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Fortifications
16 tracked developments on Fortifications in the Russian armed forces, 2026-09-20 to 2026-10-27, with sources.
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Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
Russia builds 20+ bermed shelters and ~40 'garages' for Geran drones at Crimea's Hvardiiske airbase after Ukrainian strikes, OSINT imagery shows
2026-10-27
Russia is expanding its infrastructure for Geran-type strike drones at Hvardiiske airbase, north of Simferopol in occupied Crimea, according to the Ukrainian OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint (Harbuz). On 26 October the analyst posted annotated satellite images on Telegram that, in his reading, show more than 20 small shelters under construction, each protected by earthen berms, plus about 40 smaller 'garages' for storing, servicing and preparing drones for launch. Neither report gives dimensions or a precise layout of the shelters. The channel did not say who took the satellite images or when they were captured.
The analyst also marked part of the base where at least one hangar appears damaged, which he attributes to an earlier Ukrainian drone strike. He says Hvardiiske has no fixed launchers and uses mobile platforms instead: drones are loaded onto specially equipped vehicles and launched from the runway. In his view, the new shelters disperse and harden drone storage after the earlier strikes on its hangars.
Ukraine has repeatedly said it struck the airbase. The SBU claimed hits on infrastructure there on 24 June and on two hangars holding Shaheds and aviation equipment on 3 July. Ukraine's General Staff and the SBU reported further strikes in early July. On 3 August the General Staff said nine aviation-fuel tanks were destroyed and two hangars damaged. Satellite images of 10 August showed damaged Geran hangars. The General Staff claimed strikes on drone storage and launch sites on 17 August, 1 September and 13 October; on 13 October four storage sites were reportedly damaged, with signs of secondary detonation. From 7 October onward the General Staff listed Hvardiiske as a launch area, including on the night of 27 October, when Russia launched 280 Shahed-type drones, 69 of them jet-powered. These strike claims come from Ukrainian state bodies, and the shelter counts come from a single OSINT channel. None of this has been independently verified.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Euromaidan Press
«Лазейка перекрыта: обстановка на Дружковском направлении» (Rybar: 'Loophole closed: the situation on the Druzhkivka direction')
2026-10-26SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
In a map digest on the Druzhkivka direction, Russian milblogger channel Rybar claims that assault troops of the Southern Group of Forces have been seen inside the "Mayskaya" electrical substation on the southeastern approaches to Kostiantynivka. Rybar infers that all buildings of the site are under stable Russian control from the fact that Ukrainian forces are using aviation to strike it. It adds that Russian troops have also taken several strongpoints in treelines to the north, which would protect the private housing sector in eastern Kostiantynivka against further counterattacks; Rybar says Ukrainian infiltration groups had repeatedly been inserted into basements there.
According to the post, the situation in the north of Kostiantynivka remains difficult: Ukrainian units are trying to widen a "wedge" they previously created in the built-up area but cannot consolidate, while Russian aviation strikes Ukrainian troop concentrations in Druzhkivka. Rybar acknowledges an abundance of Ukrainian drones and problems with extending Russian supply routes, but argues that the initiative east of Kostiantynivka remains with the Russian army. Citing recent Russian advances near Chasiv Yar, it suggests the capture of the substation could mark the start of the final elimination of the Ukrainian-held "salient" (also called a "pocket") near Krasne.
This is a single source from a Russian milblogger, not independently verified. Rybar is a personal/editorial voice, not a Russian Ministry of Defence position; milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD.
Sources: Rybar (Telegram)
Russia's Digital Development Ministry recommends underground or bunkered strategic data centres after Ukrainian drone strikes; Yandex relocates all three supercomputers
2026-10-26
Russia's Ministry of Digital Development has approved recommendations for protecting data centres against drone attacks and other aerial threats, business daily Kommersant reported, citing a document it reviewed. Critical data centres are to be split into three categories by the consequences of an attack; category K1 covers strategic facilities whose damage could disrupt key government functions for an hour or more. For these, the recommendations call for underground or bunker placement. They also call for reducing data centres' visibility from the air and combining 'physical reinforcement' with electronic-warfare equipment and counter-air systems, and apply to facilities being designed, built or already operating, regardless of owner.
