap-up)
2026-10-04SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Defence Ministry's newspaper, published an overview of the main phase of the strategic command-staff exercise Tsentr-2026, which ended on 2 October at the Central Military District's 255th Chebarkul range, watched by President Putin and with Defence Minister Belousov reporting. According to the paper, more than 6,000 troops took part at Chebarkul (4,600 Russian, 1,479 foreign, 634 of them from CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force contingents). More than 600 pieces of equipment were used, including 55 aircraft and helicopters, 567 UAVs and more than 50 robotic systems. Representatives of 41 states took part. Six of them sent contingents: Belarus, China, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan and Tajikistan. Overall command was held by Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. The paper names the key features as mass use of UAVs, ground robotic systems and electronic warfare, assaults on motorcycles, buggies and quad bikes, and counter-battery fire 'taking into account the experience of the special military operation'.
The drone section focuses on the 'Roy' (Swarm) formation. FPV crews in this formation supported motorcycle assault groups, which attacked from the flanks while fire came from the front. Concentrated FPV strikes hit enemy firing positions as they were revealed, and mobile fire groups in 'Ulan-2' vehicles fought off enemy UAVs. The paper says swarm use of strike FPV drones is 'widely used' by Unmanned Systems Forces units in the war zone. It adds that Central Military District drone units combined swarm strikes on ground targets with point defence against air threats by FPV interceptors. Other drone elements were a Supercam-S350 with 'Repei' software for tank fire from indirect positions (up to 4.5 h endurance, data link up to 100 km), Kub-2 loitering munitions with thermobaric warheads (range over 60 km), a Kurier ground robot with rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers, and Bogomol, Impuls and Depesha ground robots for resupply and casualty evacuation. Heavy Mangas and Zanoza-30 drones dropped supplies to assault troops. Assault groups also practised slipping through the grey zone via a water conduit and a pre-dug tunnel.
On armour, the article says uncrewed tanks with uninhabited fighting compartments manoeuvred within armoured groups and fired from short halts. It credits their mobility to a 'multichannel, jam-resistant' control system that duplicates the most vulnerable control nodes. T-14 Armata and T-90M tanks with the Arena active protection system used 'tank carousel' fire. The paper says Arena's radar detects FPV drones on approach and fires a fragmentation cloud with a radius of up to 200 m. The tanks were covered by a 'Spiridon' support vehicle and the Derivatsiya-PVO anti-aircraft gun system. Su-34s dropped twelve OFAB-500PD bombs at once on a command post and flew the 'Shnek' anti-missile manoeuvre; tactical aviation stayed outside enemy air-defence engagement zones. The article does not mention the reported problems with the uncrewed tanks (see entry e-20261004-07). Single source: this is a Russian state source (the Defence Ministry's newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda) presenting the ministry's own account of a staged exercise; the claims have not been independently verified.
russia Forms New Division for First Time in Year and Sends It Into Battle for Kostiantynivka: What Does It Mean?
2026-10-04SINGLE SOURCE
According to Defense Express, citing the Unit Observer account on X, Russia has formed the 84th Motor Rifle Division within its 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly the 1st Army Corps of the so-called "LPR"). The core of the new division is the 4th Motor Rifle Brigade together with two motor rifle regiments that were attached to it. Russian forces have reportedly committed the division to the fighting for Kostiantynivka. Defense Express says this is the first report in 2026 of a new division-level formation being created in the Russian army.
Defense Express puts this in context with earlier years. In 2025 there were reports of three new divisions formed from existing brigades: the 71st Division based on the 200th Brigade (June 2025) and two naval infantry divisions late in the year. Seven new divisions were reportedly formed in 2024, and the army grew from 12 divisions in 2022 to 23 by early February 2025. One new division in 2026 is therefore a comparatively low rate of expansion. The outlet also points to a structural shift: before February 2022 a Russian motor rifle division had one tank regiment and two motor rifle regiments at its core, whereas divisions formed in 2024–2025 have three motor rifle regiments and only a tank battalion. Defense Express attributes this to heavy Russian losses of armour and personnel.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express (Ukrainian defence-media outlet), which itself relies on an open-source X account; the claims have not been independently verified.
