Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
«[…] условно без "Старлинка". А что стало с нашими БПЛА, когда России отключили «серый» Starlink?» (Dva Majors: 'Ukraine nominally without Starlink. What happened to our UAVs when Russia lost "grey" Starlink?')
2026-10-14SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
This is the personal/editorial voice of the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Dva Majors, not a position of the Russian MoD; milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the content has not been independently verified. Prompted by the new Starlink restrictions on Ukrainian forces, the channel (which uses a derogatory term for Ukrainians) recalls that in February 2026 SpaceX, together with the Ukrainian authorities, effectively cut Russian units off from Starlink, which affected control of long-range drones. It lists the replacements Russia turned to: conventional digital radio links with air and ground relays; Mesh/MANET radio modules, which it says appeared on Russian drones in 2025 and have been found by Ukraine on Gerans; 3G/4G LTE cellular modems with Russian and Ukrainian SIM cards, also found in Gerans, dependent on network coverage; and Russian Yamal and Express satellites with VSAT terminals, which it says are suitable for ground stations but, due to latency and equipment, no on-board substitute for Starlink. It pins hopes on the Rassvet low-earth-orbit constellation of Bureau 1440, claiming 32 satellites were launched in 2026, while a working network is still to come.
For Ukraine the channel sees comparable options besides official Starlink and military Starshield: radio control, airborne relays and cellular networks, US Silvus StreamCaster MANET radios, Ukrainian HIMERA (which it says demonstrated integration with the Highline-T airborne relay in March), OneWeb terminals, and a planned Ukrainian–Danish LEO project UASAT (STETMAN/GomSpace), which it dismisses as likely graft. It also claims Ukrainian drones still fly pre-set coordinates and evade Russian spoofing using ground-placed reference beacons.
The channel concludes that Ukraine does have problems, but that one should not expect the US to have halted Ukrainian drone warfare at the push of a button, since restrictions can be lifted as quickly as imposed; it argues the episode shows the danger of building military communications on a foreign private company's infrastructure and that only the military defeat of the enemy, not deals with the Americans, guarantees Russia's security. Single source: this is a post by the Russian milblogger channel Dva Majors that has not been independently verified.
«Сначала решили, что это русская РЭБ»: в ВСУ комментируют ограничения Starlink (Topwar: '"At first we thought it was Russian EW": Ukrainian forces comment on Starlink restrictions')
2026-10-14SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar reports, citing a Ukrainian defence ministry source quoted in the Western press on 14 October, that Ukraine has asked the US, SpaceX and NATO to explain new restrictions on Starlink access. According to the article, the connection cuts out when terminals move at high speed: initially a threshold of 160 km/h was reported, while figures of 60–70 km/h were later cited (Topwar garbles this as a Starlink conversion from miles per hour). This seriously disrupts drones that operators control via satellite internet. Citing The Guardian, Topwar quotes presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov as saying the restrictions appeared on the evening of 13 October, that the military was not warned, and that several missions were disrupted.
The article claims that up to around 80 Ukrainian drones lost their navigation signal on the night of 14 October shortly after gaining speed. Ukrainian troops reportedly first assumed Russian electronic warfare was to blame, but the area affected was too large, so they concluded it was a Starlink failure, and only later learned it was deliberate. No outages of stationary terminals were reported. Topwar adds that Elon Musk said Ukrainian forces are on a separate Starshield network run by the US government rather than SpaceX, and frames this as Musk hurrying to shed responsibility.
The figure of about 80 drones is unsourced in the article and not corroborated by the Ukrainian reports on the same topic. Single source: this is an article by the Russian military news portal Topwar that has not been independently verified.
Order to cap Starshield speeds for Ukraine came from inside the White House, officials say, as SpaceX's limit cripples Ukrainian drone and interceptor operations against Russian forces; The Telegraph reports Musk himself pushed Trump for it
2026-10-14
Since the night of 13–14 October, the military "Starshield" service that SpaceX provides to Ukrainian forces has stopped working on fast-moving objects without prior warning, according to Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov. Starshield is SpaceX's military business unit, with enhanced encryption and dedicated terminals running over the Starlink constellation. A source in Ukraine's Defence Ministry told Reuters that receivers now work in motion again, but only up to 100 mph (160 km/h). Ukraine's 7th Rapid Reaction (Air Assault) Corps reported link losses of 10–20 seconds at 110–120 km/h on the Huliaipole front, cancelled missions, and fast mid-range strike drones that can no longer be used as intended; activist Serhii Sternenko, citing military sources, reported drops at 60–70 km/h. The cap also hits Starlink-guided interceptor drones, which Beskrestnov called Ukraine's most effective defence against Russia's jet-powered Shaheds (Geran). Russian jet drones and missiles fly at roughly twice the cap speed, according to The Telegraph (via Euromaidan Press). On 16 October President Zelensky said the restrictions had disrupted several operations, including interceptions of jet Gerans. He added that Ukraine does not use Starlink for strikes inside Russia, and that the Defence Ministry had received signals from the White House that capability would be restored, although speeds had not yet returned to previous levels.
Who ordered the cap is disputed. Reuters (published by Defense News) reports, citing two US officials and a Western official, that the order came from inside the White House; Pentagon leaders received a message that Starshield service for Ukraine had to be slowed, but the officials did not say who made the decision. A senior Ukrainian official said Kyiv was told the same after calls to the White House, State Department and Pentagon. Musk wrote on X that Starshield is "owned and controlled by the US government" and that the military or the president decides any speed or usage limits. The Telegraph, citing four anonymous sources and as reported by Euromaidan Press, gives a contradictory account: Musk himself proposed slowing the service to Trump, Trump agreed, and the Pentagon then restricted Starshield, while a senior source says Musk later grew worried about a backlash from European customers. The denials are just as divided. A senior US official told Reuters that "no such request was ever made by the president", an anonymous US official said much the same to AFP, and Trump said he did not believe he or Musk was responsible. The White House, Pentagon and SpaceX did not respond to Reuters.
According to Reuters, the cap follows US pressure on Kyiv to stop strikes on Russian refineries, which Trump blamed for high energy prices ahead of the midterms. That pressure included a tough meeting with Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff in Miami on 9 October and a US diesel deal with Russia. For Russian forces, the cap temporarily eases pressure on front-line positions and rear logistics hit by Starlink-guided strike drones, and it weakens Ukraine's cheapest counter to jet Gerans. US Senator Richard Blumenthal warned it could cripple Ukrainian air defence. Poland, which supplied about 29,500 terminals and pays some $50 million a year, warned through Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski: "As your European customers, we are watching you." All accounts of the order's origin rest on anonymous sources, and the Telegraph version was seen only through Euromaidan Press's summary; neither version has been independently confirmed.
Militarnyi (17 October) adds detail from an audio message Zelensky sent to journalists. Above 161 km/h, he said, the Starlink link on jet-powered interceptor drones is completely lost after about two minutes and the drone is lost with it. Zelensky said Ukraine had driven Starlink-equipped vehicles in EU countries at 180 km/h or more without the link dropping, and has records of this, so the cut-off applies inside Ukraine. He put the share of jet Shaheds downed by Ukrainian aviation at about 55-60%. Militarnyi notes this puts a strain on a small pool of pilots and on the F-16 fleet, roughly half of which is in Europe for long-term repair and maintenance. Interceptors used against jet Shaheds include the P1-SUN JetKiller, SPYS and Sting S, which derive from electric quadcopters, plus a likely jet-powered interceptor based on the Bars missile drone; according to the minister Militarnyi cites, Yevhen Khmara, one unit destroyed five targets with five Bars, and the approach is being scaled up. Militarnyi reports that SpaceX has not responded to the Ukrainian military or the Defence Ministry, that US officials blame "technical difficulties", and that the restrictions were still in place as of 17 October. These are Ukrainian statements and have not been independently verified.
«Мобильные огневые группы ПВО: угрозы, концепция и решения» (Topwar: Mobile air-defence fire groups — threats, concept and solutions)
2026-10-14SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar author Kirill Ryabov describes Russia's mobile air-defence fire groups (MOG PVO) as its main answer to small drones and to mass long-range Ukrainian drone raids. Their job is to fight light, numerous UAVs; larger targets are a secondary task. According to the article, the first Russian groups appeared in 2023. Some were formed as regional and volunteer units under the BARS reserve project. They now serve in the ground forces, other arms and the Rosgvardia, both in the war zone and in rear areas covering cities, military and industrial sites. A MOG is a small team with its own vehicle, communications, sensors and weapons. It stands duty at a set position or redeploys on headquarters orders to close gaps in other systems' coverage and to block newly spotted drone routes. The author says MOGs work best when tied into the overall air-defence command loop, so targets can be shared with conventional SAM units.