The move follows a Ukrainian campaign against Russian data centres that began in October in response to Russian strikes on data centres in Kyiv. Within a week, Ukrainian drones hit three of Yandex's six data centres — in Sasovo (Ryazan region), Kaluga and Vladimir — and later a Sberbank data centre in the Saratov region. IT-market sources cited by Kommersant estimate that replacing equipment knocked out at Yandex will take up to six months.
Separately, Yandex said it has moved all three of its supercomputers — Lyapunov, Galushkin and Chervonenkis — out of their previous locations to new computing sites, and that they were not damaged in the drone attacks. Two of them were housed at Sasovo; Chervonenkis ranked 19th in the world TOP500 list in 2021. A source cited by Forbes Russia said the three machines are independent nodes rather than one supercluster, so they can be placed separately. The claim that they were undamaged comes from Yandex itself and has not been independently verified.
Sources: Kyiv Independent · Meduza (EN) · Meduza (EN)
Russia builds outer air-defence ring of new towers near Putin's Valdai residence, bringing the total to about 50 positions, roughly half the number around Moscow
2026-10-25
Russia has built more than a dozen new towers for air-defence systems around Vladimir Putin's residence at Valdai (Novgorod region) in October, bringing the number of air-defence positions in the area to about 50, or by some counts more than 50. The finding comes from Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Russian Service, based on satellite imagery analysed jointly with an OSINT researcher who posts on X as @jembobineuse (jembob); Radio Liberty journalist Mark Krutov mapped the positions. Ukrainska Pravda and Militarnyi report 16 new towers, Meduza's summary of the same investigation 'at least 15'. They were built within a 50 km radius, mainly south of the residence on the side facing Ukraine, forming an additional outer ring. The journalists assume they are meant for Pantsir-S1 gun-missile systems or Tor surface-to-air missile systems. No new positions have yet been found in the northern part of the outer ring; these may follow in the coming months.
The new ring runs past Khotilovo military airfield, which is used for Putin's flights and is linked to the Valdai residence by a dedicated railway line; one tower there was built as early as March 2026. Several more positions sit on the shore of the Vyshny Volochyok Reservoir, around Lisiy Island, where according to an earlier Radio Liberty investigation the Russian military built a laboratory complex that may be linked to a biological weapons programme; construction of two towers near that facility began in early September, around the time that investigation was published. Meduza adds the wider picture from the OSINT analyst's count: Russia now has about 177 towers carrying short-range air-defence systems, of which about 98 are in and around Moscow and about 50 near Valdai. Fewer than 100,000 people live within 50 km of Valdai, against more than 20 million in the capital region.
The build-up has been gradual: the first air-defence system near the residence appeared in January 2023 and a second in July 2024; by April 2026 satellite imagery showed at least 27 units around it, after seven Pantsir towers were added in March. Russian authorities claimed that more than 90 Ukrainian drones tried to attack the residence in late December 2025; Ukraine denies this, and according to Meduza the CIA concluded that the target of the Ukrainian drone attack in Novgorod region was an unspecified military facility not near the residence. Militarnyi also points to the parallel expansion around Moscow: about 24 new Pantsir towers were reported in July, and at least seven more in June after a Ukrainian drone attack in May. The findings rest on open-source satellite analysis and have not been confirmed by Russian authorities; the exact counts differ slightly between reports.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Militarnyi · Meduza (EN)
Russia completes testing of Titan robotic demining system, TASS reports
2026-10-23
The Russian state news agency TASS reports that Russian specialists have developed Titan, a robotic demining system. Its purpose is to clear a continuous route through anti-personnel minefields and explosive obstacles. TASS presents it as a response to the widespread use of anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices in the 'special military operation' zone. TASS does not name the manufacturer and quotes only an unnamed company representative and developer.
According to the developer, Titan weighs 2.3 tonnes and carries 1 tonne. It reaches 7 km/h with sweeping equipment and 14 km/h without, operates autonomously for at least 3.5 hours, and clears a 2 m wide path. Control range is at least 500 m, depending on the type of communication link, and an electronic warfare module is optional. The vehicle has electric motors, a low profile, all-round fragmentation protection and increased blast resistance. The developer says it can clear mines with pressure-action, pull-action and break-wire fuzes, and claims that no comparable equipment of this quality and protection is used on either side of the line of contact.