Tsentr-2026: Shturm robotic tank debut falters in the mud while T-90M's Arena-M downs drones in staged attack
2026-10-03
During the Tsentr-2026 strategic exercise (28 September – 3 October, more than 47,000 troops according to the Russian Defence Ministry), Russia used uncrewed tanks from Uralvagonzavod's Shturm heavy robotic assault system in drills for the first time. The ministry said on 2 October that President Putin was shown the vehicles at the Chebarkul range in Chelyabinsk region, built on the T-72B3M chassis in a tank version and a BMPT-style version, giving fire support to assault units. The main version carries a shortened 125 mm gun, a dozer blade and extra armour; a 152 mm version is reportedly in development. Each vehicle is driven by three operators in a separate crewed control vehicle on a tank chassis that has to stay within about 3 km, according to Rostec's 'Russian Weapons' project and ANNA News.
According to Russian sources cited by Defence Blog, the debut went badly. The Shturm repeatedly lost its radio link to the control vehicle, and for Putin's demonstration a driver-mechanic on board drove it instead of remote operators, for fear of a technical failure. A photo shows the vehicle nose-down in a muddy ditch. Russian armour expert Andrei Tarasenko said the engine compartment and turret roof are almost unprotected against drones and called the concept unsuccessful because it depends on a command post 3–4 km away with line of sight. The ministry has published no data on how the link performs under electronic warfare.
At the same exercise, a T-90M used its Arena-M active protection system (KBM, Kolomna) to shoot down FPV quadcopters and fixed-wing drones in a staged attack on a tank column. Russia did not say how many drones were launched or intercepted, or whether any got through. Arena-M reportedly received a drone-intercept mode in 2025, and Ukrainian units have reported it destroying FPV drones in combat, one unit saying it took 15–20 drones to knock out a tank fitted with it. However, the known configuration carries only 12 interceptor munitions, and new T-90M and T-72B3M tanks delivered in September did not have the system fitted.
Russian infiltrators in Kharkiv Oblast border villages draw a Ukrainian tank-drone counterattack: two spike-armoured 'hedgehog' tanks under a layered drone escort strike infiltrators in Vilkhuvatka and withdraw intact
2026-10-01
Euromaidan Press (David Axe) reports that Russian infiltrators have been slipping into villages and towns along Ukraine's north-eastern border with Russia. The outlet assesses that the aim is likely to pull Ukrainian troops away from the larger battles farther south around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Ukraine wants to clear these small groups without tying down scarce infantry, and the Ukrainian 475th Assault Regiment has answered with a mixed team of two heavily up-armoured tanks and three types of drone. In a recent counter-infiltration action the tanks pushed into Vilkhuvatka, Kharkiv Oblast, about 9 km from the Russian border. The regiment's own video was geolocated by open-source accounts (GeoConfirmed, UAControlMap).
It is not clear which tank type the regiment uses. The tanks are wrapped in metal cages with hundreds of welded steel spines, which set off incoming explosive drones at a safe distance from the hull, while the cage catches drones the spines miss. Russia came up with these 'hedgehog' (also called turtle) tanks first, and Ukraine copied the idea once it proved able to deflect dozens of drones at a time. To get through a Russian kill zone of bomber and one-way attack drones in the air, loitering ambush drones waiting on the ground and mines, the tanks were escorted by a Vampire heavy bomber drone, at least one explosive FPV quadcopter and at least one surveillance quadcopter. The surveillance drones scouted ahead, the bomber was used against mines and ground-based ambush drones, and the FPVs were meant to intercept incoming Russian FPVs. According to the video, the tanks took several hits from Russian drones and mines but kept moving, reached an intersection inside the village, fired their main guns at nearby Russian infiltrators and then withdrew intact. The effect on the infiltrators is not stated.
The article places this within the 475th's wider work with the 1st Assault Regiment on 'multi-domain' tactics that combine ground, air and cyber means. 1st Assault Regiment commander 'Perun' argued that fighting in only one domain makes no sense, because the enemy would simply bring in another one. Euromaidan Press concludes that tanks can still fight and survive if drones support them. It expects the tank-drone pairing to spread along the roughly 1,200 km grey zone if it keeps working, as Ukraine's manpower shortage deepens. This is a single action shown in a unit video; neither its outcome nor the wider claims have been independently verified.
russia Claims T-14 Armata With 152mm Gun Can Shoot Down Ukrainian Deep-Strike Drones
2026-09-30SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express reports on Russian claims, which it attributes to Russian propagandists and which were highlighted by armoured-vehicle historian Andrii Tarasenko, that the T-14 Armata tank has undergone a comprehensive modernisation programme. The article stresses that the T-14 has still not taken part in combat operations during Russia's nearly five-year full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the Russian claims, the upgrades include a 152mm gun able to fire Krasnopol guided artillery shells, which supposedly turns the tank into what the Russian side calls a 'short-range air defence system' that could engage Ukrainian deep-strike drones.
