Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
Asked whether Ukraine would send troops to defend NATO, Zelenskyy instead offers Ukraine's drone-defence know-how to neighbours facing Russian incursions
2026-09-26
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Ukraine will share its experience of defending against drones with partners facing Russian hybrid and drone attacks, NATO members and non-members alike, Euromaidan Press reported, citing UNIAN. Asked whether Ukraine would send troops to defend NATO members under attack, Zelenskyy did not answer that question directly. He pointed instead to Ukraine's "Drone Deal" agreements. These are bilateral pacts, open to countries inside and outside NATO, that combine sales of drones and missiles and joint production with "an exchange of experience". According to the report, Ukraine had signed such deals with nine countries by early August and was negotiating with more than a dozen others. Kyiv presents itself as "a security provider for Europe".
The offer comes as Russian drone and hybrid activity spreads beyond Ukraine, to Moldova, Romania and Germany among others. "Russia will continue hybrid attacks against various countries, and not only NATO members," Zelenskyy said. He singled out Moldova, which belongs to neither NATO nor the EU. According to the report, Moldova logged 39 Russian drone incursions in the first eight months of 2026. On 24 September drones entered both Moldovan and Romanian airspace while Poland scrambled fighter jets. Zelenskyy said Ukraine offers help "above all to those countries that help us during the war".
As a precedent for sharing counter-drone expertise, Zelenskyy cited Ukraine sending specialists to the Middle East to help protect critical infrastructure. He said sharing drone-defence know-how is "precisely part of this exchange" under the Drone Deal framework. The development shows Kyiv using its combat-tested counter-UAS experience as a diplomatic and security asset, while it avoids any commitment of troops.
WSJ: Российский бизнес организует самостоятельную защиту предприятий от БПЛА
2026-09-26SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru) relays a Wall Street Journal report that Russian companies are increasingly organising their own protection against Ukrainian drones. Its lead example is steel and mining group Severstal, controlled by Alexei Mordashov, which deployed an air defence system at one of its plants after a Ukrainian drone strike. Businesses are said to be moving from passive protection such as fencing and netting to active defence: leasing air defence systems from Defence Ministry-linked structures, building their own, and hiring staff to detect and destroy drones. Job sites advertise such security posts, some tied to Defence Ministry contracts, with employers promising the staff will not be sent to the front.
Topwar notes that this fits Kremlin policy: strategic enterprises that fail to organise protection risk tough state measures, up to temporary 'external administration'. It also describes a growing commercial market for automatic and semi-automatic counter-drone detection and defeat systems with electronic warfare components, and an expanding insurance market against drone damage, including for private citizens, which it says the Bank of Russia supports. The WSJ original is paywalled and was not reviewed in full.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru), a private Russian military news outlet relaying a Wall Street Journal report; the claims have not been independently verified.
The Russian milblogger channel Rybar says a new compilation by war correspondent Alexander Kots illustrates "another systemic problem" for the Russian armed forces: the number of drones fielded by the opponent keeps growing, and so does the range of UAV types in use.
Rybar argues that shooting down individual drones can go on indefinitely, but at these volumes striking production facilities and warehouses alone can no longer solve the problem. What is needed, it says, is a mass response directly in the air, with relatively cheap FPV interceptor drones coming to the fore. The post gives no figures or specific drone types and refers readers to a longer piece on Rybar's channel on the Russian MAX platform, which was not reviewed.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal/editorial Telegram channel. It does not represent the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the ministry. The claims have not been independently verified.
Russia's weeks-long strike campaign against Ukrainian data centres and telecom sites continues: Kyiv's Cosmonova hit twice, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine facilities targeted, and an Odesa data centre struck on 4 October, MoD says
2026-09-26
Russian drone strikes and falling debris hit at least three Kyiv districts (Shevchenkivskyi, Solomianskyi, Sviatoshynskyi) on 26 September, damaging an office building, preschool grounds and other non-residential buildings; Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported seven injured. Russia's Defence Ministry (via TASS) and the Dva Mayora channel claimed one hit struck the Cosmonova data-processing centre, which they say supported mobile internet and Starlink connectivity for Ukraine's armed forces. The damage is confirmed from the Ukrainian side: the operator said its main facilities were damaged and traffic was rerouted to backup sites, and Kyiv Post and Ukrinform reported the centre was hit twice that day, knocking Novyny.LIVE, Armiya TV and Channel 24 off air or degrading their signal, with Suspilne and 'We Are Ukraine+' also affected. The Starlink role attributed to Cosmonova remains a Russian characterisation not confirmed by Ukraine.
The strikes are part of a sustained campaign. According to Ukrainian tech-sector sources cited by Kyiv Post, Russia had been hitting Ukrainian data centres for about three weeks by late September, including four facilities in a single operation on 24 September. Breaking Defense (2 October) quotes Kateryna Chernohorenko, deputy defence minister for digital transformation in 2023-2025, saying data centres face increased attacks; it reports that on 27 September a drone hit Kyivstar, Ukraine's largest mobile operator, and that the Russian MoD claimed a strike on a Vodafone Ukraine data centre. Chernohorenko said not everything can be moved underground, so stronger anti-ballistic and anti-drone defences, already critically short, are key; Ukraine has moved some data centres abroad and invested in underground networks. She also warned of a possible fighter shortage by year's end, as F-16s used against drones face, per the Wall Street Journal, 40-week maintenance cycles in Belgium instead of two to six weeks.
In Odesa region the Russian Defence Ministry claimed, via TASS, strikes on 26 September on a Nova Poshta logistics centre and the Epicentr logistics hub, which it says stored foreign military cargo for the Ukrainian army, and on a bulk carrier heading to Odesa allegedly carrying military cargo. On 4 October it claimed Geran drones had hit another Nova Poshta logistics centre in Chornomorsk and a data centre in Odesa, with hits 'confirmed in real time' on released video, plus a cargo vessel in the Black Sea east of Odesa said to carry military supplies. These Russian MoD claims, including the military characterisation of the targets, have not been independently confirmed.
Головна загроза прийде разом із туманами: «Перун» про плани росіян на Запоріжжі
2026-09-26SINGLE SOURCE
Dmytro 'Perun' Filatov, commander of Ukraine's 1st Separate Assault Regiment, told Suspilne that Russian forces on the Zaporizhzhia axis have reduced the number of assaults, which he attributes to Russia choosing another direction for its main effort, apparently Dobropillia. Infiltration attempts still happen daily, mostly by groups of two or three infantrymen, countered by strike-and-search actions along Ukrainian supply routes. According to Filatov, Russian forces fire little artillery at his unit because Ukrainian counter-battery fire quickly destroys guns after they fire; there is therefore no classic artillery preparation before infantry actions, and Russian fire is concentrated on drones. Russian crews hide their guns with revetments, camouflage nets and dug-in positions, and limit their firing arc so they do not have to cut trees in tree lines.
Filatov named the former Kakhovka reservoir bed as a particular threat: dense vegetation, high humidity and long autumn and winter fogs make it hard to observe and control. He says Russian troops used these conditions last year to enter the village of Prymorske, which Ukrainian forces now fully hold again, and expects the area to become very hard to hold with current forces as the weather worsens. He does not expect a full-scale offensive on Zaporizhzhia, but the same infiltration tactics under more favourable conditions, requiring no extra units. He identified the Russian force in the sector as the 'Dnepr' grouping, which includes airborne (VDV) troops.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from ArmyInform, the news agency of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. The claims about Russian plans have not been independently verified.
Ракета или дрон: в польской прессе оценили «Герань-5»
2026-09-26SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru) relays an assessment by the Polish outlet Defence24 of Russia's jet-powered Geran-5, asking whether it is a drone or a cruise missile. According to Defence24, the Geran-5 is not a Shahed-136/238 derivative but is based on the Iranian Karrar jet drone, powered by a commercial Chinese Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet, with a reported top speed of up to 650 km/h, a range of about 1,000 km and a ceiling of up to 6,000 m. At about 850 kg total mass it carries a roughly 90 kg warhead (versus 250 kg for Scalp Naval and 450 kg for Tomahawk). Its electronics reportedly include a 12-channel Kometa-M12 satellite-navigation receiver, a US-made Tracker V3 telemetry unit and a Chinese Xingkai Tech XK-F358 mesh modem; Defence24 puts the unit cost well above $100,000, giving up the low cost that made earlier Gerans attractive. Topwar adds that MANPADS (ceiling roughly 3,500–4,000 m) cannot reach it, forcing Ukraine to use SAMs or fighters, and that first footage of Ukrainian drones intercepting Geran-5s has appeared.