According to TASS, testing is complete and the system is expected to be deployed in the zone of operations. Work continues on better protection, new controls and refined sweeping equipment. This is a claim by a Russian state source, based on an anonymous developer; the specifications and status have not been independently verified.
Sources: TASS
Ukrainian military intelligence says it captured three Russian soldiers infiltrating toward Zaporizhzhia through the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir bed
2026-10-20
Russian sabotage groups are using the dried-up bed of the former Kakhovka Reservoir to move behind Ukrainian lines toward Zaporizhzhia, Euromaidan Press reports, citing Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR). On 19 October HUR said fighters of the Bratstvo Battalion, part of its Timur Special Unit, had found and destroyed Russian sabotage groups and captured three Russian servicemen, one of whom they gave first aid. A HUR video shows the fighting and the captures. According to HUR, the small groups try to penetrate deep into Ukrainian rear positions to build up forces, destabilise the situation, disrupt logistics and neutralise Ukrainian combat crews. One prisoner said two of the three men in his group had been killed by a 'Baba Yaga', the Russian nickname for Ukraine's heavy bomber drones. HUR says counter-sabotage operations on the Zaporizhzhia axis are continuing.
The terrain favours infiltration. Since Russian forces blew up the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023, the drained reservoir bed has become overgrown with willows, poplars and shrubs; a Bratstvo chief of staff (call sign 'Dyviziia') said that during an earlier raid in April troops could see only about two metres ahead and moved through the thickets with little sense of direction. ISW warned on 26 September that Russia might use the dry bed to push north once autumn fog and dense vegetation set in. In November 2025 the same battalion ran a raid about 7 km from the former shoreline. According to ISW, Russia's aim around Zaporizhzhia is to get within artillery range of the city, hold forward positions and protect its own rear; in January 2026 Russian forces tried to take Stepnohirsk along the former shoreline, which Ukrainian spokesman Vladyslav Voloshyn said would let them bring long-range artillery or fibre-optic drones within reach of the city's outskirts. On 22 September a Southern Defence Forces spokesperson said there were no signs of a direct offensive on Zaporizhzhia.
The report fits the infiltration pattern the tracker noted at the end of September (e-20260930-06): small Russian groups using concealment in the reservoir bed rather than a large-scale assault. The captures confirm the route is being used in practice, but they say little about its scale. All details come from HUR, a party to the conflict, and have not been independently verified.
Sources: Euromaidan Press
From nets to tunnels: Ukraine's 93rd Brigade moves troops underground to evade drones
2026-10-18
Militarnyi, drawing on a TSN television report, says troops of Ukraine's 93rd Kholodnyi Yar Separate Mechanized Brigade are using underground tunnels to reach their positions on the Kramatorsk axis in Donetsk region. With enemy drones constantly overhead and the danger growing closer to the front, anti-drone nets stretched over roads no longer offer reliable protection, because newer drone technologies allow drones to get past them. A passage with exits leading directly into the positions cuts the time soldiers spend in the open; a serviceman with the call sign Omar, who guided the journalists, called it an excellent solution that protects the troops. The report gives no tunnel dimensions, length or construction method.
The article places the shift in a wider trend. It cites a February 2026 Ukrainska Pravda column by journalist Yuliia Kyriienko describing a 'Vietnamization' of the front, in which drones force soldiers to dismount and walk dozens of kilometres to their positions, and which argued for protected routes to move food and ammunition and to evacuate the wounded. Militarnyi also recalls its earlier report on an underground fortification network of about 2 km in eastern Ukraine, with 12 corrugated-steel structures connected by passageways. During filming, the brigade's drone operators said they struck a Russian vehicle and possibly a gun, and showed an FPV drone with an enlarged warhead that they said can disable a tractor unit or a tank.
The claims about the strikes and drone capabilities come from Ukrainian troops and have not been independently verified.
Sources: Militarnyi
Ukraine makes anti-drone road nets a national standard in defensive-lines strategy through 2028, in response to Russian FPV hunting of logistics
2026-10-16
According to Ukraine's Defence Ministry, the Ukrainian government has approved a Strategy for the Engineering Equipment of Defensive Lines through 2028. One of its priorities is stronger anti-drone protection of logistics routes. The ministry says the strategy turns the existing, largely ad hoc road-protection efforts into a single national standard, with deadlines, assigned responsibilities and control mechanisms. The ministry drafted the document on its own initiative, based on combat experience. Funding is to come from state and local budgets and other sources not prohibited by law.