Further claimed upgrades are a chrome-lined barrel for the 152mm smoothbore gun, said to allow it to fire Kornet anti-tank guided missiles with a claimed range of up to 10,000 metres, the integration of a Pterodactyl reconnaissance drone and a new fire-control system. The tank reportedly carries 40 rounds, 24 of them in the autoloader, and the Russian state corporation Rostec is allegedly already working on an unmanned version of the T-14. The article does not name the specific Russian outlet or official behind the claims.
Defense Express's own assessment is a second layer on top of the Russian claim: it calls it ironic to present the T-14 as having 'short-range air defence capabilities', as if Russian forces really intend to shoot down Ukrainian deep-strike drones with Krasnopol shells. In the outlet's view, the sheer range of capabilities being attributed to the tank points to a more fundamental problem, namely that Russia still appears to have little understanding of what role a tank should play on the modern battlefield.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express (Ukrainian defence outlet) about unattributed Russian claims; neither the claimed upgrades nor any air-defence capability of the T-14 have been independently verified.
Майже 80 років і 9 тисяч кілометрів — до зустрічі з FPV: «Скіфські Грифони» уразили російський Т-54
2026-09-29SINGLE SOURCE
The Ukrainian 423rd Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment 'Scythian Griffons' published video on 29 September 2026 of an FPV drone strike on a Russian T-54 tank in the Russian rear. According to ArmyInform, the tank had been fitted with additional protective structures against aerial attack, which the drone nevertheless penetrated. No location is given.
The T-54 entered service in 1946, making the design almost 80 years old. The regiment assesses that this vehicle travelled almost 9,000 km from storage bases in Russia's Far East to the front. It argues that the use of such tanks, armed with a 100 mm gun, points to Russian shortages of modern tanks and of standard-calibre tank ammunition, since Moscow keeps drawing Cold War-era equipment from storage despite having developed the T-72, T-80 and T-90. That interpretation is the unit's own; the article offers no data on how widespread T-54/55 use is.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD media); the claims have not been independently verified.
Syrskyi: Ukrainian active protection systems for armoured vehicles intercept 60–80% of FPV drones in testing
2026-09-27
Oleksandr Syrskyi, whom Militarnyi describes as the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told LB.ua in an interview that Ukrainian active protection systems (APS) for armoured vehicles can already intercept between 60% and 80% of FPV drones. He said Ukraine and Russia are both developing systems to shield armour from drone attack, and that the latest Ukrainian APS developments have proven effective in testing. Syrskyi did not name a specific system or vehicle type. In his view drones still hold the advantage in the contest between attack and defence, but once these measures are "brought to full maturity, the use of armored vehicles will once again become relevant, and the pace of offensive operations will change".
On the Russian side, Militarnyi recalls that in July 2026 Russia deployed a T-72B3A tank with the Arena-M APS, modified to counter FPV drones, for the first time. Ukrainian drones destroyed the tank, but it took seven drones to use up the APS's countermeasure ammunition, and the total came to 15–20 FPV drones per vehicle. According to Militarnyi, Russia has started only limited deployment of such systems despite their shortcomings. Scaling up production and improving how they are used could still greatly increase the battlefield value of armour. That would raise the cost of Russia's FPV-centred anti-armour tactics and, in turn, of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian armour.
Militarnyi points to two Ukrainian projects in this area. The company Ukrainian Armor has shown an unmanned module that detects, tracks and destroys drones automatically using shotguns. The company I-SEE has built an AI drone-detection system that combines computer vision with Edge AI and is now developing an autonomous anti-drone APS on top of it. The company says the system has grown from an intelligent detector and tracker into a "universal core" for kinetic interception systems. It is hardware-independent and processes video on board, without latency or an internet connection. The 60–80% figure comes from Syrskyi alone; no test conditions, drone types or systems were given, and the claim has not been independently verified. Fibre-optic FPV drones were not mentioned.