A separate topwar.ru analysis by Anatoly Blinov examines whether Ukrainian interceptor drones can catch the jet-powered Geran-3/Geran-4 (claimed 300–350 km/h). It cites manufacturer claims such as Vluchnyk's Zorelit v5 (416 km/h, 47 km range, about $2,000, factory tests completed 21 September), Wild Hornets' Sting (280 km/h), Quantum Systems' STRILA (350–415 km/h), F-Drones' LITAVR (350 km/h), SkyFall's JetKiller (370 km/h, 9,000 m ceiling) and General Cherry's BULLET (310 km/h), plus the turbojet Alexa Spatium codified in August. The author stresses that none of these speeds or hit rates is independently verified and that no confirmed interception of a jet-powered Geran by an interceptor drone has been publicly documented.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru), a private Russian military news and opinion outlet, partly relaying Polish press and Ukrainian manufacturers' own claims; none of the technical figures has been independently verified.
Ukraine reports record September for destroyed Russian air defense systems and radar stations under its e-Points scoring system
2026-09-26
Militarnyi reports, citing the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, that September 2026 was a record month for the destruction of Russian air defense systems, and in particular radar stations, since the start of the e-Points (e-Baly) program. The figures are therefore Ukrainian Ministry of Defense data, not independently verified, and the record is measured only against the program's own history, not the whole war. The article gives no absolute count of systems or radars destroyed, and no breakdown by system type; the only comparison is that September exceeds all earlier months of the program. One strike on a Russian air defense system was recorded at a distance of 552 km.
Under e-Points, verified strikes recorded in the DELTA combat system earn points that can be redeemed for equipment through the Brave1 Market; since March, personnel can also exchange points for equipment components. All results are video-documented in DELTA and verified by the Brave1 defense innovation cluster. Other September figures cited: 33,087 Russian personnel confirmed killed (only March and April 2026 were higher), more than 11,000 confirmed hits beyond 20 km from the front line for the first time, and a record number of strikes beyond 50 km, many on the Mariupol-Crimea logistics route. The Ministry also says Shahed-type drones neutralized were 28% higher than in August, with about 55% of Geran jet-powered drones neutralized since early September, increasingly by interceptor drones.
A separate claim: analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko, as reported by Charter'97 on 26 September, said Russia lost 76 air defense systems in the first part of September, against the earlier monthly record of 73 in July 2023; the Ukrainian General Staff cumulative toll was given as 1,673 systems. That is a different measure from the Ministry's e-Points record, was not in the Militarnyi article, and is not independently confirmed.
Ukrainian drones halt Lukoil's Perm refinery, Russia's seventh-largest, for the second time in a month
2026-09-25
The Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez refinery in Perm halted operations after a Ukrainian drone attack overnight on 25 September, Reuters reported citing industry sources. By output it is Russia's seventh-largest refinery: in 2024 it processed 12.6 million tonnes of crude and produced 2 million tonnes of gasoline and 5.3 million tonnes of diesel. According to Reuters' sources, as relayed by RBC-Ukraine, the strike caused a fire and damaged pipelines, storage facilities and processing units. Perm governor Dmitry Makhonin confirmed only an attack on an unnamed "industrial facility"; local and independent media identified the refinery. The Moscow Times reports one man was killed in the Perm strike.
It is the second strike on the plant in about a month: a drone attack on 21 August caused a large fire and led to a shutdown on 24 August, when according to UNITED24 the primary atmospheric-vacuum distillation unit was damaged. The same night Ukraine also hit the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov region, which suspended operations, and industrial and civilian sites in Ulyanovsk region, where at least eight people were injured. Russia's Defence Ministry claimed 592 Ukrainian drones were intercepted over Russia and occupied Crimea overnight; that figure is not independently verified.
The strike fits Ukraine's sustained long-range drone campaign against Russian refining. UNITED24 claims the campaign has knocked out roughly a third of Russia's refining output and pushed crude processing to its lowest level in more than a decade; that assessment comes from a Ukrainian state outlet and has not been independently confirmed.
German investigators suspect GRU behind arson attack next to Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing in Munich
2026-09-25
In the night of 2–3 September 2026, incendiary devices were thrown from a moving car onto a construction site in Munich's Berg am Laim district, directly next to the headquarters of technology and defence company Rohde & Schwarz and defence firm Helsing, which supplies drones to Ukraine's armed forces. Only one device ignited, near containers; a second was defused. Nobody was hurt and damage was limited. Two suspects, a 28-year-old woman and a 38-year-old man, were arrested at the scene and are in pre-trial detention; German reporting describes both as Bulgarian nationals.
According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, cited by Meduza and Abendzeitung München, German investigators believe Russian military intelligence (GRU) recruited the pair as low-level agents, and that they belonged to a GRU team operating from Slovakia. That team is also linked to an attempted arson attack in late August at a Skyeton drone factory in Haniska, Slovakia, where two Latvians and a Ukrainian were detained. The attribution is not officially confirmed: a spokeswoman for the Munich General Prosecutor's Office declined to confirm the intelligence link, citing the ongoing investigation.
German intelligence reportedly attributes such incidents to the GRU's Department of Special Tasks, a unit said to have been set up in February 2025 to coordinate assassinations and sabotage abroad and to infiltrate Western companies and universities. If confirmed, Munich would be the second suspected Russian attack in Germany within about a month, after explosive drones were found in August at Leipzig Airport near Ukrainian cargo aircraft. Germany formally accused Russia of sabotage on 1 September; Moscow denies involvement.
Most firms in Russia's Molniya drone supply chain are unsanctioned, Ukrainian research finds
2026-09-25
Research by the Ukrainian think tank Center for Defense Reforms, shared exclusively with the Kyiv Independent (25 September 2026), finds that most companies involved in producing Russia's Molniya strike drones are not under Western sanctions. The Molniya is made by Atlant Aero LLC; according to Serhii Beskrestnov, a former adviser to Ukraine's Defence Ministry, it costs around $1,600, has a range of up to 50 km and carries a warhead of up to 10 kg. Its low cost and simple production have made it one of Russia's most widely used strike UAVs.
Atlant Aero LLC itself is sanctioned by the EU and Canada, but not by the United States or the United Kingdom. Its controlling shareholder, Prominvest JSC, is not sanctioned in any jurisdiction, and neither beneficial owner Viktor Grigoryev nor the company's four other co-owners face Western sanctions. The report identifies a further 10 unsanctioned Russian companies providing critical components and services, plus 11 unsanctioned Chinese suppliers of critical components — among them Shenzhen Xingkai Technology Company, which the report says supplies mesh-network equipment that lets Russian drones fly deep into Ukrainian territory.
Satellite imagery cited in the article shows Atlant Aero's main production site in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, expanded rapidly in 2025, with additional production buildings next to the existing facility; no production-volume figures are given. Center for Defense Reforms chairman Oleksandr Danylyuk said companies involved in producing Russian weapons must face Western sanctions. The findings come from a single advocacy-oriented research report and have not been independently verified.
Ukrainian drones halt Novoshakhtinsk refinery and set Ilsky refinery ablaze on consecutive nights; Moscow–Tolyatti passenger train damaged
2026-09-25
Overnight on 24–25 September Ukrainian drones struck the Novoshakhtinsk refinery, the only refinery in Russia's Rostov region and one of southern Russia's largest fuel suppliers (about 5.6 million tonnes a year), forcing it to halt operations, according to Rostov governor Yury Slyusar. He said around 50 drones were downed over the region, part of 592 Ukrainian drones Russia claimed to have intercepted nationwide that night; no casualties were reported. It is at least the third strike on the plant this year, after two hits in August caused a fire lasting several days.
The following night Ukraine's General Staff confirmed a strike on the Ilsky refinery in Krasnodar Krai (about 6.6 million tonnes a year), which it says supplies fuel to the Russian military. It named the 1st Separate Centre of the Unmanned Systems Forces and the 414th Unmanned Systems Brigade ('Madyar's Birds') among the units involved, at a range of about 400 km; Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point said FP-1 drones damaged three primary processing units and a tank farm. The plant has reportedly been hit at least 16 times since 2022. Krasnodar governor Veniamin Kondratyev said, via TASS, that a Ukrainian drone attack on Seversky district — where Ilsky lies — killed people and seriously injured one, damaged a residential building and started fires at two enterprises; no death toll was given.