The background is the Russian use of FPV drones against supply lines: according to Euromaidan Press, Russian FPV drones attack almost any moving target within 15–30 km of the front. Roads are therefore being covered with overhead netting, wire-mesh canopies and reinforced barriers meant to stop drones before they reach vehicles. Citing an earlier report, Euromaidan Press says more than 1,066 km of such protection had been built by mid-July 2026; the target is 4,000 km by the end of 2026.
Besides road protection, the strategy covers building and maintaining fortifications, engineering obstacles, modern designs, materials and camouflage, a reserve of construction materials, and digital record-keeping. A single digital geographic information platform, building on systems including the DELTA situational-awareness system, is to hold a 'passport', photos and location and condition data for each structure, so that work can be verified and repairs and resources allocated. The ministry says proven solutions will be scaled up while also accounting for new threats and changes in Russian tactics. For the tracker, the move confirms that Russian FPV interdiction of the logistics zone has become persistent enough that Ukraine is answering it with permanent, nationally standardised infrastructure.
Sources: Euromaidan Press
Russia builds the first three of 16 large bomber shelters, each about 63 x 63 m, at Engels-2 after repeated Ukrainian drone strikes (Defence Blog)
2026-10-13
Russia has nearly finished the steel frames of the first three of 16 planned large aircraft shelters at Engels-2 in Saratov Oblast, the main base of its strategic bomber fleet. Defence Blog reports this based on satellite imagery published by the open-source analysis group AviVector. An Airbus Defence and Space image dated 12 October shows three shelter frames side by side on new concrete pads, each connected to the airfield by a freshly paved taxiway. AviVector first saw ground being broken in imagery from 5 September.
AviVector estimates that each shelter measures about 63 by 63 metres, with 7-metre side walls and a peak height of about 17 metres. That is large enough for a Tu-160, which is about 54 m long with a wingspan of almost 56 m when its wings are fully extended, and for the smaller Tu-95MS. Earth berms behind the frames deflect jet blast upward. This suggests that aircraft are meant to start their engines and taxi directly from the shelters. The frames have not yet been clad, the wall and roof materials are unknown, and no completion date has been given. The Russian Ministry of Defence has not commented.
The construction follows repeated Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Engels, about 600 km from the front line, since December 2022. Those attacks first hit fuel and ammunition storage and, in recent months, parked aircraft. According to President Zelenskyy, the SBU destroyed a Tu-95 at Engels in July, and satellite imagery taken days later appeared to show a wrecked bomber. A second Tu-95 was reportedly damaged in an SBU drone strike on 28 August. Until now the bombers were parked in the open. Shelters would hide which aircraft are present and offer some protection against drone warheads and debris. Russian crews had already painted outlines of Tu-95s on the apron as decoys. Russia can no longer build new Tu-95s, so every airframe lost permanently shrinks the long-range fleet.
Sources: Defence Blog
Ukrainian FPV commander recalls drone kill on Russian UR-77 mine-clearer carrying over two tons of explosives
2026-10-07
"Skipper", an FPV company commander in Ukraine's 413th Raid Unmanned Systems Regiment, told Army TV that his proudest strike was destroying a Russian UR-77 mine-clearing vehicle with a cheap FPV drone during Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive. According to his account, the vehicle detonated after a second hit, and the blast was so large he thought it was "a small nuclear blast". The strike itself is therefore not new; the account appears in an Euromaidan Press interview piece published on 8 October 2026. The regiment now operates on the Zaporizhzhia front.
The UR-77 ("Zmiy Horynych") dates from the 1970s and is built on the chassis of the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer. It fires a rocket-propelled line charge that reportedly contains more than two tons of explosive, clearing a lane about six metres wide and setting off anti-personnel mines across a band of up to 15 metres. Citing Militarnyi, the article notes that although the system was designed to open routes for fast tank advances, Russia now more often uses it as an assault weapon against Ukrainian fortifications, using the line charge to flatten defensive positions.
The account rests on the commander's own description and has not been independently verified; the article gives no location or exact date for the strike.