Equipment is not standardised, because the groups were set up in haste. Most use pickups or buggies, often Russian-made, or converted UAZ-452 'Bukhanka' vans. Some groups have compact radars or emitter detectors. The main weapons are PKM/PKT, DShK, NSV and Kord machine guns, sometimes the GShG-7.62 aircraft machine gun, often on multi-gun mounts. The article gives an opening-fire range of about 1 km for rifle-calibre and up to 1.5 km for heavy machine guns, and notes the chance of a kill at those distances is much lower. Shotguns with special buckshot work only out to a few dozen metres, 100 m at most. The groups also use interceptor drones such as the Yolka: 1.3 kg according to the developer, up to 2 kg according to an Arkhipelag-2025 data sheet, with up to 3 km engagement range and operator or automatic electro-optical guidance. Vehicle-mounted jammers are said to disrupt drones out to a few hundred metres.
The author also lists weaknesses. Performance drops sharply at night and in fog or rain, firing at low-flying targets puts civil aviation at risk, and Ukraine is raising raid sizes and improving EW, including against the interceptors. He expects new mounts, better anti-drone ammunition and better interceptors. Single source: this is an article by the Russian pro-government military outlet Topwar that has not been independently verified.
Ukrainian FP-1 Drones Strike russian UAV Storage Site and EW Equipment in Donetsk Region (Video) (Defense Express)
2026-10-12SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express reports that operators of Ukraine's 237th Unmanned Systems Battalion used Fire Point FP-1 long-range strike drones against a Russian site in occupied Donetsk region that held UAVs, a drone workshop and electronic warfare (EW) equipment. According to the Ukrainian military statement the outlet relies on (the 7th Rapid Response / Air Assault Corps), reconnaissance had identified the site as a place where equipment was stored and prepared for Russian units in the area, and from which supplies were regularly sent to combat units – in effect a logistics hub.
The target was reportedly in a five-storey residential building more than 100 km behind Russian lines. The Ukrainian side says the strike destroyed the building and the equipment inside, and released video of the attack. The report presents this as an example of Ukrainian unmanned systems reaching well beyond the front line.
The article gives no figures for how many drones or EW systems were in the building, and no independent damage assessment. That the target was in a residential building comes from the Ukrainian account. Single source: this is a report by Ukrainian defence outlet Defense Express, based on Ukrainian military statements, that has not been independently verified.
Russian-led CSTO drills with 1,500 troops, riot police and about 80 drones in Belarus's Vitsebsk Oblast, which borders Latvia and Lithuania
2026-10-12
The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has begun five-day drills in Belarus's Vitsebsk Oblast, which borders Latvia and Lithuania, Euromaidan Press reports. According to tags on the article, the exercises are named "Indestructible Brotherhood-2026" and "Barrier-2026". They began on 12 October; Reform.news gives the window as 11-16 October. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are taking part; Armenia, the sixth member, is not. Citing The Moscow Times, which quotes the bloc, the drills involve more than 1,500 troops and over 300 weapons and vehicles, including about 80 drones. Russia contributes motorised rifle, reconnaissance, electronic warfare and drone units from its Central Military District, and Belarus fields riot police and internal troops.
The scenario centres on a peacekeeping operation and a response to a biological threat. A CSTO general said that Russia, as this year's chair, prioritised peacekeeping readiness and a joint biological-protection and medical unit. Minsk says the drills were planned and are aimed at no one, but Belarus's chief of the general staff called them "one of the measures of strategic deterrence against aggressively minded states" and said the West is effectively preparing for a new war. On the same day, Lukashenka ordered a snap readiness check of a battalion of the 6th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade, after saying in September that the whole army would be checked, up to mobilisation.
The article sets the drills against a wider build-up of pressure on NATO's north-eastern flank. It cites migrant pushes onto the Latvian border escorted by armed, masked men; the theft of Latvian border cameras; Lithuania's deployment of up to 100 soldiers to the Kaliningrad border; and Italian NATO jets downing a drone that entered from Belarus in September. It also notes that Belarus hosts Russian Oreshnik units and equipment used to guide attack drones into Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence still rates the threat from Belarus as low.
Downed Geran-4 drones carry a 32-element, likely Alabuga-made anti-jam GNSS antenna, while Geran-4 and Geran-5 also get camera-based terrain navigation
2026-10-10
A 32-element CRPA (Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna) has been found in a Geran-4 strike drone shot down over Ukraine, Militarnyi reports, citing an analysis by The Insider of photos and videos of wreckage; the photos, taken in September 2026, are credited to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov. The unit is effectively two 16-element antennas in one housing: 16 elements work in the GPS L1 band (about 1,575 MHz) and 16 in the L2 band (about 1,227 MHz). A CRPA protects satellite-navigation reception against jamming; the more elements, the more separate jamming sources it can null. Cheaper L1-only versions are the norm on drones and missiles, so a dual-band 32-element design marks a step up in jam resistance.
The antenna closely resembles products of the Chinese firm Harxon but shows signs of local manufacture, including a rough metal casing stamped "ALB". Militarnyi assesses it was likely made at the Alabuga plant in Tatarstan, where Geran drones are produced, and that Russia is moving towards at least kit (screwdriver) assembly of such boards there. Harxon was earlier reported as Alabuga's main supplier of multi-element antennas; it was subsequently sanctioned and says it dismissed staff who had contact with Russia. Ukraine had already seized a 32-element CRPA on a Russian weapon system in July. The sources do not describe the antenna fit of the Geran-2 or Geran-3.
Separately, Beskrestnov, an adviser to the Ukrainian president on defence technology, wrote on Telegram that Russia is fitting drones with image-based navigation: an onboard camera compares what it sees with stored terrain imagery, which in basic versions can be public satellite or ground imagery such as Google's. Because this does not rely on satellite signals, it is hard to jam. According to him, Russian forces already use it on Molniya, V2U and Lancet drones, and similar systems were recently found on the Geran-4 and Geran-5, which use a flight controller called "Susanin". He expects wider use in 2027, including on medium- and long-range strike drones and cheap cruise missiles, which would push Ukraine towards physical interception rather than jamming. These are claims by a Ukrainian official and have not been independently verified.
Analyst Clément Molin counts 770 confirmed Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian supply trucks in September and warns that winter will make supplying Crimea even harder
2026-10-09
French open-source mapper Clément Molin, who follows Ukraine's counter-logistics campaign closely, counted 770 confirmed Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian trucks in September in the logistics zone behind the front line. His count includes only hits confirmed by video or photographs, so the real number is likely higher. His monthly figures are 214 in May, 586 in June, 656 in July, 630 in August and 770 in September, compared with a few dozen a month before that. In an X thread on 7 October he wrote that more than 3,000 trucks and vehicles have been hit on key roads since May 2026. The figures come from Molin's own open-source tally as reported by Euromaidan Press and have not been independently verified.
The strikes target the main supply routes through occupied southern Ukraine to Crimea, especially the R-280 and the Mariupol-Melitopol road, the main artery of Russia's land corridor. Strikes on Black Sea cargo ships make it harder for Russia to move this traffic to sea. The drones named are the Hornet, B-2, RAM 2X, Chaklun and various long-endurance FPV quadcopters, many with onboard AI that detects a truck and homes in on it in the final seconds. Control runs through overlapping links, including Starlink terminals (some mounted on balloons) and mesh radio networks.
In spring Russia began moving trucks in convoys with mobile fire-support groups. Molin says a typical convoy has three to five supply trucks and two to three air-defence vehicles, increasingly with jamming equipment. Ukrainian drones reportedly hit the gun trucks first, leaving the supply trucks exposed to follow-on strikes. Molin expects winter to make things worse for Russia, because bare trees give less cover from surveillance and poor off-road conditions push traffic onto the paved roads where most strikes happen. The article also cites a May assessment by Tochnyi that this pressure could weaken front-line positions enough to allow breakthrough operations in the south. It notes, however, that it is unclear whether Ukraine has enough reserves to exploit that.
«Mesh-мережа стала відповіддю, на відсутність супутникової навігації»: як росіяни відволікають українську ППО (ArmyInform: "The mesh network became the answer to the lack of satellite navigation": how the Russians distract Ukrainian air defence)
2026-10-09SINGLE SOURCE
Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Captain 2nd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk said on the national 'United News' telethon that Russian forces are using mesh networks to plan and carry out drone attacks because satellite navigation over Ukrainian territory is denied. In his words, the mesh network has become Russia's answer to the lack of satellite navigation over Ukraine. He added that the system has weak points: it depends on mesh relays, and recent media reporting has focused on ways to counter it and on Russia's ability to use intermediate relay points, including on Ukrainian territory. He did not give technical details, drone types or numbers.