Omsk's Transmash Plant Develops Own Anti-Drone Armor for T-80BVM Tanks
2026-09-22SINGLE SOURCE
Omsk's Transmash plant (part of Uralvagonzavod) has developed its own anti-drone protection kit for T-80BVM tanks, distinct in design from the arrangement used on T-72B3M/T-90M tanks built at Uralvagonzavod's Nizhny Tagil plant. The Omsk variant combines a large "mangal" (cope-cage-style false roof) on metal supports, angled metal-grid screens around the hull and turret perimeter, and freely hanging, chain-linked cables along the tank's sides — used instead of the rubber-fabric slat panels fitted at Nizhny Tagil. A removable dynamic-protection module is also fitted above the engine compartment.
According to the report, the all-metal grid-and-cable arrangement is meant to detonate FPV-drone warheads at a standoff distance from the armor and to damage drone propellers before impact; the metal construction is presented as more durable than rubber slat screens, which the outlet says can burn or degrade during cross-country movement. The kit is fitted during factory modernization/repair of T-80BVM tanks at Omsk. The Topwar author notes it is "odd" that the two Uralvagonzavod plants apparently developed separate, uncoordinated anti-drone solutions for their respective tank lines.
This report is drawn from a single Russian military-enthusiast outlet (Topwar) and has not been independently verified. Russian sources have an interest in presenting domestic hardware and countermeasure developments favorably, so claims of durability or effectiveness against FPV drones should be treated as unconfirmed until corroborated elsewhere.
No tanks, lone soldiers: Russia shifts to small-group infiltration tactics on the northeastern front
2026-09-20
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force spokesperson Viktor Trehubov said on 20 September that Russian assault tactics have shifted markedly over the past year on the northeastern front: rather than attacking in columns supported by tanks and armored vehicles, Russian troops now advance in small groups of a few soldiers, or even alone, trying to cross the "kill zone" separating rear positions from the front line undetected.
According to Trehubov, small groups or individual soldiers who make it through the kill zone take cover and wait for others to catch up before regrouping into larger assault elements — reflecting Russia scaling down each assault wave because of the difficulty of crossing a kill zone that has expanded to roughly 20 km. Armor has been all but pulled from frontline assault roles: tanks have "moved not just to the back seat, but to the third row," used mainly when Russia can mass enough drone cover to escort them through, or when poor weather grounds Ukrainian drones. Ukrainian mechanized brigades told the Kyiv Independent this spring that their own tank crews rarely deploy under current drone-saturated conditions — indicating this is a mutual adaptation to dense drone ISR/strike coverage on both sides, not a Russian-only phenomenon.
Ukrainian military media separately reporting on the Kupyansk sector specifically describe a similar pattern — infantry infiltrating in small groups through remaining forest cover, spreading pressure across multiple directions rather than one concentrated mechanized thrust, with heavy equipment relegated to fire support, mine-clearing and logistics, and Ukrainian drone reconnaissance credited with detecting groups before they regroup. Note: this Kupyansk-specific framing comes from separate Ukrainian military-affiliated reporting, not from the verified kyivindependent source itself, which describes the tactical shift at the broader "northeastern front" level without naming Kupyansk explicitly.
Operation Vivaldi: Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps takes Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka after suppressing Russian drones; ISW sees 'tactical drone overmatch' as mine-packed BTR-60s reach Russian fortifications, corps claims 250+ prisoners
2026-09-20
In the third 'season' of Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps says it liberated Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka in northern Donetsk Oblast near Lyman and regained control of Karpivka and Novomykhailivka, adding 51 sq km to the 176 sq km it says it has retaken since the offensive began. Corps commander Andrii Biletskyi calls Nove, a key Russian hub on the bridgehead ringed by commanding heights, the turning point; according to the corps, Russia expected the main thrust on the Shandryholove-Zelena Dolyna axis, burned its reserves counterattacking there and 'slept through' the real strike. Biletskyi claims about 2,000 Russian losses in this phase and more than 250 prisoners, and told Militarnyi that Russian units 'lost control and surrendered in groups', together with their officers, drone pilots and artillerymen. He lists the Russian formations engaged as the 20th Combined Arms Army (3rd and 144th Motorised Rifle Divisions) and the 25th Combined Arms Army (67th Motorised Rifle Division, 164th and 169th Motorised Rifle Brigades, 11th Tank Brigade). The 3rd Assault Brigade carried much of the fighting, with border guard detachments retaking Ridkodub.