Sources: Euromaidan Press
678 окупантів і 120 одиниць техніки за місяць: як дрони й НРК масштабують дистанційне мінування (ArmyInform: 678 occupiers and 120 vehicles in a month: how drones and UGVs scale up remote mining)
2026-10-07SINGLE SOURCE
According to ArmyInform, Ukrainian Defence Forces killed 678 Russian soldiers and destroyed 120 units of weapons and military equipment on engineering obstacles (minefields) over the course of one month. The Command of the Support Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine released video of this work. A further 19 targets were reportedly hit on barriers laid by Ukrainian engineer units. Strikes are recorded in real time and confirmed results are entered into the DELTA system.
The article says mine-laying has shifted from sappers working by hand to drones that deliver and emplace part of the mines, so routes can be blocked without sending personnel into areas under fire or under Russian drone observation. Ground robotic systems (UGVs, such as the 'Tarhan' shown in a photo) also lay barriers in front of Ukrainian positions or on routes Russian units use to move troops and vehicles. As an example it cites an earlier report on the 91st Separate Okhtyrka Support Brigade, whose engineers laid about 3,000 mines in one week, cutting Russian movement routes and creating a 'kill zone'.
Single source: this is a report from ArmyInform, the news agency of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, that has not been independently verified.
Sources: ArmyInform
"Droneports": Ukrainska Pravda and OSINT group CyberBoroshno map Russia's purpose-built Shahed/Geran launch bases, such as Tsimbulova, and explain why hardened, dispersed layouts make them so hard to destroy
2026-10-01
In an investigation with the Ukrainian OSINT community CyberBoroshno, Ukrainska Pravda describes how Russia moved from launching Iranian-supplied Shaheds off existing military airfields (from autumn 2022, in Crimea and Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; known sites included Cape Chauda, Yeysk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Kursk, Seshcha and positions near Balaklava) to a network of purpose-built "droneports". Domestic Geran production meant drones had to be assembled, stored, inspected and prepared on site, so Russia added garages, underground stores large enough for drones and their warheads, and launchers placed in earth- or blast-walled revetments. The best-known site is Tsimbulova in Oryol Oblast, about 180 km from the border and covering some 5 sq km; according to OSINT analyst Harbuz (Dnipro Osint), Alabuga began building it in August 2024 and finished the main facilities by February 2025, as the first site designed entirely for storing, maintaining and launching drones. UP's satellite analysis counts 23 launchers, 387 garages and 26 underground stores there, with four more jet-drone launchers and 83 garages/shelters being prepared; in 2026 larger launchers for jet-powered Geran-4/5 drones were added. Another droneport sits on the ruins of Donetsk airport, about 50 km from the front.
The design assumes attack: facilities are dispersed, separated by earthworks, and munitions and fuel are kept under concrete and earth so that a strike's blast stays contained and cannot trigger a chain reaction. Sites have their own power (solar panels, diesel generators), fuel depots, radio and navigation equipment for drone control, multiple access and exit roads, and air-defence and electronic-warfare cover; Shahed attack drones and Gerbera decoys are also stored in the open. Harbuz says Tsimbulova was built with large spare capacity (up to 3,000 combat drones) when Ukrainian intelligence put Shahed output at about 2,000 a month in late 2024, and that damaged structures can be rebuilt quickly and cheaply. According to the article, up to 95% of launches come from bases in Bryansk, Rostov, Smolensk and Oryol oblasts, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea; UP has identified at least 63 launchers at the main droneports. Leaked Alabuga documents published by the Molfar Intelligence Institute reportedly show civilian Alabuga staff working at the sites complaining of "unjustified risk" after a December 2024 strike and being threatened to keep working.
Ukrainian strikes have therefore aimed at disrupting launches rather than destroying the bases outright. The article cites the 2024 strikes near Balaklava (after which the area was no longer used) and Yeysk (followed by 48 days without Shahed launches), Storm Shadow strikes on the Tsimbulova area under construction in December 2024 and January 2025 (the Ukrainian General Staff claimed over 200 Shaheds destroyed), repeated drone and even FPV strikes on Donetsk airport by the 1st Separate Centre of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and a 21 September 2026 strike that penetrated a drone bunker at Tsimbulova. Ukraine has also hit Geran/Gerbera relay and ground control stations (Trubchevsk, Zaliznyi Port, Skadovsk, Chornomorsk, Olenivka). An officer of that centre, Falco, calls trained launch operators the scarcest and most valuable target; the authors suggest Ukrainian ballistic missiles could be needed against underground depots. Strike-effect claims come from Ukrainian sources and have not been independently verified.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (EN)
Курская область: задержан сотрудник Минобороны, ответственный за приемку оборонительных сооружений
2026-09-30SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The Russian milblogger channel Dva Mayora relays a statement by Kursk governor Alexander Khinshtein that a Russian Ministry of Defence employee responsible for accepting (signing off) defensive structures in Kursk Oblast has been detained. Khinshtein describes it as a continuing unravelling of a corruption tangle involving embezzlement of budget funds in the construction of fortifications in the Kursk border area.