Pletenchuk described modern drones as becoming multi-platforms that can carry other drones and various types of weapons. He said Russia keeps finding ways to counter Ukrainian developments and copies both Ukrainian drone tactics and technical solutions. According to him, Ukraine's Defence Forces have repeatedly struck elements that provide Russian reconnaissance and navigation, including equipment on towers and on gas-production platforms in the Black Sea, as part of an effort to deny Russia the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
On the Black Sea Fleet, Pletenchuk said damaged and non-operational ships remain in occupied Crimea, that the auxiliary fleet is large, and that the fleet's main potential is now in Novorossiysk. He said that this month, during combined strikes, Russia for the first time [in this period] used cruise-missile carriers to launch Kalibr missiles; he judged their effectiveness as not very high, but said the carriers continue to serve to divert Ukrainian air defence. Russian forces at Novorossiysk are kept on constant alert because they expect a Ukrainian strike on the base. Single source: this is a Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (ArmyInform) report that has not been independently verified.
Су-24, два катери, 40 пунктів управління та десятки засобів ППО, РЛС і РЕБ — результати middle strike за вересень (ArmyInform: Su-24, two boats, 40 command posts and dozens of air-defence, radar and EW assets: results of middle strike for September)
2026-10-09SINGLE SOURCE
Ukraine's Ministry of Defence has published a September tally of its 'middle strike' campaign. According to the ministry, Ukraine's Defence Forces hit more than 30 Russian air-defence, radar and electronic-warfare assets, 40 command posts and more than 50 logistics targets during the month. The report does not define the term or name the Ukrainian units or weapons involved.
The air-defence and radar assets listed as hit are S-400 launchers, Buk-M3 systems, Pantsir-S1 and Pantsir-S2 systems, and 92N6, Nebo-U, Nebo-SV, Podlyot, Kasta and P-18 radars. Citing Ukraine's General Staff, the report also says more than 20 sites used to store and operate drones were hit in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and other occupied areas, including a UAV-operator training centre of the 'Akhmat' formation in Petropavlivka. At Saky airfield in occupied Crimea, a Su-24 bomber was hit in September, and the destruction of a MiG-29 fighter and a Ka-27 shipborne anti-submarine helicopter was confirmed. In Sevastopol, a BK-16 landing craft and a Project 12150 'Mangust' fast patrol boat were hit; these are the 'two boats' in the headline.
Logistics strikes are said to have hit depots, bases and other supply sites, as well as a railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal used by Russian forces. The report gives no information on damage levels, exact dates or locations beyond those named. It adds detail to a verified entry already in the tracker on a record September for destroyed Russian air-defence systems and radars. Single source: this is a Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (ArmyInform) report that has not been independently verified.
Ukrainian long-range strikes on 9-10 October 2026 hit Russian oil and port infrastructure in Rostov, Samara and Belgorod oblasts, along with command posts and an EW station.
2026-10-09
On the night of 9-10 October, drones attacked the oil-loading terminal of the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery in Rostov-on-Don, according to the Russian outlet Astra, monitoring Telegram channels and Rostov Oblast governor Yuri Slyusar. Eyewitness footage showed a large fire after a series of powerful explosions. Slyusar confirmed the fire and said more than 50 UAVs had been shot down since the previous evening. He added that a railway bridge was damaged and train services in both directions were suspended. Ukrainska Pravda describes the terminal as an export transshipment point for petroleum products that also supplies fuel to the Russian military, with a design capacity of about 2.5 million tonnes a year. In the same attack, according to the Rostov governor as cited by Militarnyi, two ships were damaged at the port of Azov in the Don delta. He did not name the ships or describe the damage. Ukrainian drones had already hit an oil depot in Azov on 10 July 2026.
The Ukrainian General Staff said its forces struck the Samara linear production dispatching station (LVDS "Samara") near Prosvet in Samara Oblast again on the night of 9-10 October. The station receives, stores and blends crude oil into Urals, Russia's main export grade. According to the General Staff, an earlier strike on 7 October destroyed four RVS-50000 storage tanks and caused a large fire there. The General Staff also reported strikes on Russian command posts near Peremozhne (Zaporizhzhia Oblast) and Dokuchaievsk (Donetsk Oblast), an electronic warfare station near Trukhanovo in Bryansk Oblast, and a training centre for Russian army sergeants near Khorly in Kherson Oblast. It said the extent of the damage was still being assessed.
Separately, a fire broke out overnight on 8-9 October at an oil products storage facility north of Belgorod, according to the monitoring Telegram channel Exilenova+, which also published coordinates of the possible strike site. The local outlet Vremya Press, citing the regional operational headquarters, reported a night-time drone attack on Belgorod Oblast. Militarnyi notes that there is no official confirmation that this depot was hit, and that the number of tanks affected, the scale of the fire and the weapon used are unknown. Claims of results come from the Ukrainian General Staff and from Russian regional officials respectively. They have not been independently verified.
В режиме свободной охоты (Krasnaya Zvezda: In free-hunt mode)
2026-10-08SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda profiles 'Altai', deputy commander of the FPV drone group of the 58th Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, which now fights on the Druzhkivka axis. The article opens by saying that the main weight of the fighting has shifted from the front edge to the near rear, where drones dominate and target the opposing sides' lines of communication; the line of contact has become almost a demarcation line held by small forward groups. It describes the workflow: a technician launches the FPV drone from a concealed spot and leaves, while the operator flies it from a camouflaged dugout far from the launch site. In one case Ukrainian EW replaced his video feed with an image (normally, he says, Ukrainian jammers show white noise).
According to 'Altai', a 2014 volunteer who started with drones in 2018, the battalion's FPV group was formed from 2024 onwards. That meant building a workshop and finding skilled technicians, on whom 'the main part of drone work rests'. The group fought at Bakhmut (Artyomovsk) towards Chasiv Yar, also supplying forward units by air, and in 2025 on the Kostiantynivka axis. It now strikes vehicles, infantry and Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles in and around Druzhkivka. Its tactics: strikes on pre-identified targets, 'free hunting', and landing drones in ambush. Depending on conditions it flies radio-controlled or fibre-optic FPVs, and repairing broken cables or antennas can take half a day. He describes flying a drone under an anti-drone net over a road and aborting an attack at the last moment after spotting an 'Evacuation' sign on a minibus carrying civilians. In earlier years his quadcopter corrected SPG-9 and AGS-17 fire.
Single source: this is a report from Krasnaya Zvezda, the newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence, that has not been independently verified. The claim about the territorial situation around Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka reflects the Russian MoD's own account.
Ukrainian firm Phantom Defense says its counter-drone EW systems were tested at Fort Carson in the Pentagon's Drone Dominance programme
2026-10-08
Ukrainian defence tech company Phantom Defense says its electronic warfare (EW) systems were tested in the United States during the second stage ("Gauntlet II") of the Pentagon's Drone Dominance programme, at Fort Carson in Colorado. According to the company's press service, speaking to Ukrainska Pravda, Phantom Defense was one of three manufacturers engaged by the Pentagon to build a counter-UAV environment against which the competing drones were tested.
The company deployed its Specter PRO dome and directional EW system, intended to protect strongpoints, brigade headquarters and critical infrastructure, plus its compact Specter L, X and XL systems. It also demonstrated Streamhunter, a tool that intercepts drone video feeds. All elements were tied into a C2 system for detection, classification, engagement and confirmation of suppression. Phantom Defense says its systems suppressed the tested drones, worked in various weather conditions and recreated the EW environment drone operators face on the front line; it says it has been invited to further Drone Dominance events. A follow-up piece by Defender Media, carried by Euromaidan Press as labelled advertorial content, names the C2 layer as Kupol, which shows separate tools on one shared map, allows remote EW operation, links sensors, interceptor drones and turrets, and suggests defeat options from terrain and a drone database; the company also claims its system neutralised more than 7,000 drones over more than 100 km² in one Ukrainian city within a year. These claims come from the company itself.
According to the report, the Drone Dominance programme has a budget of US$1.1 billion and tested solutions from 25 manufacturers in its initial phase; after the first phase around 30,000 drones are to be bought from 11 companies for US$150 million. The US military earlier placed an additional order for 1,320 F10 FPV drones from Ukrainian firm F-Drones under the same programme. The item is relevant mainly as an indicator that Ukrainian counter-drone EW, developed against Russian drones, is being used to reproduce front-line conditions in US testing.
French firm Harmattan AI unveils the IRIFI long-range strike drone with a claimed 2,000 km range, and Morocco signs a letter of intent to become its first customer.
2026-10-08
French defence company Harmattan AI has unveiled the IRIFI, a long-range strike drone it says can hit targets up to 2,000 km away. Militarnyi reports this on the basis of Harmattan AI's own blog post. The drone launches from mobile container-based launchers and is designed to be used in large numbers. The operator sets the target and route before launch, and the drone then flies the mission without constant contact with the ground station. According to the developer, one operator could manage dozens of drones. AI is meant to help plan strikes from satellite imagery, but a human still makes the engagement decision.