The strongest fortifications, notably at Nove, were broken with converted Soviet BTR-60 armoured carriers: Euromaidan Press reports they come from a batch of 110 donated by Bulgaria, and were filled with potentially dozens of TM-62 anti-tank mines, rigged for remote control, driven into Russian bunkers and detonated as unmanned vehicle-borne IEDs. The corps says they were used 'to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications'. Euromaidan puts the cost of a conversion at perhaps a few thousand dollars, against tens or hundreds of thousands for a glide bomb, with no Ukrainian crew at risk. This adds to earlier robotic improvisations in Vivaldi: kamikaze UGVs air-dropped by heavy bomber drones more than 10 km behind the lines, and NC13 unit UGVs carrying two Bullspike grenade launchers that fire on positions and then detonate inside the shelters.
What this says about the Russian defence: ISW assesses that Ukraine achieved 'tactical drone overmatch'. Old, slow armoured vehicles were driven up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes, which ISW reads as Ukraine having neutralised Russia's drone defences in the sector, on a front where drones normally keep armour kilometres back. According to ISW this followed shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian drone and EW systems that would otherwise have hit the vehicles. Deputy corps commander Maksym Zhorin credits a 'Protective Drone' system of EW assets with neutralising around 20,000 Russian drones (no period given). ISW also notes that Russian EW runs on diesel generators, and the corps said on 17 September that strikes on logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast had degraded fuel supply, straining Russia's use of drones and EW. Earlier strikes on mapped command posts and drone launch points (20th Army, 144th Division, Rubikon) and claimed partisan rail sabotage fit the same picture of a defence that leaned heavily on drones for surveillance and fires and gave way once they were blinded. All figures are claims by the 3rd Army Corps and Ukrainian media, a party to the conflict, partly relayed via ISW; none has been independently confirmed and the reporting does not describe Russian countermeasures.
The 425th Separate Assault Regiment "Skelya" has received Ukrainian-built T-84 tanks. The unit announced this with a video released to mark Ukraine's Tank Forces Day, showing its tank crews with one of the new vehicles. The article does not specify how many tanks were delivered.
The T-84 is a Ukrainian-developed tank, an evolution of the Soviet-era T-80UD, designed by the Kharkiv Machine-Building Design Bureau (KhKBM) and built at the Malyshev Plant. The first prototype dates back to the 1990s. It is armed with a 125mm cannon with an autoloader, powered by a 6TD-2 diesel engine rated at 1,200 horsepower, and carries a crew of three. Production has always run in small batches — the T-84 never became a mass-produced platform.
The tank has seen combat use since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022; Militarnyi reported a T-84 at the front as early as May 2022, possibly operated by the 14th Mechanized Brigade. Ukraine has also sold T-84s abroad — the United States received four in 2003-2004 and tested one at Yuma Proving Ground; another was spotted being transported within the US in 2025.
Oklahoma National Guard Trials Ukraine-Style Cage Armor on Convoy Vehicles
2026-09-15
During Exercise Thunderstruck 3.0, held September 12 at Camp Gruber Training Center, Oklahoma National Guard convoy vehicles were photographed and filmed fitted with welded wire-mesh cage screens against first-person-view (FPV) drones. This is the same basic principle behind the improvised 'cope cages' that Ukrainian forces began welding onto tanks and trucks as early as 2022, a practice that later spread to Russian forces: the cage is meant to detonate or deflect a drone's shaped-charge warhead before it reaches the vehicle's hull. It is thus a direct, visible instance of a Western unit adopting a defensive technique that originated on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield.
Imagery shows a Humvee carrying a mesh screen mounted over the vehicle, and cargo trucks fully enclosed in boxy, welded cage frames. These vehicles moved as part of a tactical convoy that also included a marked ambulance, suggesting the Guard tested the added protection on logistics and medical-evacuation vehicles as well as combat platforms. Neither the Oklahoma National Guard's public release on the exercise nor its participating unit commanders specifically addressed the cage armor seen in the imagery, though the release did describe Thunderstruck as built around lessons from 'evolving threats,' where drones provide persistent surveillance, track troop movements, and influence how formations maneuver.