In the same window, passenger train No. 66 from Moscow to Tolyatti was damaged by what Russian Railways called 'external interference' on the Samara–Ulyanovsk regional border, injuring the driver and halting traffic on the line, Meduza reported. The governor did not name a cause; Russian channels reported a drone. Damage assessments rest on Russian regional officials and Ukrainian military and industry claims.
Russia strikes Kyiv in overnight, daytime and evening drone waves on 25 September; 173 drones, over 50 of them jet-powered, launched the following night
2026-09-25
Russia struck Kyiv in several separate drone waves on 25 September rather than in a single night-time raid. Overnight and into the morning, drones hit high-rise residential buildings in the Solomianskyi and Pecherskyi districts (one at fourth-floor level, another between the seventh and tenth floors), killing a 14-year-old, Meduza reported, citing Mayor Vitali Klitschko and the city administration. Russia's Defence Ministry claimed its strikes that night targeted a Ukrainian drone assembly and storage site, military warehouses, a port and a cargo ship. Ukrainian officials gave no drone types or numbers for the overnight wave.
A daytime drone strike followed at around 15:00 local time, hitting an office building in Solomianskyi district and setting cars ablaze in the adjacent car park; at least four people were killed and several dozen injured, according to Klitschko and the National Police. Meduza reported that a medical facility and the data centre of internet provider DataGroup in the same district were also hit. President Zelensky said a McDonald's warehouse had been targeted earlier that day and framed the attacks as a deliberate widening of targets to businesses, data centres and internet providers. In the evening a drone crashed into a two-storey nursery school in Obolonskyi district, and another set more than 300 sq m of a school in Ivanivka (Kyiv Oblast) on fire; no children were present. By 19:39 Klitschko put the day's toll in Kyiv at 7 killed and 57 injured.
The next wave began at 18:00 on 25 September and ran through the night. Ukraine's Air Force reported 173 drones: Shahed-type attack drones (more than 50 of them jet-powered, which points to the Geran-3 type, although the Air Force did not name it), Gerbera attack drones and Parodiya decoys, launched from Oryol, Kursk, Millerovo, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and Shatalovo in Russia and from occupied Donetsk and Hvardiiske in Crimea. By 07:30, 134 had been shot down or jammed; hits were recorded at 19 locations and falling debris at 8. These Air Force figures cannot be independently verified.
The Russian milblogger channel Rybar reports that Ukrainian forces resumed strikes on Russia after about a day of relative calm, launching at least 594 UAVs according to the Russian Ministry of Defence. It mocks the Ukrainian delegation in the United States for having called for a ceasefire. Rybar says most drones were shot down, but some industrial sites were hit. In Ulyanovsk, it says, the 'Iskra' electronics plant was damaged and drones also hit residential buildings, wounding eight people. It adds that a passenger train was damaged in Ulyanovsk oblast near the border with Samara oblast, with no passengers hurt but train schedules to be adjusted. A refinery in Perm krai was attacked, killing one person, and in Voronezh the 'Voronezhsintezkauchuk' plant, which makes synthetic rubbers and thermoplastic elastomers, was hit.
Rybar calls the new raid expected. It claims Russian strikes had destroyed some Ukrainian workshops and production capacity, causing problems with storing and assembling drones, so Ukraine now has to build up resources for massed attacks. According to the channel, much of Ukraine's weaponry comes directly from Europe, and cargo flights, including to Lviv, have increased over the past two weeks. The channel also notes that, for the first time in a long while, authorities in the affected Russian regions stopped blaming fires and impacts on 'debris'. It welcomes this, arguing that stock phrasing cannot hold up against the photos and videos Ukrainian channels publish, and that plainly admitting damage can restore public trust. Finally, it claims Russia's own strike campaign has already hurt Ukraine's economy and paralysed shipping, but says attacks must continue and sometimes be adjusted to achieve a strategic effect.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal/editorial Telegram channel (Rybar). It does not represent the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the ministry. The claims have not been independently verified.
На Северном флоте отрабатывали защиту от беспилотников
2026-09-25SINGLE SOURCE
According to the Northern Fleet press service, units responsible for guarding and defending Northern Fleet basing points in Murmansk Oblast held an exercise on repelling a UAV attack on military facilities. In the scenario a fleet facility came under simulated air attack, and personnel practised detecting, suppressing and engaging low-flying aerial targets.
Electronic warfare crews jammed and suppressed the control links of small UAVs, while mobile fire groups and air observation posts practised detecting aerial objects and employing weapons against them. The press service stressed that this was a planned exercise, not a report of a real attack. The article links it to earlier Ukrainian threats of sabotage against Russian Navy infrastructure, including nuclear submarines and missile carriers, and says the military continues to improve air-defence and counter-sabotage protection of basing points, with particular attention to countering various drone types. It names no specific units, bases, ships or weapon systems.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Topwar, a Russian pro-government military news site relaying Ministry of Defence information; it has not been independently verified.
«Мы не убегаем от FPV-дронов, мы на них охотимся»: мобильная огневая группа «БАРС-Курск» (группа Араба)
2026-09-25SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
WarGonzo highlights a mobile fire group (MOG) of the volunteer brigade 'BARS-Kursk' (Group North) commanded by Yevgeny Lobaev, call sign 'Arab'. He is the son of the arms designer Vladislav Lobaev and originally joined the brigade as an instructor. The group operates on what it calls one of the hottest stretches of the Kursk border area. Its task is to shoot down Ukrainian FPV drones and other UAVs that hit transport routes, infrastructure and civilians. The linked Kurskaya Pravda feature (25 September) says the group has set a brigade record for drones downed over the past two months. No figures are given.
According to the post and the article, the group differs from other BARS-Kursk MOGs in rarely using pickups and machine guns. It moves on foot, sets ambushes along known drone flight corridors and relies on automatic small arms. It has largely abandoned 12-gauge shotguns because it engages FPV drones at 200–250 m. The deputy platoon commander ('Russkiy') gives the reason: Ukrainian FPVs now carry directional-fragmentation charges, like a directional mine, with a roughly 50 m fragment spray, so range and reaction time are critical. Detection relies on video-interception receivers, which reportedly pick up drones before they can be heard and show drone type, distance and even operator call signs. The group also posts observers ('eyes') along ammunition-supply and evacuation routes to hunt loitering 'waiter' drones. A former competition sniper serves as senior shooter and instructor. Engagements are filmed for after-action review. The article describes a fast cat-and-mouse cycle. When the group starts downing fibre-optic drones, Ukrainian operators switch to analogue links. When those are jammed with EW, they move to digital links. They then attack in pairs or threes, from the flank and at very low altitude. One fighter recounts an FPV coming for the group via a detour about 20 minutes after it had downed another drone.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal/editorial Telegram channel (WarGonzo), which relays a feature from the Kursk regional newspaper Kurskaya Pravda. It does not represent the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the ministry. The claims have not been independently verified.
Ukraine hits two Russian missile-component plants in two nights: Almaz-Antey's Iskra in Ulyanovsk (Kh-59, Pantsir parts) and the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant, which leaked files tie to at least seven missile programs including Kh-101 and Oreshnik
2026-09-25
Ukrainian long-range drones struck JSC NPP 'Iskra Plant' in Ulyanovsk overnight on 24–25 September 2026, as part of a wider drone barrage on Russia. The plant belongs to the Almaz-Antey defence conglomerate and makes semiconductor devices, microwave components and electronics. According to Militarnyi and an identification by the independent Russian outlet ASTRA, it supplies components for Kh-59M2/M2A air-launched guided missiles (via the Yaroslavl Radio Plant) and diodes used in Pantsir-S1 air defence systems. Ulyanovsk governor Alexei Russkikh confirmed the attack, reporting damage to industrial and civilian infrastructure and eight people injured, including a child.