Harmattan AI says the IRIFI's navigation does not depend on GNSS satellite signals and that it uses optical guidance in the terminal phase. The company claims this makes it resistant to electronic warfare and gives it an accuracy of about one metre. These are manufacturer claims that have not been independently verified. Warhead weight, speed, dimensions and unit cost have not been disclosed.
According to Moroccan outlet Le Desk, Morocco's Defence Ministry and Harmattan AI signed a letter of intent at the Marrakech Air Show on 7 October 2026. It covers procurement, joint development and production in Morocco. This is not a final supply contract: the number of drones, the programme cost and the timeline for serial production have not been announced. The deal builds on a strategic partnership agreed in June 2026 between Harmattan AI and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces. Harmattan AI also has ties to Ukraine. In October 2025 it partnered with Skyeton to add AI to Raybird drones, and in February 2026 it planned to fit its compact Sahara synthetic aperture radars to Ukrainian drones.
«Ястреб-С» против спутниковой связи (Topwar: "Yastreb-S" against satellite communications)
2026-10-08SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar (author Kirill Ryabov) describes the Yastreb ("Hawk") family of electronic warfare systems, developed by JSC NPP with backing from Russia's Foundation for Advanced Studies (FPI). The base Yastreb 1.0 was announced in late January 2026; according to TASS (26 September) it is in its final test phase and is to be handed to the army in November for troop trials, possibly in the war zone against real drone signals. Yastreb-S, reported by Izvestia on 7 October citing the Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies, is a more advanced variant: the 1.0 complex plus a frequency-shifting module. Only 1.0 is currently being tested; no test data on Yastreb-S has been published.
According to the developer, Yastreb 1.0 automatically scans 100 MHz to 6 GHz, while Yastreb-S reaches up to 15 GHz. That covers drone control and video bands (433 MHz to 5.8 GHz) and GPS/GLONASS. The system is said to detect links and their parameters, counter frequency hopping and jam drone links, and in reconnaissance mode locate emitters and sometimes intercept drone video. Instead of a battery of band-specific jammers and antennas, it reportedly uses a single compact emitter module that can be mounted on fixed sites or vehicles. The headline claim is the ability to disrupt satellite links such as Starlink, which Ukrainian units use for drone control.
The editorial staff is notably sceptical. A 15 GHz ceiling covers Starlink's Ku-band user links but not the Ka-band. Fully blocking Starlink from the ground is called unlikely; temporarily disrupting a single link during a drone's approach is more realistic. The November date means troop trials, not combat readiness, and the vehicle is vulnerable to counter-EW and small drones. The author also notes that Russian industry has announced several anti-satellite-link systems whose serial production remains unclear.
Single source: this is a report on developer claims by Topwar, a Russian military news site (not a state outlet), that has not been independently verified.
Latvian court sentences woman to six years in prison over €43 transfer that investigators say was meant for drone-jamming equipment for Russian troops
2026-10-07
Riga City Court has sentenced Polina Kamleva, a resident of Rēzekne, Latvia, to six years in prison for financing an armed conflict, Meduza reports (citing the Latvian outlet Delfi). Prosecutors had asked for eight years; the offence carries up to ten years under Latvia's criminal code. Kamleva is described as a pro-Russian activist and a member of the Latvian Russian Union party. The ruling was reported on 7 October 2026.
According to the report, the money went to the Russian side. Investigators say Kamleva transferred €43 (157 Belarusian rubles) intended for Russian forces, specifically towards a mobile electronic warfare system, i.e. a drone-jamming device, for Russian military use. She asked an acquaintance in Belarus to make the transfer because, as she put it, transfers from Latvian banks to Russian banks were impossible. The request for funds came from an acquaintance in Russia linked to the Kaskad military-patriotic center, and the two exchanged WhatsApp messages in December 2024 in which she agreed to help.
Latvia's State Security Service detained her in December 2025. Kamleva denied criminal intent: she argued the messages did not clearly establish that the money was meant for Russian forces and cited unemployment and psychological distress at the time. The case illustrates how small-scale crowdfunding for Russian EW and counter-drone equipment is being prosecuted in the Baltics, including routing payments via Belarus to bypass banking restrictions. Single detail to note: the claims about the purpose of the transfer are those of the investigators and prosecution as relayed by Meduza and Delfi.
Аеродром «Сеща», РЕБ і пункти управління дронами: Сили оборони вдарили по низці військових цілей (ArmyInform: Seshcha airfield, EW and drone control points: Defence Forces struck a series of military targets)
2026-10-07SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform, the news agency of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, reports, citing the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, that Ukrainian Defence Forces struck a series of Russian military targets on 6 October and during the night of 7 October, both in Russia and in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory.
In Bryansk Oblast (Russia) the claimed targets are the Seshcha military airfield (with the results still being clarified), an electronic warfare (EW) station near Hrynove, and a radar station near Elionka. In Donetsk region the claimed targets are a storage, preparation and launch site for attack unmanned aerial vehicles near Donetsk, and command observation posts near Hirnyk, Ukrainsk and Kurakivka. In Zaporizhzhia region, drone control points near Bilotserkivka and Kamyanka are claimed hit.
In temporarily occupied Luhansk region, a materiel-and-technical supplies depot near Krychne and a fuel-and-lubricants depot near Kondryche are claimed. The article notes that similar infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted since September 2026. Damage figures beyond the Seshcha clarification are not given in the summary.
Single source: this is a report from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence news agency ArmyInform, based on General Staff claims, that has not been independently verified.
Ukraine's General Staff says it hit Seshcha airfield, an EW station and a radar in Bryansk Oblast, plus drone control points in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia
2026-10-07
Ukraine's General Staff reported that Ukrainian defence forces struck a number of Russian military sites in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory and in Russia on 6 October and during the night of 6-7 October. In Russia's Bryansk Oblast, it said the Seshcha airfield had been hit, adding that "the extent of the damage is being clarified". It also reported hits on a Russian electronic warfare station near Grinyovo and a radar near Elionka, both in Bryansk Oblast.
In the occupied south and east, the General Staff said a storage, preparation and launch site for Russian attack drones was hit in Donetsk Oblast. It also claimed strikes on Russian UAV ground control stations near Bilotserkivka and Kamianka in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and a command and observation post in the Hirnyk area in Donetsk Oblast, as well as command and observation posts near Ukrainsk and Kurakhivka in Donetsk Oblast.
Logistics targets were also listed: a warehouse of a Russian unit near Krynychne and a petrol, oil and lubricants depot near Kondriuche, both in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainska Pravda notes that on 5-6 October Ukraine reportedly hit a drone warehouse near Siverskodonetsk and an ammunition warehouse near Khrustalne in Luhansk Oblast. All results are Ukrainian General Staff claims, damage at Seshcha is still being assessed, and none of it has been independently confirmed in the source.
Ukraine lists the SHOT-L1, a roughly $9,300 fixed-wing drone that homes on Russian jammers such as the Pole-21 and Zhitel, on Brave1 Market
2026-10-07
A Ukrainian fixed-wing strike drone built to find Russian electronic warfare systems by their own radio emissions and dive onto them has been listed on Brave1 Market, the government-run online store where Ukrainian units order weapons, according to Ukrainian outlet Defender Media as relayed by Defence Blog. The drone, called SHOT-L1, can strike targets up to 80 km away and is priced at UAH 416,000 (about $9,300) per unit on the platform. The manufacturer has not been named, and there is no information on whether the drone has been codified, the formal approval that admits a product into Ukrainian military service.
According to the manufacturer, an operator sends the drone toward the area where a target is believed to be. Once it reaches the assigned zone, an onboard system scans for radio emissions, determines the direction of a detected source and steers the drone onto it automatically. If several emitters are active at once, the drone goes for the strongest one. If no active signal is found within a set time, it switches to a backup mission and attacks a fixed ground target chosen before launch. The SHOT-L1 carries a 4 kg payload, cruises at 100 km/h with up to 60 minutes of flight time, and has a thermal camera, an analog video link and a terminal guidance system for the final approach.
The manufacturer lists three Russian jamming systems as typical targets: the R-340RP Pole-21, the R-330Zh Zhitel and the Mgla. Pole-21 is designed to jam satellite navigation signals such as GPS, while the truck-mounted Zhitel is built to jam satellite phones, cellular networks and navigation signals. Ukrainian estimates put the cost of a single Zhitel at around $10 million, which gives the headline cost contrast with the roughly $9,300 drone. Both systems are widely used by Russian forces, and jamming is a constant problem for Ukrainian drone units that rely on radio control links and satellite navigation. Brave1 Market launched in 2025; Ukraine's Defense Ministry said troops ordered more than 590,000 drones through it in the first nine months of 2026, with interceptor drones the most popular category. The performance claims come from the manufacturer's listing; no combat results are reported.