Thunderstruck 3.0 folded friendly and simulated adversary drones into training alongside UH-60 Black Hawk operations, convoy movements, and medevac drills, under the Guard's Launched Effects Program, which has brought together military, industry, academic and government partners since 2022 to develop drone and counter-drone capabilities. Brig. Gen. Colby Wyatt described the goal as testing systems, tactics and procedures; retired Col. Shane Riley of RXR Worldwide spoke of using the drones for 'threat replication' to prepare units for what they might face in a future conflict. It remains unclear whether the cage screens reflect a formal equipment decision by the Oklahoma National Guard or a field-expedient addition specific to this exercise.
Russia's New T-90M and T-72B3M Tanks Arrive With Upgraded Anti-Drone Protection
2026-09-12
Russian state manufacturer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) — the sanctioned tank plant in Nizhny Tagil — has delivered a new batch of T-90M "Proryv" and T-72B3M tanks to Russian forces, according to parent company Rostec. The delivery was timed to coincide with the 80th observance of Russia's "Tank Crew Day." As with previous batches, Russia disclosed neither the quantity nor the front-line sector receiving the vehicles.
The tanks carry upgraded all-round protection against attack drones. Footage released by Rostec shows the turret wrapped in a screen of woven steel cable, with additional armor added over the running gear and rubber strips mounted on spring-loaded supports along the hull sides. UVZ says the "maximum protection" kit for the T-90M took roughly two years to develop and that protection specifically against unmanned aerial vehicles remains under continuous development. Earlier UVZ shipments have also included nets designed to intercept FPV drones and electronic-warfare jamming equipment; sources differ on whether this specific batch includes those features. Each tank undergoes a test drive of at least 100 km before dispatch.
The T-90M is the most modern and expensive variant in the T-72/T-90 lineage, featuring a newly designed welded turret, Relikt reactive armor and a remote-controlled machine-gun module; it serves as an interim upgrade while the T-14 Armata remains stuck in prolonged trials. The T-72B3M is a cheaper, mass-refurbished T-72 variant. The delivery fits a broader adaptation cycle: open-source analysts at Oryx estimate Russia has lost more than 4,400 visually confirmed main battle tanks since February 2022, pushing UVZ to increasingly refurbish older T-72B hulls alongside new production. Russian claims of "maximum protection" are disputed: Militarnyi notes a July 2026 incident in which a T-72B3A fitted with the Arena-M active protection system — reportedly its first known combat use — failed to function, during an attack on ten tanks near Maiak, Donetsk region. Exact tank numbers and the actual battlefield effectiveness of the new protection remain independently unconfirmed.
Polish Lubawa Unveils Net Screen Against FPVs and Grenade Launchers
2026-09-10
Polish manufacturer Lubawa S.A. has unveiled a lightweight net screen ('Lekka osłona siatkowa') at the MSPO 2026 defense exhibition in Poland, designed to protect vehicles against both shaped-charge RPG rounds (PG-7V and PG-7VM type) and FPV drone strikes. The screen consists of a frame made from composite material or aluminum alloy, with tear-resistant, weather-treated cables tensioned by fabric straps secured with Velcro. Metal fittings at the cable intersections are meant to prevent shifting.
The system mounts to a vehicle's hull through adjustable brackets that set the standoff distance between the net and the armor — the classic slat-armor principle, now adapted for the drone threat. At the exhibition it was shown fitted to a Bobr 3 reconnaissance vehicle; earlier, at Poland's Armed Forces Day parade in August 2026, South Korean KLTV armored vehicles were also displayed wearing the same screen. According to Lubawa's own product page, the net and profiles alone weigh just 4.75 kg/m², and a European/PCT patent application is pending.
Neither the news article nor the manufacturer's material includes independent test results or hard performance figures against FPV drones — the protection claims come from Lubawa itself. This fits a broader pattern of Polish and other NATO eastern-flank manufacturers showcasing drone-adapted vehicle protection at exhibitions like MSPO amid the persistent threat along the Russian and Belarusian border.
Ukrainian Armor unveils Saigak armored vehicle, explores German partnership for production
2026-09-09
Ukrainian private defense manufacturer Ukrainian Armor unveiled two new land vehicles at the MSPO 2026 exhibition in Kielce, Poland (September 2026): the Saigak, the company's first light armored personnel vehicle, and the Varta-3, a new MRAP variant. The Saigak is built on a Toyota Hilux pickup chassis reinforced with an armored capsule cabin rated to PZSA-3 ballistic protection (stopping standard 5.45x39mm and 7.62x39mm rifle rounds), carries up to five people, and is intended to replace the unarmored SUVs currently used to move commanders and personnel around the battlefield. It is powered by a 2.4-litre, 240hp diesel engine, has a top speed of 140 km/h and a range of up to 600 km.