On the night of 26 September Ukraine hit the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant (AOMZ) in Azov, Rostov Oblast, which President Zelensky and the General Staff confirmed. The plant is part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV) and makes opto-mechanical and optoelectronic equipment and electronics for artillery, missile and anti-tank weapons. According to the SBU, its Alpha special group and the Navy used Neptune cruise missiles and Ruta, Palianytsia and Bars jet-powered drone-missiles. The SBU said the strike started a fire at the foundry and damaged equipment in five production buildings, including optical production, an assembly section, an electroplating workshop and a printed-circuit-board facility. OSINT and NASA FIRMS fire data indicated a fire near the site. The same night Ukraine also hit the Ilsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai. After the strike, the private analytical group Dallas Analytics published internal AOMZ, KTRV and supplier correspondence, state-contract data and cooperation schedules covering April 2023 to March 2025. According to these files, the plant is part of the production chains of at least seven missile programs. For the Kh-101 cruise missile it makes the Otblesk navigation lidar, which fixes the missile's position when satellite navigation is jammed, and the flight-control automation unit, for which no alternative supplier reportedly exists. The files also list guidance elements for the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, seekers for the Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, and electronics and seekers for the R-74 air-to-air missile. For the R-37M air-to-air missile the plant makes power, switching and battery-activation units, harnesses and housings. It also makes flight-control automation for the Kh-35U, Kh-59 and Kh-69 missiles, plus seekers for the Kh-38ML missile and the KAB-250L guided bomb. A March 2025 request asked whether the plant could supply 500 sets of electronic components and 1,000 housings a year from 2026, as the Aerospace Forces sought larger deliveries.
The two strikes show Ukraine targeting the electronics and seeker supply chain behind Russian missiles and air defence, not only launch platforms and fuel. The Azov documents suggest single points of failure, notably for the Kh-101. The damage claims rest on Russian regional officials, statements from the SBU and the Ukrainian military, and OSINT indicators. The leaked documents come from a Ukrainian-aligned private group and have not been independently authenticated. The extent of production disruption has not been independently verified.
Update 7 October: Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint, that satellite images have revealed the consequences of the 25 September attack on the Zavod Iskra research and production company in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk. According to the analyst, most of the strikes hit the building's facade rather than the roof. As a result, around 80% of the strikes were not captured by the satellite: only two of the 11 confirmed strikes caused visible damage in the imagery. Dnipro Osint believes that facade hits could cause significantly more serious internal damage than roof hits, particularly if production facilities and equipment are located behind the walls. This is the analyst's assessment; the extent of internal damage is not confirmed.
Krasnaya Zvezda profiles an assault instructor with the callsign 'Kuznets' ('Blacksmith') who trains replacements for the assault units of the 27th Separate Guards Motor Rifle (Sevastopol) Brigade of the 'West' Group of Forces at a training ground inside the war zone. According to the paper, he volunteered in 2022 and first fought near Sumy. His core message is cohesion over heroism: assault troops move in pairs or threes, cover each other, watch assigned sectors and do not advance as a mass.
The course moves from small arms (AK-74M, SVD) to RPG-7 and AGS-17 grenade launchers, then covers close combat in tree lines (short bounds, natural cover, firing prone), tactical medicine with self-aid and fast casualty evacuation, and seizing and holding strongpoints built from dugouts and foxholes, including organising the defence and keeping communications going afterwards. A separate block deals with the drone threat: crossing open ground while expecting air attack, using camouflage, evasion and natural cover. The article notes that a fully equipped assault soldier carries a total weight of about 100 kg.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence; its claims have not been independently verified.
Krasnaya Zvezda reports that snipers from the Far East in the Group of Forces 'East' on the Zaporizhzhia axis now spend most of their time shooting down drones rather than enemy soldiers. Their main targets are FPV drones and heavy 'Baba Yaga' hexacopters. The sniper pair, a deputy platoon commander callsigned 'Gost' and a mobilised soldier from Buryatia callsigned 'Grosh', say they watch the sky, cover assault infantry and defend positions against three or four reconnaissance and strike UAVs a day. They claim more than ten targets destroyed on an ordinary day.
The article describes specific counter-drone techniques. The snipers fire when a drone hovers or slows down, for example while a Baba Yaga operator is choosing where to drop munitions, or when it starts to dive. Typical ranges against hexacopters are 50–60 m and rarely 100 m. They work mainly at night because moving into open ground in daylight is too dangerous. They say the improvised armour plates Ukrainian crews fit to heavy copters may stop small-calibre rounds but not 7.62 mm rifle bullets. They aim for the flight controller ('brain'), which they place slightly right of centre, between the plate underneath and the battery on top. They choose a weapon for each type of target; one sniper reportedly uses a suppressed 'ASM' rifle that the article claims is accurate up to 1.5 km.
This is a single-source report from Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence (a party to the conflict); its claims have not been independently verified.
Rybar reports that the tactical situation for Russian forces on the Slovyansk direction is deteriorating. According to the channel, Ukrainian forces are building up their presence and making heavy use of drones against Russian supply routes west of Siversk. The worst sector is the Dibrova–Ozerne area, where Ukraine has concentrated UAV operators whose strikes hamper preparations for an offensive on Slovyansk; those positions lie across the river and outside the area of responsibility of the Russian 'Yug' (South) group of forces, which Rybar says limits Russian units' ability to hit them. Ukrainian forces are also attacking from Orikhovatka and Mykolaivka towards Rai-Oleksandrivka, Rybar reports advances from Malynivka and calls control of Vasiutynske, Tykhonivka and Pervomaiske uncertain.
The channel attributes the problems largely to the Ukrainian advance near Lyman, where it says Ukraine exploited Russian errors in planning offensive operations; earlier Russian gains near the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal are now threatened, the assault on Mykolaivka has slowed, and Rybar concludes that at the current pace the assault on Slovyansk is pushed back by several months. In a follow-up analysis of Lyman (part 2) it says that after retaking positions on the former Sviatohirsk salient Ukraine freed up significant reserves, advanced north along the Zherebets to the outskirts of Yampolivka, attacked near Novoliubivka to wedge into the 'Zapad' (West) group's lines and tried to break into Yampil. It calls the situation 'difficult' and says Ukraine aims to retake the area between the Zherebets and Nitrius rivers and threaten the northern flank of the 'Yug' group.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal, editorial Telegram channel. It does not represent a position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD.
Russian drones crash and explode in Moldova and Romania through 1 October, including a Geran-4 jet drone blast beside a highway in Orhei district and a strike on a telecom mast; ISW links incursions, Polish Starlink sabotage and Berlin airport halt to one pattern
2026-09-24
During a Russian attack on Ukraine overnight into 24 September 2026 (Ukraine's Air Force reported 282 drones plus ballistic and other missiles), drones strayed into Moldova and Romania. Moldova's Defence Ministry reported four drone incursions and partially closed its northern airspace. Near Cernița (Florești district) a drone hit a tree, fell into a field beside a farm and exploded without casualties; police preliminarily identified it as a Gerbera, a low-cost Russian drone widely used against Ukraine, and the first found in Moldova. A second explosion near Vadul Rașcov is under investigation. President Maia Sandu counts 39 Russian drone incursions in 2026, against 17 in all of 2025. In Romania, radar tracked a target entering northern airspace; two F-16s were launched and residents received emergency phone alerts. The drone stayed about four minutes before crashing near Solca, without casualties or damage; Romanian officials did not confirm its origin, while ISW-based reporting describes it as a camera-equipped Gerbera, one of four over Bukovyna (Ukraine says it shot down three). Poland's Operational Command scrambled fighters twice and activated ground-based air defence and radar.