Прокладывая маршруты «птицам» (Krasnaya Zvezda: Plotting routes for the 'birds')
2026-10-06SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian MoD newspaper, profiles a serviceman with the call sign "Bayun" of the 58th Guards Separate Special Purpose Battalion ("Southern" group of forces), who serves as navigator in an FPV-drone crew. The article says the war has changed the nature of fighting and that many tasks are now solved with unmanned systems, yet a single FPV strike involves a team of specialists; the navigator is responsible for the navigation of strike UAVs. His crew is said to be operating in the Druzhkivka direction, striking military objects in and on the approaches to the city, including equipment, weapons and ground robotic systems, both in "free hunting" mode and against pre-assigned targets.
Bayun explains that he is given a point on the map and plans how to reach it, taking into account the positions of firing points and electronic warfare (EW) assets, because flying in a straight line risks the drone being shot down by small arms or jammed. He keeps updating a scheme of landmarks and danger zones in which the enemy can affect drones, based on combat-flight experience, and says that even under very heavy EW he can find a corridor for the drone. He also watches the same video feed as the operator, which lets the operator concentrate on flying and relieves stress; sometimes the navigator spots a target first and cues the operator.
The article adds that Bayun fought as a militia rifleman in the Donetsk airport battles in January 2015, joined the unit only in 2025 after training on a simulator, and arrived early this year. He describes today's front as blurred, with small infantry groups at the front and the main burden in the near rear, where enemy drones try to cut supply and movement between positions is the most dangerous; crews disperse and keep control and launch points separate. He says 40–50 hours of simulator time are needed before flying, but that a simulator does not convey the real feel, and that he is learning to become an operator himself. Single source: this is a Russian Ministry of Defence (Krasnaya Zvezda) report that has not been independently verified.
Ukraine's Stavka sets new electronic warfare tasks as jet-powered Shaheds evade nearly half of air defences
2026-10-06
After a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff (Stavka) on electronic warfare (EW) and infrastructure protection, President Zelenskyy said Kyiv had given the military and manufacturers additional tasks to scale up the most effective EW methods, Euromaidan Press reports. Because Russia keeps modifying its jet-powered Shahed/Geran drones, Ukrainian countermeasures have to keep pace. According to the figures cited, Ukrainian air defences shot down only 55% of 2,730 jet-powered drones between 1 and 26 September, against about 90% of the slower propeller-driven types.
The article links this to Russian control links over Ukrainian territory. On 3 October presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov said Russian MESH radio repeaters had been installed in Kyiv, giving Shaheds short control links to guide them to their targets. As long as these remain in place, he argued, jamming over the city will not be effective, and "not only the bridges but the air defense assets will be under threat" while online control of drones exists.
The Stavka also discussed the foreign components in Russian drones. Defence Intelligence (HUR) reported on Russia's technology priorities and supplies of critical parts and will send sanctions proposals to the government and the National Security and Defence Council; Ukraine is aligning its sanctions with partners. The meeting also set goals for supplying long-range drones next year. In August HUR deputy chief Vadym Skibitskyi said the Geran-4 and Geran-5 (about $35,000–40,000 each) depended entirely on Chinese turbojets; Ukraine has since reported a Geran-4 with a locally built engine and a new optical navigation system. The figures come from Ukrainian officials and have not been independently verified.
«Человек против робота»: ИИ теряет цель (WarGonzo: Man versus robot: AI loses the target)
2026-10-06SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
Caution: this comes from WarGonzo, a Russian pro-war Telegram channel (milblogger). It is a personal and editorial voice, not a position of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and their claims have not been independently verified.
The post teases a report on the roads of the Dobropillia direction, which it calls a separate front where humans compete with artificial intelligence. According to WarGonzo, black ribbons are stretched above the road surface there. They break up the picture of moving objects for the AI, so that a drone camera loses its lock without recognising a target. The channel says the assault troops themselves describe this contest as "man versus robot", with the stake being not only ingenuity but understanding how the enemy's system works.
The post quotes Khan, whom it calls the "legendary" commander of the "Shtorm" (Storm) detachment: "Any robot is invented by a human. The robot tries to outpace the human brain - this is impossible." WarGonzo says the full report on how Shtorm fighters find ways around drones and AI on the hottest sector of the front was filmed for Channel One and would air that evening on its channel. The post gives no details on the ribbons' effectiveness, on which drones are affected, or on any data.
Single source: this is a Russian milblogger Telegram post that has not been independently verified.
«Каракурт» бьёт врага наверняка (Krasnaya Zvezda: "Karakurt hits the enemy for certain")
2026-10-05SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Ministry of Defence newspaper, profiles a strike-UAV crew of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (1st Guards Tank Army, "Zapad" group of forces) operating the "Molniya" strike drone on the Kupiansk axis. "Karakurt" is not a weapon system here but the callsign of the crew commander, a man in his early thirties from the Saratov region with four years of service who rose from operator to crew commander; he says he chose the name of the steppe spider because its hunt resembles an operator's work: waiting long, then striking precisely. The paper says the crew destroyed a concealed Ukrainian strongpoint, with the personnel sheltering in a fortified dugout killed together with weapons, ammunition and communications equipment.
The article, written in a narrative reportage style, describes the sequence. An aerial-reconnaissance operator ("Krot") spots a faint thermal signature on a thermal-imaging feed and identifies a camouflaged dugout with fresh tracks nearby. Coordinates go to a UAV command post, which confirms the target as a priority; the paper says radio-intelligence assets detected radio traffic indicating a communications node. The crew calculates wind, terrain and humidity, a technician checks the high-explosive fragmentation warhead and electronics, and the Molniya is launched by catapult. It is flown to avoid zones of possible electronic suppression; the paper claims the enemy has saturated the airspace with EW, decoys and camouflage, and that the crew uses terrain, altitude changes and radar blind zones. The drone loiters over the target before a vertical dive, filmed by a reconnaissance drone overhead; the paper reports collapse of the roof, fire and secondary explosions. Details such as altitude (400 m) and approach time (seven minutes) are given.
The text claims significant enemy losses "according to observers" and states the crew has carried out dozens of similar tasks. It is a propaganda-style profile with no verifiable data (no location grid beyond "square 214", no imagery, no independent confirmation). Single source: this is a Russian Ministry of Defence newspaper (Krasnaya Zvezda) report that has not been independently verified.
«От тактики роевого применения дронов до атак безэкипажных танков» (Krasnaya Zvezda: From swarm drone tactics to uncrewed tank attacks — Tsentr-2026 wrap-up)
2026-10-04SINGLE SOURCE
Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian Defence Ministry's newspaper, published an overview of the main phase of the strategic command-staff exercise Tsentr-2026, which ended on 2 October at the Central Military District's 255th Chebarkul range, watched by President Putin and with Defence Minister Belousov reporting. According to the paper, more than 6,000 troops took part at Chebarkul (4,600 Russian, 1,479 foreign, 634 of them from CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force contingents). More than 600 pieces of equipment were used, including 55 aircraft and helicopters, 567 UAVs and more than 50 robotic systems. Representatives of 41 states took part. Six of them sent contingents: Belarus, China, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan and Tajikistan. Overall command was held by Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. The paper names the key features as mass use of UAVs, ground robotic systems and electronic warfare, assaults on motorcycles, buggies and quad bikes, and counter-battery fire 'taking into account the experience of the special military operation'.
The drone section focuses on the 'Roy' (Swarm) formation. FPV crews in this formation supported motorcycle assault groups, which attacked from the flanks while fire came from the front. Concentrated FPV strikes hit enemy firing positions as they were revealed, and mobile fire groups in 'Ulan-2' vehicles fought off enemy UAVs. The paper says swarm use of strike FPV drones is 'widely used' by Unmanned Systems Forces units in the war zone. It adds that Central Military District drone units combined swarm strikes on ground targets with point defence against air threats by FPV interceptors. Other drone elements were a Supercam-S350 with 'Repei' software for tank fire from indirect positions (up to 4.5 h endurance, data link up to 100 km), Kub-2 loitering munitions with thermobaric warheads (range over 60 km), a Kurier ground robot with rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers, and Bogomol, Impuls and Depesha ground robots for resupply and casualty evacuation. Heavy Mangas and Zanoza-30 drones dropped supplies to assault troops. Assault groups also practised slipping through the grey zone via a water conduit and a pre-dug tunnel.
On armour, the article says uncrewed tanks with uninhabited fighting compartments manoeuvred within armoured groups and fired from short halts. It credits their mobility to a 'multichannel, jam-resistant' control system that duplicates the most vulnerable control nodes. T-14 Armata and T-90M tanks with the Arena active protection system used 'tank carousel' fire. The paper says Arena's radar detects FPV drones on approach and fires a fragmentation cloud with a radius of up to 200 m. The tanks were covered by a 'Spiridon' support vehicle and the Derivatsiya-PVO anti-aircraft gun system. Su-34s dropped twelve OFAB-500PD bombs at once on a command post and flew the 'Shnek' anti-missile manoeuvre; tactical aviation stayed outside enemy air-defence engagement zones. The article does not mention the reported problems with the uncrewed tanks (see entry e-20261004-07). Single source: this is a Russian state source (the Defence Ministry's newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda) presenting the ministry's own account of a staged exercise; the claims have not been independently verified.