CEO Vladyslav Belbas described the Saigak as designed to "transform unarmored civilian pick-up vehicles" and protect them from drone threats, saying it also features an active protection system meant to counter up to 20 FPV drone attacks — a claim not reflected in the vehicle's published technical specification. The companion Varta-3, based on a Mercedes-Benz Unimog chassis, is rated to withstand blasts of up to 8 kg TNT-equivalent plus ballistic threats.
Alongside the unveiling, Belbas said Ukrainian Armor is exploring partnerships with German industry — citing Mercedes-Benz by name as an example — to support manufacturing of the new vehicles. He stressed the talks remain exploratory: no formal agreement with any German company has been reached, and there have been no discussions with the German government about future vehicle orders.
Ukraine's KhKBM says it built ~600 BTR-4s under fire and unveils the self-funded Pegas IFV at MSPO 2026
2026-09-09
At the MSPO defence exhibition in Kielce, Poland, the Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau (KhKBM/KMDB) said it has built roughly 600 BTR-4 8x8 armoured personnel carriers since the start of 2022, having relocated production out of Kharkiv beyond Russian strike range and worked through repeated attacks on Ukraine's defence industry. Company representatives put annual capacity at about 200 vehicles and said the BTR-4E is roughly 80% Ukrainian-made by component count. The 600 figure is a company statement and is not independently confirmed.
The resilience story has a flip side: KhKBM also said the state is not currently ordering BTR-4Es. The last existing state order was completed in mid-2026, and on-hand component stocks are enough for only another 100-200 hulls. The plant has kept producing under fire, but faces an order drought that threatens continuity.
KhKBM separately unveiled the Pegas, a new tracked IFV of about 35 tonnes that it has been developing on its own initiative since 2024 using company funds, with no state financing. Intended to replace Soviet BMP-1/BMP-2 vehicles, it is designed for STANAG 4569 Level 4 all-round protection and Level 6 across the frontal arc, with planned armament via the Topaz module (30 mm cannon, coaxial 7.62 mm, two ATGMs, 30 mm automatic grenade launcher) plus planned anti-UAV electronic warfare. A mock-up was displayed at MSPO and a first prototype is reported to be about half assembled. All specifications are design intent; nothing is combat-proven.
Defense Express reports that two Ukrainian video materials appeared in open access at roughly the same time, both dealing with improvised anti-drone protection fitted to M1A1 Abrams tanks in Ukrainian service. In an interview by the outlet Hromadske with crews of the 425th Separate Assault Regiment "Skelia," the tankers describe an episode in which one of their Abrams withstood hits from as many as 20 enemy FPV drones. That vehicle was said to be additionally covered with cage ("mangal") armour combined with reactive/active-protection blocks. The account is presented as evidence both of the platform's baseline survivability and of the quality of the field-improvised add-on protection.
The second video, attributed to the Armia Media portal, shows a tank crew of the 225th Separate Assault Regiment operating an Abrams fitted with "hedgehog"-type protection — outward-projecting welded steel spikes. According to the crew, this design is particularly effective against fiber-optic-guided FPV drones: the trailing control cable catches and tears on the steel spikes, so the drone loses control and falls before it can strike. The report notes that the spike array is welded on ergonomically, still allows access to the turret, and does not appear to restrict the tank's mobility. Surrounding context in the piece states that a single tank sortie now requires around two weeks of planning and weather timed to limit Russian strike-drone employment.
This is a single Ukrainian-source account (Defense Express, relaying Ukrainian unit videos) and has not been independently confirmed; the "20 drone hits" figure and the claimed performance of the improvised armour rest on the crews' own statements. Defense Express is a Ukrainian outlet with a pronounced editorial slant.
Почему танки перестали доминировать на поле боя? (Rybar video essay)
2026-09-05SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
Rybar published a short video essay (2:21) from its #ИсторияПодвига series, forwarded from the affiliated channel Тактикарь, asking why the tank no longer dominates the battlefield. Rybar first sketches the classic role: since the early twentieth century the tank was the "steel fist" of armies — it broke through defensive lines, supported infantry and served as an assault gun. Tanks entered the "SVO" in that role, with examples such as a T-80BV crew destroying Ukrainian armour and the "carousel" tactic used against Ukrainian infantry.