The incidents continued. On 26 September an unidentified drone crossed Moldovan airspace between 11:16 and 11:18, from the direction of Stepanivka (Odesa Oblast) past Novokotovsk in breakaway Transnistria. That evening, after residents alerted the authorities, Moldova's Border Police found debris of an unidentified drone outside Volintiri (Ștefan Vodă district, near the Ukrainian border), cordoned off the area and contacted the Ukrainian authorities; type and origin had not been officially identified by 27 September. Romania reported an unidentified object in its airspace overnight into 26 September, and allied fighters were scrambled. On the night of 28-29 September Romania again scrambled jets for an aerial asset near its airspace, though no violation was officially reported. On 29 September Romania's Defence Ministry said debris of an object, presumably a drone, had fallen on farmland on Great Brăila Island in Brăila County, reported by a local resident during the night. He said a fire broke out after the crash but went out by itself, with no casualties or damage. Interior Ministry units and the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) cordoned off the site and the pieces will be sent for expert examination; type and origin were not stated (Ukrainska Pravda via European Pravda). Police had already found drone fragments near Chișinău on 18 September. On 30 September, during another Russian mass attack on Ukraine, Kyiv Independent reported a drone crashing in Moldova (only the headline was available to us). According to Euromaidan Press, a Russian drone exploded near Hîrbovăț against a civilian mobile operator's mast, leaving blast marks over about 12 metres of the structure; service stayed up. (Euromaidan Press placed the village in Transnistria; Ukrainska Pravda, citing Moldova's General Police Inspectorate, puts it in Anenii Noi district and says the drone exploded about 40 m above the ground after striking the mast.) A second, jet-powered drone was detected at 10:26 heading toward Soroca in the north, and flights over northern and central Moldova were suspended. Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu said Russia would answer for its war crimes. That evening a third incident followed: according to Moldova's Defence Ministry and General Police Inspectorate (via Newsmaker, European Pravda and Ukrainska Pravda), a drone entered Moldovan airspace at around 20:45 and exploded after colliding with trees in a tree line right next to a highway near Brănești in Orhei district, in the centre of the country. Shortly before midnight police said it had features typical of a jet-powered Geran. On 1 October they reported a main crater of about 50 cm across and 30 cm deep, damaged trees and traces of shockwave and heat within up to 30 m, two smaller craters (about 50 and 30 cm) on the roadside some 15 m away, and fragments scattered over roughly 120 m, including rear wing sections marked 'Geran-4', electronic modules and propulsion parts, among them a heat-damaged jet engine. No casualties were reported.
ISW links the 24 September crashes to two incidents on 23 September. The first was a fire that destroyed the power system and backup generator of a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska, Poland. Deputy PM Krzysztof Gawkowski called it sabotage aimed at Ukraine's military internet access, though no perpetrator has been officially named. The second was a 45-minute halt at Berlin-Brandenburg airport after an unconfirmed drone sighting. ISW assesses that intentional and accidental Russian drone incursions are likely part of a Kremlin effort to normalise airspace violations by making them more frequent. It also says growing Western intelligence warnings suggest Moscow is diversifying its means of attack, citing Lithuanian reports of possible container-launched Gerberas in the Mediterranean. Euromaidan Press adds a political angle: on 29 September 46 opposition lawmakers filed a motion to suspend pro-EU President Maia Sandu (67 of 101 votes needed, then a referendum within 30 days). Ukrainian analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko argues the timing is deliberate, a pro-Russian destabilisation campaign; this is his assessment, not an established finding.
SBU: FSB-recruited soldier passed coordinates of Ukrainian drone repair battalion for Russian missile strike
2026-09-24
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) says it has detained a mobilised serviceman of a motorised infantry brigade in Kharkiv region who worked for Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). According to the SBU, the FSB recruited him before he was called up, making contact through a female relative living in Russia. In the army he served as an electrician repairing unmanned aerial systems in a battalion that restores Ukrainian drones.
The SBU says he collected the locations of his own and neighbouring units and passed the coordinates of the drone repair battalion to his FSB handler to prepare a Russian missile strike on it. He reportedly rotated five smartphones for encrypted communication with his handlers and planned to leave the unit shortly before the strike, using a hospital visit as a pretext.
SBU counterintelligence says it detained him in a service vehicle after he left the unit. He has been charged with high treason under martial law (Art. 111(2) of the Criminal Code), which carries up to life imprisonment. These are the SBU's claims; they have not been independently verified and no strike is reported to have taken place. The case illustrates the Russian targeting pattern of using recruited insiders to locate drone repair and maintenance sites.
Русская армия ударила по предприятию с двигателями для ракет «Фламинго» в Борисполе
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
WarGonzo reports, citing the Russian Ministry of Defence, that on the night before 24 September Russian forces carried out a massive strike on Ukrainian drone production, telecommunications and logistics. According to the post, a Kyiv enterprise making components for long- and medium-range drones was hit, as were the 'Kyivstar' and 'Parkovy' telecommunications centres, which it says provided communications and computing capacity to the Ukrainian armed forces. Two logistics centres in Odesa, allegedly storing and distributing military and dual-use cargo from European countries, were also reportedly struck. The post does not say which weapons were used.
In a second post on 25 September, again citing the Russian MoD, WarGonzo claims a strike on a drone assembly and storage site of the company Fire Point at Boryspil, Kyiv oblast. According to the post, Honeywell TFE731 engines — the powerplant of the long-range 'Flamingo' cruise missile — were stored there, and a large fire broke out after the strike. The post also claims strikes on two logistics centres in Odesa oblast and on berthing infrastructure and three military-equipment storage facilities in the port of Reni. No weapon types are named.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal, editorial Telegram channel. It does not represent a position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD. The claimed strike results have not been independently verified.
Report: CIA warned Spain, France and Italy of possible Russian drone attacks launched from ships in the Mediterranean; Italy disputes it
2026-09-24
The Spanish daily El Mundo reported late on 23 September that the CIA has warned European governments of a possible Russian drone operation against Spain, France or Italy. The drones would be launched from ships in the Mediterranean. According to El Mundo, as relayed by Ukrainska Pravda, Defense News and Meduza, European foreign ministries received a detailed CIA report that was drawn up after CIA Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow. Several defence analysts told the paper they knew the report existed. The core claim comes from an anonymous Lithuanian source. Defense News calls this source a Lithuanian intelligence source, Ukrainska Pravda refers to 'the Lithuanian government' and Meduza to the Lithuanian Defence Ministry. The source says Russia would hide the drones in shipping containers on commercial vessels, which Defense News links to the Russian 'shadow fleet', and catapult them towards the coast from international waters. One source told El Mundo: 'It is not difficult at all.'
The sources do not agree on the drone type. Ukrainska Pravda and Defense News name the Gerbera, a small drone with a wingspan of about 2.5 m, a range of about 600 km and a warhead of four to five kilograms. Meduza names the Geran-5 and also mentions a pro-war Russian Telegram channel that wrote about supplying Geran-5s to Algeria to threaten southern France. According to El Mundo, the aim would not be heavy damage. The drones would be used to shut down an airport, start fires, fly over military sites or show that Russia can reach Europe's rear areas. The report says the three countries were chosen because they hold elections in 2027. El Mundo links the warning to Macron's Defence Council meeting of 16 September, after which he invited party leaders and 2027 presidential candidates to the Élysée. Meduza also reports that French authorities took the warning seriously and raised readiness, but gives no further detail.
None of this has been confirmed. The CIA and the governments named have not commented publicly, and Defense News notes that the report has not been independently corroborated. Italy pushed back openly. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto wrote on X that the alarm 'helps no one', that there is no evidence to support it and that 'no one needs more fuel on the fire'.
Ukrainian drones hit oil depot in Rostov region and industrial facility in Krasnodar Krai
2026-09-24
Ukrainian drones struck targets in Russia's Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai on the night of 23–24 September 2026. Rostov governor Yuri Slyusar said air defences shot down drones over the city of Taganrog and over the Kagalnitsky and Neklinovsky districts. He said office buildings at an oil depot in Kagalnitsky district were damaged by what he called falling drone debris, with no fire and no casualties.
In Krasnodar Krai, the regional emergency headquarters reported a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in Dinsky district after drone debris fell on it. No casualties were reported. Russia's Defence Ministry said it shot down 40 Ukrainian drones overnight across Russian regions and occupied Crimea.
The strike is part of Ukraine's ongoing long-range drone campaign against Russian fuel and industrial infrastructure in the south. Ukrainska Pravda notes a Ukrainian claim that more than 45% of Russia's oil refining capacity had been knocked out as of 21 September, following a recent strike on the Moscow refinery. That figure has not been independently verified. The damage reported this night was limited.
Казахстан проводит масштабные стратегические учения «Батыл Тойтарыс – 2026»
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoye Obozreniye reports that CSTO member Kazakhstan is holding the strategic command-staff exercise 'Batyl Toitarys 2026' in September. Around 7,000 troops and some 2,000 weapons and vehicles are said to take part. The exercise has four components: land ('Aibalta 2026'), air ('Ashyk Aspan 2026'), naval, on the Caspian ('Khazar'), and territorial/inter-agency ('Beket 2026'). According to the outlet, the CSTO Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian region are running a linked exercise, 'Rubezh 2026', with about 1,500 troops, more than 300 vehicles and 115 UAVs.