Ukrainian General Staff claims strikes on Buk-M3 SAM system, Donetsk drone launch site and Bryansk EW station
2026-10-04
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine says Ukrainian forces carried out several strikes on Russian military assets on 3 October and the night of 3–4 October. They report hitting a Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile system near Kuroshany in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and a site near Donetsk used to store, prepare and launch Russian strike UAVs.
The General Staff also reports hitting a Russian electronic warfare station near Klimovo in Russia's Bryansk Oblast, and telecommunications hubs used by Russian units near Hirnyk, Yasynuvata and Donetsk.
These are claims by a party to the conflict. The General Staff gave no details on the damage, and the strikes have not been independently verified. The Donetsk drone site is a different facility from the Tsymbulova base in Oryol Oblast, which was also struck in the same period.
«Мамонт» на трассе «Новороссия»: тяжёлые FPV ВСУ против нашей логистики (Two Majors: balloon-delivered heavy Ukrainian FPV drones with Starlink attack the R-280 'Novorossiya' highway)
2026-10-04SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
This is based on two posts from the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Два майора (Two Majors), a milblogger, not an official Russian source. It represents a personal/editorial voice; milbloggers can contradict each other and the Russian Ministry of Defence, and the claims below have not been independently verified.
On 4 October 2026, according to Two Majors, the R-280 'Novorossiya' federal highway was attacked by dozens of balloons launched from the right (Ukrainian-held) bank of the Dnipro. This road runs through occupied southern Ukraine and is used for Russian logistics. The balloons are said to have dropped 'Hornet-2' drones and strike FPV quadcopters fitted with Starlink antennas; the channel posted a photo of one downed FPV drone beside the road. In a follow-up on 5 October, it identified the drones as the 'Mamont' (Mammoth) heavy FPV made by Escadrone. The channel says this drone carries up to 4 kg, twice as much as standard models, and flies 12 km with a 4 kg warhead or up to 30 km with a 1.5 kg warhead; it dates the first combat use to November 2023. It claims the automatic balloons flew without engines above 6.5 km on favourable winds and were hard for radar to see. According to the channel, at least 25 heavy FPVs were placed in advance along the highway, including on wind-turbine towers, and some may have been left in ambush mode ('zhduny') on the roadside. The channel says such drones can be found only by sweeping the area or flying reconnaissance drones along the route. It adds that the Starlink antennas let operators keep control where standard EW systems jam the normal radio link.
Two Majors calls the method a way to deliver drones around dense Russian air defence. The balloon carries the drone to high altitude and releases it at a calculated point with an almost full battery; the channel claims this extends loitering-munition range from 60–70 km to about 200 km. It expects Ukraine to try hanging glide bombs under balloons next. It urges arming the mobile fire groups that escort civilian lorries, fuel tankers and military vehicles with smoothbore guns, having fixed posts sweep the roadsides, and finding ways to detect and destroy balloons at 6.5–9 km altitude. Single source: this is a Russian milblogger (Два майора) report that has not been independently verified; there is no Ukrainian confirmation of the attack.
Советник Зеленского: в Киеве есть российские ретрансляторы для управления БПЛА
2026-10-03SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoe Obozrenie relays a social-media post by Serhiy Beskrestnov (call sign 'Flash'), Zelensky's adviser on technology development, who suggests that one to three Russian mesh relay devices may be operating inside Kyiv, forming a temporary control channel through which Geran drones are guided onto targets. He argues such devices are very hard to find but must be found, because while they exist Ukrainian electronic-warfare systems are effectively neutralised.
Beskrestnov admits he is not certain the relays exist, or whether Russian strikes are corrected some other way. As supporting evidence he cites the Russian strike on an SBU building, when, he says, no other Russian drones in the area could have acted as relays, and he says he examined earlier strikes on Kyiv's bridges for signs of remote command links. He has previously described a theory in which each drone carries a modem acting as a relay, so that a group of UAVs forms a self-healing mesh network (compare entry e-20261001-05 on Russian in-flight drone mesh networks).
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Voennoe Obozrenie (topwar.ru) (Russian defence-media outlet), relaying a Ukrainian official's hypothesis; the claims have not been independently verified and the source himself presents them as uncertain.
Tsentr-2026: Shturm robotic tank debut falters in the mud while T-90M's Arena-M downs drones in staged attack
2026-10-03
During the Tsentr-2026 strategic exercise (28 September – 3 October, more than 47,000 troops according to the Russian Defence Ministry), Russia used uncrewed tanks from Uralvagonzavod's Shturm heavy robotic assault system in drills for the first time. The ministry said on 2 October that President Putin was shown the vehicles at the Chebarkul range in Chelyabinsk region, built on the T-72B3M chassis in a tank version and a BMPT-style version, giving fire support to assault units. The main version carries a shortened 125 mm gun, a dozer blade and extra armour; a 152 mm version is reportedly in development. Each vehicle is driven by three operators in a separate crewed control vehicle on a tank chassis that has to stay within about 3 km, according to Rostec's 'Russian Weapons' project and ANNA News.
According to Russian sources cited by Defence Blog, the debut went badly. The Shturm repeatedly lost its radio link to the control vehicle, and for Putin's demonstration a driver-mechanic on board drove it instead of remote operators, for fear of a technical failure. A photo shows the vehicle nose-down in a muddy ditch. Russian armour expert Andrei Tarasenko said the engine compartment and turret roof are almost unprotected against drones and called the concept unsuccessful because it depends on a command post 3–4 km away with line of sight. The ministry has published no data on how the link performs under electronic warfare.
At the same exercise, a T-90M used its Arena-M active protection system (KBM, Kolomna) to shoot down FPV quadcopters and fixed-wing drones in a staged attack on a tank column. Russia did not say how many drones were launched or intercepted, or whether any got through. Arena-M reportedly received a drone-intercept mode in 2025, and Ukrainian units have reported it destroying FPV drones in combat, one unit saying it took 15–20 drones to knock out a tank fitted with it. However, the known configuration carries only 12 interceptor munitions, and new T-90M and T-72B3M tanks delivered in September did not have the system fitted.
«Тунгуска», дрони-перехоплювачі й автоматичні турелі: як сьогодні працює «мале ППО»
2026-10-01SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform reports, based on a video and statements from the Ukrainian Air Force's Air Command 'Centre', how short-range air defence is currently organised in Chernihiv Oblast, across which thousands of Russian attack drones have flown in the past six months. According to the military, a single means is no longer sufficient against modern aerial targets; machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, interceptor drones and automated turrets must complement each other. One system still in use is the Tunguska gun-missile vehicle: a commander showed 25 kill markings for downed Shaheds on its hull (with one more not yet applied), and the crew has also shot down jet-powered attack drones. Mobile fire groups operate alongside it; one soldier said his group has downed 12-13 aerial targets, and such units can be reinforced with missile means for more difficult targets, including jet UAVs.
Interceptor drones form a separate layer: a pilot said his unit destroyed more than 50 aerial targets in a year, and interceptors that are not expended on a target are recovered, repaired and reused. Automated anti-aircraft systems are another layer; one such system is credited with 41 kills, including two cruise missiles, with the military citing speed (a shorter time from detection to opening fire) as the main advantage of automation. Remotely operated turrets were also shown: according to an operator, one turret downed up to six Shaheds in a single night during a massed raid, needing roughly 25-30 rounds per target, and it can also engage a jet drone that enters its engagement zone.
The military claim that in the first half of the year about 17,000 Shaheds entered the oblast and roughly 3,500 left it; around half of the targets are shot down and about a quarter more are suppressed by electronic warfare. Short-range air defence is therefore being built as a multi-layered system (Tunguska, mobile fire groups, interceptor drones, automated systems and remote turrets), and Air Command stresses that when the enemy changes tactics or introduces a new type of target, the task is to find a countermeasure quickly and scale what works.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD news agency) based on statements by Ukrainian Air Force personnel; the kill claims and figures have not been independently verified.
«Про це знає їхнє вище командування»: що стоїть за тактикою інфільтрації росіян між позиціями
2026-10-01SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform reports remarks by Ruslana Bohdan, communications officer of Ukraine's 57th Separate Motorised Infantry Brigade (named after Kost Hordiienko), made on Army TV about the South-Slobozhanskyi (south Kharkiv) direction. According to Bohdan, Russian troops keep trying to slip through the gaps between Ukrainian positions. She stresses that these are not designated sabotage-reconnaissance groups (DRG): the soldiers receive no task to seize, destroy or fight, but only a waypoint to reach, after which they are sent new coordinates. 'Their higher command knows about this,' she says, implying the infiltrations are a sanctioned approach rather than improvised action by small units.