Then, Rybar argues, everything changed because of "small, cheap products made from commercial components" — FPV drones — which he calls the most serious challenge to the tank since it first appeared on the battlefield. The factors cited are: mass-producible, very cheap FPV drones and anti-tank guided missiles that make any visible vehicle vulnerable; the loss of combined-arms cover (infantry, air defence, electronic warfare) so that tanks can no longer advance under protection; and a cost asymmetry in which a drone worth a few hundred dollars disables a vehicle worth millions. The consequence: both armies no longer use the tank for the breakthrough but as mobile artillery and standoff fire support — firing from cover, then withdrawing quickly.
As countermeasures Rybar points to physical protection (cope cages, rubber and chain skirts, and more recently the heavier "hedgehog" cage armour), vehicle-mounted jammers against FPV control links, active protection systems, and above all adapted tactics that minimise exposure; he implicitly concedes that no single measure removes the drone threat. Caveat: this is a single Russian milblogger source (Rybar), a personal/editorial voice and not an MoD position; milbloggers contradict each other and the MoD. The item connects thematically to entry e-20260905-02 (hedgehog cage armour and Ukraine's decision to park its Abrams tanks).
Krasnaya Zvezda profile «The Fiddler and his symphony of battle»: 1st Guards Tank Army assault-group training
2026-09-01SINGLE SOURCE
SINGLE SOURCE — Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Defence Ministry's official daily (a state/propaganda outlet). A front-line profile built around an instructor with the call sign «Skripach» (Fiddler). The peg is a multi-day combat-coordination course (боевое слаживание) for assault groups at a polygon in the rear area of the «special military operation» zone. The article identifies the trainees as personnel of the assault subunits of the 12th Guards Tank Regiment, 4th Guards Tank Division (Kantemirovskaya), 1st Guards Tank Army, «Zapad» grouping of forces. The soldiers practised seizing strongpoints and small-arms fighting in built-up terrain across more than 20 assault episodes; the training ground is described as a maze of buildings with breached walls and multi-level firing points, with new injects every hour (enemy armour, loss of communications).
Skripach is a senior sergeant and machine-gunner who has fought since 2022 and now trains new intakes between rotations. A comrade («Zira», a rifleman-instructor) says the optimal urban assault team is no more than four men — machine-gunner, rifleman, grenadier and commander, each with his own sector. Entering a building is called the most dangerous phase: approach at an angle, throw a grenade, then an instant rush inside while the machine-gunner suppresses the adjacent floors. Training also covers self-emplaced smoke, mock underground passages and tactical medicine (self-applied tourniquet, shift the weapon to the good hand, keep moving and firing).
As a final check, the assault groups took three notional strongpoints in sequence, with success defined as an assault time no longer than eight minutes; the article says all groups passed. There are no claims of specific battlefield results, locations or dates — it is primarily a morale and human-interest story. The one piece of durable OSINT value is the ORBAT detail (12th Guards Tank Regiment / 4th Guards Tank Division / 1st Guards Tank Army under «Zapad») and the picture of tank-division personnel trained and fielded as dismounted urban assault infantry — consistent with the well-documented Russian pattern. Uncorroborated by independent reporting.
Lightness and Maneuverability Against Drones: US Army Orders Thousands of ISV Armored Vehicles
2026-08-23SINGLE SOURCE
SINGLE SOURCE — Russian publication (Topwar.ru) on US procurement policy. The US Army has sharply expanded its ISV order from GM Defense: from an original 649 to 11,582 units (nearly 18-fold). The ISV carries nine soldiers and prioritizes lightness/agility over armor; meant to complement, not replace, the Humvee/JLTV.
Rationale per the article: lessons from Ukraine — units remaining visible/stationary too long can be detected by drones and quickly destroyed. US planners reportedly aim for rapid repositioning/dispersal to outpace enemy targeting cycles. One ISV variant uses a Toyota Hilux chassis (TAG Dynamics), indicating reliance on civilian platforms.
CAVEAT: Russian publication on US equipment policy; no independent confirmation of exact figures, contract terms, or rationale — treat as a claim relayed by Topwar, not verified fact.