According to the governor's quoted statement, the detained MoD representative was responsible for acceptance of defensive structures in the Kursk region and in neighbouring frontline oblasts. Preliminary findings, he says, are that the man signed acceptance certificates 'without looking', i.e. without actually accepting any work. A criminal case has been opened against him under Part 3 of Article 285 of the Russian Criminal Code (abuse of official powers).
Khinshtein says he is sure the story does not end here and that the Kursk regional government intends to keep cooperating actively with the justice authorities to expose everyone involved in what he calls a crime unprecedented in scale and cynicism. The claims come from a Russian regional official, relayed by a milblogger channel, and cannot be independently checked.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Dva Mayora (Russian milblogger Telegram channel); it is a personal/editorial voice, not a position of the Russian MoD, and milbloggers regularly contradict each other and the MoD. The claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: Два майора (Telegram)
Уланово освобождено: обстановка на Североукраинском направлении
2026-09-29SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
Rybar writes that little is said about the fighting in Chernihiv Oblast, but the front there has not gone quiet. According to the channel, units of the Russian 'Sever' (North) group of forces are pushing Ukrainian forces back in forested areas along the border and advancing toward the Loknia river, while Ukraine regularly attacks Bryansk Oblast with drones. Rybar says Russian units liberated Ulanovo some time ago: the Russian MoD announced it on 28 September, and later footage appeared of flags being raised among the village buildings.
Rybar assesses that Russian forces will probably consolidate on the reached line in the coming weeks. Further advance north would require restoring the bridge over the Loknia in the centre of Ulanovo, which Russian artillery had earlier destroyed to isolate Ukrainian units. It also reports tactical gains near neighbouring Yastrebshchina, where 'Severyane' allegedly pushed Ukrainian troops out of the forest on the approaches and individual assault groups are trying to infiltrate the built-up area, and near Kharkovka, where another stretch of forest next to the state border came under Russian control. Ukraine is said to be trying to stop assault troops reaching the bridge over the Kalinovka, whose capture would allow inserting assault groups into Vishenka.
Rybar calls the North-Ukrainian direction secondary, so large breakthroughs are not to be expected; in its view the Russian strikes are diversionary, forcing Ukraine to move reinforcements to the Hlukhiv and Orlovka area and thereby exposing other sectors. All place names are as given in the post, which places the action in Chernihiv Oblast; none of the claims has been independently confirmed.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Rybar (Russian milblogger Telegram channel); it is a personal/editorial voice, not a position of the Russian MoD, and milbloggers regularly contradict each other and the MoD. The claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: Rybar (Telegram)
Investigation: Russia has been rebuilding Facility 1335 in the Urals, the bunker linked to the 'Dead Hand' (Perimeter) nuclear command system
2026-09-26
A joint investigation by the Danish outlet Danwatch, The Sunday Times and the Dossier Center reports that Russia's Ministry of Defence has been carrying out a large modernisation of Object 1335 (codename 'Grot') since 2018. The facility is an underground complex inside Mount Kosvinsky Kamen near the village of Kytlym in the Sverdlovsk region of the Urals. According to the reporting it serves as a command post of the Strategic Missile Forces and is linked to Perimeter (Perimetr), the Soviet-era backup command system known in the West as 'Dead Hand'. Perimeter was built in the mid-1980s to make sure a retaliatory nuclear strike could still be launched if the leadership were killed or communications cut off. Militarnyi describes the complex as having at least 24 rooms, with the main and emergency exits about 2.5 km apart.