When infiltrators do manage to reach the Ukrainian rear, using vegetation and bad weather as cover, the brigade deploys strike-search groups to locate and eliminate them. Bohdan describes the fighting as 'super-modern' and heavily drone-centric, though direct contact still occurs when terrain or weather restricts drone use. According to the article, the brigade's electronic warfare assets work against roughly 350-400 radio-controlled FPV drones in its sector alone; the period this figure covers is not specified. The airspace is said to be constantly filled with Russian reconnaissance drones, Molniya fixed-wing drones, FPV drones (including fibre-optic ones) and Lancet loitering munitions, and Molniya operators reportedly perform evasive manoeuvres such as inverted loops when engaged.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD outlet), based on a statement by a Ukrainian brigade spokesperson; the claims have not been independently verified.
Ukrainian Air Force: Russia links attack drones in in-flight mesh networks so one drone can scout, strike and relay control for the rest
2026-09-30
Euromaidan Press (Taisiia Vivdych) reports that Russia is deploying attack drones linked in mesh networks, so that individual drones can act as scout, striker and communications relay for others in the same group. The main source is Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat, who says the drones "talk to each other and hand the control signal back" toward operators, allowing chains of drones to fly long distances with relays; one drone can be scout, strike drone and relay for the rest.
The article cites Ukrainian figures of 3,177 jet-powered attack drones launched in September 2026 against 2,850 in August, an increase of 327. It also says Russia is acquiring higher-resolution cameras and more expensive imaging equipment, letting operators study ground detail more precisely and assign specific tasks to individual drones.
Chains of Russian drones frequently cross near the Ukraine-Belarus border, though Ihnat said Ukrainian intelligence has not yet confirmed whether Russia uses relay towers. Ukraine counters with F-16s, ground-based air defence and MANPADS, but Ihnat stressed the need for more missile stocks. These are claims by a Ukrainian official as relayed by a Ukrainian outlet and are not independently verified.
Russia upgrades the Geran-4 jet drone with a shaped-charge cutting warhead and 'whisker' contact fuze against power lines and bridges; HUR details a US-made magnetometer, 'Susanin' optical navigation and an Alabuga-built engine
2026-09-30
According to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, adviser to the Ukrainian President on defence technology, Russia on 30 September used for the first time a special shaped-charge cutting payload (KRSN) on a jet-powered strike drone, designed to destroy high-voltage transmission towers and steel bridge structures. Militarnyi, citing photos published by Defense Express, identified the carrier as the Geran-4: the warhead combines a main charge of about 40 kg with four supplementary linear cutting charges in a revolver-cylinder layout, which focus the blast along a line to slice through pylon legs, cables or bridge girders rather than causing broad blast damage. This also explains the 'whiskered Shahed' that volunteer Serhii Sternenko showed on X on 1 October (reported by Defence Blog). According to Beskrestnov, the rods on its nose are a simple mechanical contact fuze: a metal rod inside a metal tube closes the firing circuit on contact, so a close pass over a power line is enough to set off the charges, whereas a standard impact fuze needs a solid surface and may not fire when a drone clips a cable or the open lattice of a tower.
On 5 October Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR) published details and photos, via its War&Sanctions portal, of the upgraded Geran-4, which it says Russia began deploying in autumn 2026 (Ukrainska Pravda). HUR confirms that the KRSN warhead is meant to cut bridge structures and overhead power-line supports with a shaped-charge jet. The upgraded drone also carries a new MOKh module built around a high-precision magnetic induction sensor (magnetometer), the PNI5GA made by the US company PNI Sensor; working together with the SADRA inertial navigation module, it reduces gyroscope drift and improves the accuracy of autonomous navigation. On top of satellite and inertial navigation, Russia has added the 'Susanin' optoelectronic correlation system, which compares live images from an optical sensor with a reference image stored in memory to keep the drone on its route from launch to target. According to HUR, the identical system is fitted to the Geran-5 in its K5 modification, which confirms earlier Telegram-based reporting. HUR also says the Chinese Telefly turbojet has been replaced by a localised Russian-made equivalent produced at Alabuga, while the remaining electronics and components are unchanged from earlier Geran versions.
Militarnyi describes the Geran-4 as a development of the Geran-3: about 3 m wingspan, 3.5 m long, 450 kg take-off weight, a 160 kgf turbojet, a cruise speed of 350-500 km/h, a range of 850 km, an altitude band of 100-5,000 m and a warhead of more than 50 kg. Ukrainska Pravda notes that Russia used five times as many jet drones in July as in June and says the new warhead may signal that Russia plans to step up attacks on transmission lines. According to Defence Blog, such lines have so far been hit less often than power plants and substations because towers and cables are small and hard to hit. HUR's emphasis on bridges follows Russian jet-drone strikes on Kyiv's Dnipro bridges in early October. The claims come from Ukrainian intelligence, official-adjacent, volunteer and media sources and have not been independently confirmed.
EU sanctioned Russia's Starlink rival Rassvet but not its manufacturer Bureau 1440; Ukraine now urges the US to sanction the companies behind it before it becomes operational
2026-09-30
According to Euromaidan Press, the EU's 21st sanctions package (23 July 2026) targeted Rassvet, Russia's low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation built as a replacement for SpaceX Starlink access after it was cut off, but did not list Bureau 1440, the private company assembling the satellites, or its CEO. Bureau 1440 is already on Ukraine's sanctions list but, per the article, remains outside every Western sanctions regime. The US research group C4ADS called designating the manufacturer the single most visible and effective step available; Viktoriia Vyshnivska of Ukraine's NAKO cautioned against expecting dramatic results, but said sanctions would raise sourcing costs for Western boards and components, many of which already face EU export controls.
Ukraine is now also pressing Washington. Denys Sienik, deputy chief of mission at the Ukrainian embassy in Washington, told Reuters (as reported by Ukrainska Pravda on 1 October) that Russia is rapidly expanding Rassvet and that the embassy will give the US government and Congress detailed information on the companies and individuals facilitating the project. "If they launch Rassvet by the end of 2026, they will be able to hit Ukrainian targets real time on our territory," he said, adding that leaving these entities unsanctioned would make the programme possible and would be "a game-changer". According to the report, Alexei Shelobkov, CEO of developer Iks Holding, said in June that operational deployment is planned for 2027; the first batch of 16 satellites was launched in March, with an eventual constellation of 900 planned in the coming years (SpaceX operates more than 10,000 Starlink satellites).
The military concern on both sides is the same: Ukrainian technology adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov warns that Rassvet would let Russian forces fly long-range strike drones under real-time satellite control over Ukrainian territory, and Euromaidan Press notes it could let Russian drones operate through Ukrainian jamming. Ukraine itself cannot use Starlink for real-time UAV guidance inside Russia because of geofencing. Ukrainian officials estimate sanctions could slow development by about a year, while Russia reportedly needs five to eight years to complete the constellation. Timelines and threat assessments are claims by Ukrainian officials, Euromaidan Press and the cited experts, not independently verified.
russia Equips New Geran-5 Drones With Kh-101-Style Navigation: Why Darkness Could Be Problem
2026-09-28SINGLE SOURCE
According to Defense Express, Russia has upgraded its Geran-5 jet-powered drones with a new guidance module called Susanin, a Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) system that navigates by comparing preloaded reference satellite imagery with images from an onboard camera. This lets the drone keep navigating where satellite navigation (GNSS) is jammed or unavailable, making it more resistant to electronic warfare.
Defense Express stresses that the technology is not new: comparable systems have flown on the Russian Kh-101 cruise missile and the American Tomahawk for years. It also notes that Ukraine uses similar scene-matching on its own deep-strike drones. The outlet points to a key limitation: accuracy depends on lighting, season and even the time of day, since the sun angle changes shadow patterns. At night the system performs considerably worse, particularly without extra illumination or specialised image processing.
This creates a tension, the outlet argues, because Russia mostly launches Kh-101 missiles at night, when Ukrainian mobile fire groups find targets harder to detect. A night-launched Geran-5 relying on Susanin could thus lose navigation accuracy, although this is Defense Express's assessment and not an observed result.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express (Ukrainian defence outlet); the claims have not been independently verified.
Из интересных задымлений в Киеве — задымление в Академии наук
2026-09-28SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
Fighterbomber (Telegram, 28 Sep 2026) comments on smoke seen at the Academy of Sciences in Kyiv after the overnight strikes, mocking Ukrainian reactions and implying the site was not a legitimate target of interest. The blogger writes that he very much doubts Russia would spend a Geran (Shahed-type) drone on this object. In his view the actual target was probably Ukrtelecom nearby, and the hit on the Academy would be thanks to Ukraine's own electronic warfare (EW).