The article describes the exercise as heavily shaped by lessons from the Ukraine war. At the Sary-Shagan range, units practised repelling massed air attacks. The drills covered layered air defence, air-defence ambushes, external target cueing, rapid relocation and countering several types of drone. Radars and EW systems were linked into a single reconnaissance picture, in effect an air-defence 'system of systems'. The drone element had two parts: using the army's own UAVs and FPV drones, and defending against enemy ones with EW, air defence, camouflage, field fortifications and manoeuvre. At the Matybulak range, troops practised small-group and trench combat and reinforced trenches and shelters against drones. The article also mentions ground robotic systems (earlier trialled at the 'Shaiqas' event), a digital headquarters, and AI-assisted automated command systems for decision support.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a Russian outlet and has not been independently verified. The figures and exercise details have not been checked against Kazakh MoD or CSTO statements.
Danish intelligence (DDIS) sees 'low but growing risk' of a limited Russian military attack on a NATO border state in the coming months, alongside escalating hybrid warfare
2026-09-24
Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS/FE) published an unclassified update, 'Assessment of the Threat from Russia', on 24 September 2026, supplementing its February 2025 assessment. It states that Russia will further escalate its hybrid war against NATO and the West in the coming months, citing intensified sabotage, destructive cyberattacks and drone attacks on European targets — including a foiled drone plot against Leipzig/Halle Airport that German authorities say Russia planned over several months — and Russian drones and in some cases missiles hitting NATO countries bordering Ukraine. It names the 14 September incident in which a Russian frigate off Gedser fired flares at a Danish military helicopter as the most serious recent example of aggressive Russian conduct towards NATO units in the Baltic; Denmark's security service PET has separately warned of sabotage planning against Danish defence companies.
DDIS assesses a 'low but growing risk' that Russia will carry out a limited military attack on one or more NATO countries bordering Russia in the coming months — even while the Ukraine war continues and without having built the capability for a regional war — as a potential 'desperate move' to divert European resources from Ukraine and divide NATO. Possible forms it names: isolated long-range strikes on infrastructure supporting Ukraine (with Moscow possibly claiming the weapons strayed because Ukraine jammed them), a false-flag operation using Ukrainian-made drones, or a limited, possibly unmarked troop contingent — the latter requiring a months-long, hard-to-hide build-up. An outright invasion is judged 'highly unlikely' but 'cannot be ruled out' and would need at least six months of preparation.
The February 2025 timelines remain valid according to DDIS: about six months for Russia to be able to fight a local war against a neighbour, about two years to pose a credible regional threat to the Baltic Sea NATO states, and about five years to be ready for a large-scale war in Europe — assuming the Ukraine war ends or freezes, Russian forces grow faster than the West's and Moscow judges the US would not back European allies. DDIS says Russia sees a 'window of opportunity' before European military capability grows towards 2030, and that its behaviour hinges on whether it believes it can stay below the threshold for a collective NATO response — a threshold Russia itself is likely unsure about.
Як працює 413-й полк «Рейд»: Євген Карась про знищення С-400 та діпстрайки по росії
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
In a radio interview on Army FM on 23 September 2026, Yevhen Karas (callsign "Vortex"), commander of the 413th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment "Raid" of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, said the regiment destroyed a Russian S-400 air defence system together with four missiles that had been used against Kyiv, adding that many had doubted such a system could even be found. He also claimed that one Ukrainian crew destroyed four Buk air defence systems in a single day, but said repeating such results has become harder because Russia now positions its systems farther apart.
According to Karas, the regiment operates at ranges "from zero to two thousand" kilometres with long-range strike drones, operational-depth drones, reconnaissance platforms, bomber drones, FPVs, interceptor drones and long-range reconnaissance-strike complexes; some operators are qualified on around 30 systems. He said the 413th pioneered systematic long-range strikes into Russian territory and was reorganised to expand that capability, and that the resulting kill zone forces Russian units to keep equipment 50 km or more from the front in some areas.
This is a single-source report from the Ukrainian MoD outlet ArmyInform, based on claims by a Ukrainian commander (a party to the conflict), and has not been independently corroborated.
Danish-Ukrainian startup BlueShadow plans armed sea-drone swarms to shoot down Russian attack drones over Odesa
2026-09-23
BlueShadow, a Danish maritime-defence startup, is building a system called BlueDragon to protect Odesa against Russian attack drones. Euromaidan Press, citing Defender Media, reports that BlueDragon would use autonomous swarms of armed sea drones to shoot down Russian attack drones. The company also says it has built an open software platform that can help intercept Shahed-type drones. BlueShadow's core software pulls together data from maritime sensors, commercial feeds and open sources, merges it into a single operational picture, and uses AI to detect threats. The report does not explain how the sea drones would actually engage aerial targets, such as their sensors, weapons or how they would coordinate with Ukrainian air defence.
BlueDragon is not in service. It is a prototype in testing. The company is aiming for Ukrainian Defence Ministry certification in late 2026 and plans to deploy it in spring 2027. BlueShadow's other product, BlueSentry, is a separate system for protecting ports, offshore wind farms, undersea cables and maritime borders against hybrid attacks. The company plans to launch BlueSentry in the Baltic and North Seas in October 2026.
Founder Charles Maher is a former US Navy officer who commanded a nuclear-powered submarine. According to the report, almost his entire engineering team works in Ukraine and uses more than 15 Ukrainian suppliers. The Ukrainian fund Resist.UA has signed a letter of intent to invest an undisclosed sum in BlueShadow's €2 million pre-seed round. This summer, Resist.UA launched Resist 2.0, an Estonia-based fund that aims to raise €50 million for Ukrainian defence-tech companies. The same article also reports that FPV drone maker TAF Industries plans to start co-production in Denmark with Upteko. The article presents both deals as ways to get Ukrainian technology into allied markets while Ukraine's own arms-export procedures remain slow.
Ukrainian drone reportedly kills commander of Russia's 8th Artillery Regiment, a 2014 defector, in Kherson region
2026-09-23
Colonel Aleksandr Isaev, commander of the Russian 8th Artillery Regiment, was killed on 19 September 2026 in Kherson region, according to the Ukrainian project "Book of Executioners of the Ukrainian People". It says he was hit by a drone of the Ukrainian Defence Forces. Most reports describe an FPV drone, and Militarnyi says it was reportedly a Bulava. According to the same Ukrainian reporting, the regiment belongs to the 22nd Army Corps of the Black Sea Fleet's coastal forces. It was operating on the coastal (Dnipro river) axis as part of Russia's "Dnepr" group of forces.
The Ukrainian account says Isaev was born in Mykolaiv and served in the Ukrainian Navy from 1992. In 2014 he was chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Ukrainian Navy's 406th Separate Coastal Artillery Brigade in Crimea, and he defected to Russia during the annexation. The account says he was discharged to the reserve in 2015, returned to service in October 2022 and was appointed regiment commander with the rank of colonel in September 2024.
The claim comes only from Ukrainian sources. At the time of writing, no Russian official source, obituary or independent imagery confirming Isaev's death had been found. The case fits the pattern of drones being used against command personnel close to the Dnipro front line.
Russia adapts to Ukraine's middle-strike drone campaign with mobile fire groups, Rubicon interceptors and Starlink jammers
2026-09-23
According to a Kyiv Independent field report from the southern front, Russian forces have adapted to Ukraine's expanded "middle strike" campaign. That campaign uses drones against targets from roughly 35 km (the end of FPV range) out to about 300 km behind the line. Within weeks of the campaign being scaled up in the south, Russia changed logistics routes and fielded new countermeasures. Columns carrying high-value cargo are now often escorted by mobile fire groups, some riding on the vehicles and some posted at intervals along key routes such as the E58 highway to Crimea. Russia's elite Rubicon drone unit has also published dozens of videos of its interceptor teams downing Starlink-equipped Hornet drones and other middle-strike drones. The commander of Ukraine's 422nd Unmanned Systems Regiment, Mykola "Tyson" Kolesnyk, said these measures now bring down "a certain percentage" of Ukrainian drones but have not critically changed his unit's work. He also said that moving Rubicon's interceptor teams to the rear to guard the highways has let more Ukrainian fixed-wing drones cross the front uncontested.