This is speculation: the post gives no evidence of the drone type, its route or how EW would have diverted it. It links with the claimed Ukrtelecom data-centre strike reported by Russian channels the same day, and reflects the milblogger's view that EW can pull drones off course onto other objects.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Fighterbomber (Russian milblogger Telegram channel); it is a personal/editorial voice, not a position of the Russian MoD, and milbloggers regularly contradict each other and the MoD. The claims have not been independently verified.
Авіація, катери, радари та міст: ГУР знищило низку критичних елементів військової системи окупантів
2026-09-28SINGLE SOURCE
Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on 28 September 2026 that operators of its special unit 'Prymary' (Ghosts) struck a range of Russian targets, from logistics and communications to radar, aviation and naval assets. ArmyInform lists: a railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal; 9 communication towers, EW, ELINT and radar (BRLS) assets and mesh relays; a Nebo-U radar; a P-18 Terek radar command post; two Kasta-2E radars; an L-39 Albatros jet trainer; a BK-10 fast assault boat; a BK-16 fast landing craft; and a Mangust fast patrol boat.
GUR says the systematic destruction of high-value targets deprives the enemy of the ability to see, transfer data, move resources and operate at sea. The report gives no dates, locations per target, or imagery in the text. This is separate from the General Staff report of the same day on the Pantsir-S2 and drone sites.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD media); the claims have not been independently verified.
Russia reportedly fields Geran-5 'K5' variant with autonomous optical (scene-matching) navigation and redesigned fuselage
2026-09-27
Russian forces have reportedly begun using a new modification of the jet-powered Geran-5 strike UAV with an autonomous optical navigation system and a modified fuselage. The report comes from the monitoring Telegram channel Colonel GSh ("Polkovnik GSh"), which calls the variant the Geran-5 K5 and published a photo comparing the old and new airframes. According to the channel, the drone has an electro-optical correction system that navigates by matching images of the ground below. It works on the same principle as DSMAC-type (Russian: OEKS) scene-matching systems, which let a weapon correct its course without satellite navigation. The channel also says the K5 is faster than the standard Geran-5 and may therefore be misidentified in flight as other jet-powered strike weapons such as the Dan-T. Militarnyi stresses that Ukrainian sources have not officially confirmed either the K5 designation or the presence of a DSMAC-class system.
Russian sources partly corroborate the claim. Russian military correspondent Andrei Filatov (via Gazeta.ru) said that Geran-series drones already use an autonomous optical navigation system called "Susanin", which navigates by terrain imagery and lets the UAV continue on its route without radio beacons. He did not say which Geran modification carries it or describe it as DSMAC. Rossiyskaya Gazeta (27 September), citing military Telegram channels, reports that Susanin compares terrain imagery with a map loaded before flight, similar to the "Otblesk-U" optical correction option of the Kh-101 strategic cruise missile. The Russian channel Voyenny Osvedomitel said the jet Geran is "increasingly becoming a full-fledged cruise missile".
For comparison, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR) gives the baseline Geran-5 as 6.5 m long, with a 3.2 m wingspan, a maximum take-off weight of up to 850 kg, a warhead of about 90 kg, a cruising speed of 450–600 km/h, a range of about 950 km and a ceiling of 6 km. HUR's teardown of a baseline Geran-5 found a Kometa-M12 jam-resistant satellite navigation receiver, an inertial navigation system, a tracker with cellular modems, a mesh modem and a Chinese TELEFLY TF-TJ2000A turbojet. The public HUR component list includes no separate DSMAC system. Russia had already moved the turbojet from an external nacelle into the fuselage to cut drag, which may add speed and range. If confirmed, terrain-image navigation would give the drone a way to find its route that does not depend on GNSS or radio links. GNSS jamming and spoofing, which the baseline already partly counters with the Kometa-M12 receiver, would then do less against the final route correction. The K5 and Susanin claims come from Telegram channels and Russian media and have not been independently verified.
Euromaidan Press (28 September) repeats the K5 claim and adds two pieces of context. It attributes the identification to analysis of wreckage by the Ukrainian channel Polkovnyk GSh, and it places the drone in a recent operational pattern: on 25 September a jet Shahed-type drone reportedly filmed and relayed targeting data to a Geran-5 that hit the Inkom business centre in Kyiv, killing four people. Presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov called this a complex operation requiring precise coordination. The outlet also cites a roughly 55% Ukrainian interceptor kill rate against jet drones and says Ukrainian firms are developing jet-powered interceptors, although officials note that speed alone is not enough and machine-vision guidance is needed. The article confirms that Ukrainian officials have not confirmed the K5 designation or a DSMAC system, and that HUR's component list mentions none. These additions come from a single outlet and Telegram and official statements and are not independently verified.
WSJ: Российский бизнес организует самостоятельную защиту предприятий от БПЛА
2026-09-26SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru) relays a Wall Street Journal report that Russian companies are increasingly organising their own protection against Ukrainian drones. Its lead example is steel and mining group Severstal, controlled by Alexei Mordashov, which deployed an air defence system at one of its plants after a Ukrainian drone strike. Businesses are said to be moving from passive protection such as fencing and netting to active defence: leasing air defence systems from Defence Ministry-linked structures, building their own, and hiring staff to detect and destroy drones. Job sites advertise such security posts, some tied to Defence Ministry contracts, with employers promising the staff will not be sent to the front.
Topwar notes that this fits Kremlin policy: strategic enterprises that fail to organise protection risk tough state measures, up to temporary 'external administration'. It also describes a growing commercial market for automatic and semi-automatic counter-drone detection and defeat systems with electronic warfare components, and an expanding insurance market against drone damage, including for private citizens, which it says the Bank of Russia supports. The WSJ original is paywalled and was not reviewed in full.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru), a private Russian military news outlet relaying a Wall Street Journal report; the claims have not been independently verified.
На Северном флоте отрабатывали защиту от беспилотников
2026-09-25SINGLE SOURCE
According to the Northern Fleet press service, units responsible for guarding and defending Northern Fleet basing points in Murmansk Oblast held an exercise on repelling a UAV attack on military facilities. In the scenario a fleet facility came under simulated air attack, and personnel practised detecting, suppressing and engaging low-flying aerial targets.
Electronic warfare crews jammed and suppressed the control links of small UAVs, while mobile fire groups and air observation posts practised detecting aerial objects and employing weapons against them. The press service stressed that this was a planned exercise, not a report of a real attack. The article links it to earlier Ukrainian threats of sabotage against Russian Navy infrastructure, including nuclear submarines and missile carriers, and says the military continues to improve air-defence and counter-sabotage protection of basing points, with particular attention to countering various drone types. It names no specific units, bases, ships or weapon systems.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Topwar, a Russian pro-government military news site relaying Ministry of Defence information; it has not been independently verified.
«Мы не убегаем от FPV-дронов, мы на них охотимся»: мобильная огневая группа «БАРС-Курск» (группа Араба)
2026-09-25SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
WarGonzo highlights a mobile fire group (MOG) of the volunteer brigade 'BARS-Kursk' (Group North) commanded by Yevgeny Lobaev, call sign 'Arab'. He is the son of the arms designer Vladislav Lobaev and originally joined the brigade as an instructor. The group operates on what it calls one of the hottest stretches of the Kursk border area. Its task is to shoot down Ukrainian FPV drones and other UAVs that hit transport routes, infrastructure and civilians. The linked Kurskaya Pravda feature (25 September) says the group has set a brigade record for drones downed over the past two months. No figures are given.
According to the post and the article, the group differs from other BARS-Kursk MOGs in rarely using pickups and machine guns. It moves on foot, sets ambushes along known drone flight corridors and relies on automatic small arms. It has largely abandoned 12-gauge shotguns because it engages FPV drones at 200–250 m. The deputy platoon commander ('Russkiy') gives the reason: Ukrainian FPVs now carry directional-fragmentation charges, like a directional mine, with a roughly 50 m fragment spray, so range and reaction time are critical. Detection relies on video-interception receivers, which reportedly pick up drones before they can be heard and show drone type, distance and even operator call signs. The group also posts observers ('eyes') along ammunition-supply and evacuation routes to hunt loitering 'waiter' drones. A former competition sniper serves as senior shooter and instructor. Engagements are filmed for after-action review. The article describes a fast cat-and-mouse cycle. When the group starts downing fibre-optic drones, Ukrainian operators switch to analogue links. When those are jammed with EW, they move to digital links. They then attack in pairs or threes, from the flank and at very low altitude. One fighter recounts an FPV coming for the group via a detour about 20 minutes after it had downed another drone.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal/editorial Telegram channel (WarGonzo), which relays a feature from the Kursk regional newspaper Kurskaya Pravda. It does not represent the position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the ministry. The claims have not been independently verified.