The report also describes Russian efforts to take away Ukraine's Starlink advantage. Starlink was cut off for Russian forces in early February 2026 after mandatory terminal registration through Ukraine's Diia app was introduced. Since then, Russian fixed-wing drones, from the tactical Molniya to the long-range Geran class, have increasingly been fitted with decentralized mesh radio modems to keep their links and video feeds under Ukrainian EW. Russia has announced its own satellite internet system, Rassvet, but its rollout has suffered setbacks, including a satellite that reportedly fell from the sky and others that did not reach their intended orbits. Russia is also testing several Starlink jammers. The most prominent is the Peresvet-M, which according to Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskretnov floods the terminal's uplink channel. Beskretnov said it can deny Starlink over about 20 km² and has been deployed to protect key targets in Crimea.
Kolesnyk said his regiment, working with the SBU's Alpha centre, destroyed a first Russian Starlink jammer on 14 June 2026 and has since helped destroy at least five such systems. He described them as bulky and vulnerable because of their large power needs. About two weeks before the interview, according to Kolesnyk, Russia began running the jammers from the electricity grid instead of generators. He said the unit felt their effect only once and that it is still unclear whether Russia will scale the jammers up or whether they are mainly an information operation. The regiment says it struck a substation in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast that powered radars, EW equipment and Starlink jammers, and that Russian air defence downed two of the four Zozulia drones sent. All these claims come from a Ukrainian unit that is a party to the conflict and have not been independently confirmed.
Ukraine reports strike on Rubicon drone-unit warehouse near Volnovakha and Russian drone ground control stations
2026-09-23
According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian defence forces struck several Russian military targets on 22 September and overnight into 23 September. Ukrainska Pravda and the Ukrainian MoD outlet ArmyInform both relayed the statement. Among the targets was a UAV depot near Volnovakha (Donetsk Oblast) belonging to Rubicon. Ukrainska Pravda describes Rubicon as an advanced Russian unmanned systems unit; its full name is the Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies "Rubikon". The General Staff also reported hitting Russian drone ground control stations near Novoselivka Persha and Dachne in Donetsk Oblast.
The same statement lists strikes on Russian logistics: a fuel and lubricants depot near Kundriuche (Luhansk Oblast) and supply depots near Hirnyk and Velyka Shyshivka (Donetsk Oblast). It also reports hitting a cluster of personnel from a UAV unit near Krasnohorivka (Donetsk Oblast). The release does not say which Ukrainian units carried out the strikes, what weapons they used or how much damage was done. It only says that operations against key enemy military assets are continuing. Days earlier, on 20 September, a separate report said Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps had forced a Rubicon unit to relocate.
All of these claims come from the Ukrainian General Staff, a party to the conflict, and have not been independently confirmed. The Russian side has not commented on the reported strikes, and no visual evidence was published with the statement.
Russia strikes Kyiv with drones by day, then Zircon and Iskander-M missiles overnight; Zelensky claims 60% of ballistic missiles intercepted
2026-09-23
Over roughly 24 hours on 23–24 September 2026, Russia struck Kyiv first with a daytime drone attack and then overnight with a combined missile and drone strike. On the morning of 23 September, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported drone hits on petrol stations in Holosiivskyi and Darnytskyi districts, a transport infrastructure facility, a four-storey business centre, a shop building and a nine-storey non-residential building in Solomianskyi. The former Railway Market at 1 Mokra Street, next to the Central Railway Station, burned down. It was a 1973 modernist landmark that had been saved from demolition in 2021. Ukrzaliznytsia said the station building was not damaged, but its chairman Oleksandr Pertsovskyi warned that railway facilities were still under attack and that a railway worker had been wounded. According to the Kyiv City Military Administration, one man died in hospital; Ukrainska Pravda put the number injured at eight.
Between 18:00 on 23 September and 08:00 on 24 September, according to Ukraine's Air Force (via ArmyInform), Russia launched Zircon missiles from Russia's Kursk, Rostov and Orel regions, and Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Bryansk regions. It also launched 282 drones: Shahed types (including jet-powered versions), Gerbera, Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and Parodiya decoys. The main target areas were Kyiv and Odesa oblasts. The Air Force said 227 targets were shot down or suppressed by 08:00: 4 Zircons, 3 ballistic missiles, 1 Banderol/Dan-T and 219 drones. It recorded hits at 13 locations and falling debris at 10. President Zelensky said air defence intercepted 60% of the ballistic missiles fired at Kyiv in three waves. He noted that earlier this year there had been moments when the figure was zero. The State Emergency Service (SES) reported two dead and at least eight injured in Kyiv; the city administration had earlier reported one man killed. Company owners said a ballistic missile struck the main production facility and logistics warehouse of textile maker TK-Domashnii Tekstyl, and that a missile completely destroyed the jewellery company Dukachi. Both companies said no staff were hurt. SES bomb disposal teams removed Iskander-M debris from a Kyiv district. Moldovan President Maia Sandu said four Russian drones violated Moldova's airspace on the morning of 24 September and that at least one exploded in the north of the country.
On the TTP side, Euromaidan Press cited the Ukrainian air-activity monitoring channel Nikolaievsky Vaniok the evening before the missile strike. The channel said Russian reconnaissance has been mapping ordinary urban targets in and around Kyiv, including traction and power substations, a trolleybus depot, shops in Obolon, Zhuliany airport, possible fuel depots near Borodianka and Bila Tserkva, and Vasylkiv airfield. It gave no evidence or method, and Euromaidan Press could not verify the list. Andrii Kovalenko of the NSDC Centre for Countering Disinformation warned at the time of signs that a ballistic strike was being prepared. The damage reported afterwards was at rail-adjacent, commercial and industrial sites; no military targets were named in the reporting. All reporting comes from Ukrainian and Moldovan officials and Ukrainian outlets. The interception figures are Ukrainian claims that have not been independently verified. Casualty and damage figures were provisional.
Ночью сбито 514 БПЛА; сотни беспилотников шли на Москву
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The Russian milblogger channel Dva Majora reports on the Ukrainian drone attack on Russia in the night of 22 to 23 September. In a first post it states that 'hundreds of drones' were heading for Moscow, and that the men of the mobile fire groups stood between the UAVs and 'our homes'; the post is accompanied by a video and gives no further details on the Moscow direction.
A later post repeats a claim by the Russian Ministry of Defence that 514 fixed-wing UAVs were shot down overnight over the Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, Voronezh, Oryol, Kaluga, Lipetsk, Tambov, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Smolensk, Saratov, Samara, Ulyanovsk and Rostov regions, Krasnodar Krai, Crimea, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, and over the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The figure of 514 is therefore an MoD claim relayed by the milblogger, not the channel's own count. The geographic spread, from the border regions to the Volga and the Urals foothills, points to a very large, wide-front attack if the claim is accurate; the posts say nothing about damage or casualties.
This is a single-source report from the Russian milblogger channel Dva Majora, partly repeating a claim by the Russian MoD as a warring party; it reflects a personal/editorial Telegram voice, not itself a position of the Russian MoD, milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the figures are not independently corroborated.
«Паук» слушает небо: акустическая система обнаружения БПЛА
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoe Obozrenie (Topwar), in a piece by Kirill Ryabov, describes 'Pauk' ('Spider'), a Russian acoustic system for detecting drones. It is a domestic development by a resident company of the 'Ushkuynik' science and industry centre; the company itself is not named. The system was first reported by the Russian daily Izvestia on 22 September. Instead of radar, Pauk uses a network of small modules with microphones, a processor and a radio link; the modules pick up the characteristic noise of a UAV, recognise it with neural-network algorithms and pass the data to an operator console.
According to the developer, a module can hear a small FPV drone at about 200 m, while larger drones with petrol engines are detected at more than 1 km. The modules come in three housings: a rectangular one for fixed placement, a dart-shaped one that can be dropped from the air, and a spherical 'hedgehog' with spikes for placement in vegetation. They run for 3 to 30 days depending on the battery, and solar-powered versions are said to run almost indefinitely. The recommended layout is a checkerboard pattern with modules tens of metres apart and overlapping zones, so that long perimeters can be monitored.
The author stresses that the claimed performance still has to be confirmed in independent trials and that Pauk has yet to find a customer, so there is no indication that it is in service or in use in Ukraine. The system fits a wider trend of cheap, passive acoustic sensor networks against low-flying drones, which Ukraine has also used at scale. This is a single-source report from Voennoe Obozrenie (a Russian military news site, relaying Izvestia and developer claims), not independently corroborated.
RUSI Reports That Ukraine Uses PC-9 Aircraft Armed with Miniguns to Shoot Down Shahed Drones
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express, citing a RUSI commentary by senior research fellow Justin Bronk, reports that a Ukrainian volunteer group operates at least one Pilatus PC-9 turboprop trainer fitted with pods carrying 7.62mm Minigun machine guns to intercept Russian one-way attack drones. According to RUSI the aircraft has shot down several jet-powered Geran-3/Geran-4 drones, in daylight and at night, although its limited performance forces it to dive to reach sufficient speed; the operators reportedly regard about 300 knots as the minimum needed to reliably catch the jet-powered models, which cruise at roughly 350–500 km/h.
The RUSI piece uses this case in a wider argument for a NATO multinational drone-interception squadron that can counter jet-powered Gerans at night, in poor weather and under GPS denial without expending fighter jets and costly air-to-air missiles; Bronk favours the L-39NG over slower turboprops such as the A-29 Super Tucano. Defense Express adds that the PC-9 (max speed about 600 km/h, six hardpoints) is flown by Croatia, Ireland and Slovenia and may be relatively easy to obtain second-hand, and notes that no public evidence of Ukrainian PC-9 use exists beyond RUSI's claim.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express, a Ukrainian defence outlet, relaying a RUSI report; the details have not been independently confirmed.
«Вівальді» для НРК: наземні дрони здійснили понад 1100 місій
2026-09-22SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence's information agency, reports that the 'Volley' unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) unit of the 125th Heavy Mechanised Brigade was heavily involved in operation 'Vivaldi'. The brigade, part of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps, published combat footage on 22 September 2026.
According to the brigade, its ground robotic systems support frontline infantry by delivering water, ammunition and medical supplies, evacuating wounded soldiers and clearing mines from routes. The unit claims 'more than 1,100 logistics missions and dozens of soldiers saved in one season'. The article gives no details on the location, timeframe or aims of operation Vivaldi, or on the types and number of UGVs used.
The report illustrates how Ukrainian brigades now use UGVs routinely for the 'last mile' of resupply and casualty evacuation in zones where drones make movement by soldiers and vehicles very dangerous. This is a single-source report from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD media, relaying claims by the brigade itself, i.e. a party to the conflict), not independently corroborated.
Milblogger channel Rybar claims Russia's Centre group of forces is pressing its offensive on the Dobropillia axis. It cites a Russian MoD report that a Ukrainian grouping has been encircled at an important defensive node, and says Russia is disrupting supplies to the Ukrainian units holding Dobropillia. Rybar says Russian forces work in small groups: pairs and threes of assault troops who move deep into the expanded grey zone. It reports Russian troops near Verovka, west of Sviatohorivka, and infiltration towards Bilozerske, Vodiane and Novotroitske. It says small Russian and Ukrainian groups sometimes hold neighbouring dugouts in the same tree line and cannot fight because of drones, so the outcome depends on how many drones the supporting operators have and how deep the dugouts are.
Rybar also claims clearing operations further back, with positions consolidated in Svitle and around Bilytske and Rodynske, and progress on the Matiasheve–Vasylivka line towards Shylivka–Novofedorivka. Its key tactical point is that Russian forces can disrupt enemy logistics without physically holding the roads: it is enough to get a small group into a tree line next to a route to direct drone operators onto vehicles and infantry. Rybar says this was how Ukrainian supply routes to Myrnohrad were cut during the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad operation. This tactic of infiltrating to reach supply routes matches what Ukraine describes near Druzhkivka.
The post contradicts Ukrainian claims from 23 September that this Russian effort to reach the logistics routes was thwarted and the accumulated Russian forces cleared. Rybar does not mention a failure and presents the axis as a Russian advance. This is a personal, editorial Telegram voice, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and this account has not been independently corroborated.
Unidentified drone loitered near NATO's Aegis Ashore site at Redzikowo; guard unit called Poland's 112 emergency line
2026-09-22
On 15 September 2026 surveillance systems detected a drone about half a kilometre from Redzikowo in northern Poland, home of the US Navy's Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence installation that forms part of NATO's missile shield. According to Euromaidan Press, citing the Polish outlet Onet, the drone operated near the base for roughly five minutes and the military unit guarding the site followed a set procedure that included a call to 112, Poland's civilian emergency number, rather than engaging it. The Polish Defence Ministry says it established where the operator was flying from and notified the relevant services, including the police, but declined on security grounds to say whether any attempt was made to neutralise the drone or whether counter-drone systems were activated.
The origin of the drone is not established. The article itself refers to an "unknown drone" and names no one responsible; the headline's link to Russia rests on the comparison with September 2025, not on any attribution of this incident. The fact that the ministry traced the operator's launch position suggests a locally operated drone rather than a long-range Russian strike drone, but that is not stated explicitly. Euromaidan Press contrasts the episode with September 2025, when around 19 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace and Polish and allied F-16s and F-35s shot down only four of them, and with Ukraine's reported interception rate of 87.4% against Russian long-range drones.
The incident fits a wider concern about the protection of high-value NATO sites against small drones in peacetime, where guard units appear to depend on civilian police procedures rather than on an immediate engagement option. It came two days before Prime Minister Donald Tusk told parliament on 17 September that, according to NATO, Ukrainian and US intelligence assessments, Russia's plans include drone and missile strikes on countries backing Ukraine, Poland among them, possibly staged to look "accidental".
Russia builds a militarization pipeline for children in occupied Ukraine, from kindergarten to drone training, monitor says
2026-09-22
Russia is running a systematic militarization pipeline for Ukrainian children in the occupied territories, according to a six-part monitoring series by Petro Andryushchenko, head of the Center for the Study of Occupation, reported by Euromaidan Press. The pipeline starts in kindergarten with the "Conversations about Important Things" lessons from age five, runs through the "Movement of the First" as a gateway organization, Zarnitsa military games and cadet classes, and ends in practical training in drones, tactics, weapons and military medicine. Military-applied instruction makes up about half of the school subject "Fundamentals of Security and Defense". Putin ordered an expansion of such programs in December 2024.
In occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast, the Russian-run organizations claim 10,154 children aged 6-10 in "Eaglets of Russia" (97 schools, 626 class teams), more than 23,000 members of the Movement of the First by the end of 2025 (up from about 14,000 in 2024), over 2,000 children aged 11-17 in the Zarnitsa 2.0 game, 355 Yunarmiya members and 387 cadet-class pupils. In occupied Kherson oblast the Movement of the First reportedly grew from 2,700 in 2024 to 6,200 by spring 2025. The military-sports training centre VOIN claims between 10,381 and 14,450 trained cadets across the four occupied oblasts, but its programs accept people aged 14 to 35, so this is not a count of children. In May 2026 children from all four occupied oblasts attended federal Eaglets sessions.
Andryushchenko stresses that the figures are claims by Russian-run organizations, may overlap, have not been independently verified and do not show how many individual children took part or whether they move between programs. The article gives no specific numbers or program names for the drone training component.
Africa Corps fielded a Ukraine-war Molniya kamikaze drone in Mali; it came down near JNIM fighters
2026-09-22
Russia's Africa Corps, the Defence Ministry-run successor to Wagner in the Sahel, used a Molniya kamikaze drone against fighters of the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM near Dioura in Mali's Mopti region, Euromaidan Press reports. According to the monitoring account Alerte Sahel, Africa Corps troops launched the drone at JNIM positions while breaking out of a siege, and the insurgents shot it down. Footage shows the aircraft only after it had fallen and does not show how it went down, so the shootdown claim rests on Alerte Sahel's account. Early reports misidentified the drone as an Orlan-10; the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi identified it by its shape as a Molniya.
The Molniya is a cheap, simple fixed-wing kamikaze drone with a range of roughly 30-40 km and a warhead of up to 7 kg, widely used by Russian forces in Ukraine and also for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. The incident followed heavy fighting around Dioura: JNIM attacked Malian army positions on 10 September, after which Africa Corps and Malian troops were encircled in their camp for more than a week before breaking out and withdrawing. On 8 September JNIM had ambushed an Africa Corps/Malian convoy near the village of Kaka, killing 13 Russian and Malian troops between them, according to the article.
The case illustrates how equipment and tactics honed in Ukraine are migrating to Russia's African operations, which the same Defence Ministry runs through expanding supply lines. The article also notes that Ukrainian drone crews are reportedly assisting forces fighting Russia in Africa, but gives no specific evidence of that in this piece.