The evidence consists of two parts. The first is Russian defence procurement records: the investigators searched about 2.5 million records from 2018 to 2024 and found thousands of tenders naming Object 1335. These cover more than 22,000 tonnes of reinforcing steel, about 56,500 tonnes of cement, 600 km of electrical cable, 182 ventilation units, 5 MW of refrigeration capacity (bought in 2019), 14,000 lamps, heavy machinery, rock-drilling equipment, blast-resistant equipment and filters against radioactive, chemical and biological contamination. The records also list Western-made components such as Rockwool insulation and Danfoss and Belimo fittings. The second is satellite imagery, which shows extensive earthworks at the mountain's entrances and work on about six new access points. A Danish construction professor, Per Goltermann, called the quantities an 'enormous' construction project.
These records and images establish that there has been a large construction and hardening effort at Object 1335. The link to a revived and more automated Perimeter comes from interpretation and from Russian testimony. Retired Major General Viktor Khalin, who says he worked on developing Perimeter in 2005–2010, wrote in a Russian veterans' magazine in January 2026 that the system was reactivated in 2023 and can now work 'not only in an automated mode but also in a fully automatic mode'. Western experts such as Jeffrey Lewis and Andy Weber think reactivation is the most likely explanation. Tom Røseth describes the digging and reinforcement as a defensive measure to protect a retaliatory capability. Experts stress that claims about fully autonomous nuclear launch must be qualified, because Perimeter's operational details remain classified. The Kremlin did not respond to the investigators.
Sources: militarnyi · danwatch.dk
Operation Vivaldi: Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps takes Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka after suppressing Russian drones; ISW sees 'tactical drone overmatch' as mine-packed BTR-60s reach Russian fortifications, corps claims 250+ prisoners
2026-09-20
In the third 'season' of Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps says it liberated Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka in northern Donetsk Oblast near Lyman and regained control of Karpivka and Novomykhailivka, adding 51 sq km to the 176 sq km it says it has retaken since the offensive began. Corps commander Andrii Biletskyi calls Nove, a key Russian hub on the bridgehead ringed by commanding heights, the turning point; according to the corps, Russia expected the main thrust on the Shandryholove-Zelena Dolyna axis, burned its reserves counterattacking there and 'slept through' the real strike. Biletskyi claims about 2,000 Russian losses in this phase and more than 250 prisoners, and told Militarnyi that Russian units 'lost control and surrendered in groups', together with their officers, drone pilots and artillerymen. He lists the Russian formations engaged as the 20th Combined Arms Army (3rd and 144th Motorised Rifle Divisions) and the 25th Combined Arms Army (67th Motorised Rifle Division, 164th and 169th Motorised Rifle Brigades, 11th Tank Brigade). The 3rd Assault Brigade carried much of the fighting, with border guard detachments retaking Ridkodub.
The strongest fortifications, notably at Nove, were broken with converted Soviet BTR-60 armoured carriers: Euromaidan Press reports they come from a batch of 110 donated by Bulgaria, and were filled with potentially dozens of TM-62 anti-tank mines, rigged for remote control, driven into Russian bunkers and detonated as unmanned vehicle-borne IEDs. The corps says they were used 'to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications'. Euromaidan puts the cost of a conversion at perhaps a few thousand dollars, against tens or hundreds of thousands for a glide bomb, with no Ukrainian crew at risk. This adds to earlier robotic improvisations in Vivaldi: kamikaze UGVs air-dropped by heavy bomber drones more than 10 km behind the lines, and NC13 unit UGVs carrying two Bullspike grenade launchers that fire on positions and then detonate inside the shelters.
What this says about the Russian defence: ISW assesses that Ukraine achieved 'tactical drone overmatch'. Old, slow armoured vehicles were driven up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes, which ISW reads as Ukraine having neutralised Russia's drone defences in the sector, on a front where drones normally keep armour kilometres back. According to ISW this followed shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian drone and EW systems that would otherwise have hit the vehicles. Deputy corps commander Maksym Zhorin credits a 'Protective Drone' system of EW assets with neutralising around 20,000 Russian drones (no period given). ISW also notes that Russian EW runs on diesel generators, and the corps said on 17 September that strikes on logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast had degraded fuel supply, straining Russia's use of drones and EW. Earlier strikes on mapped command posts and drone launch points (20th Army, 144th Division, Rubikon) and claimed partisan rail sabotage fit the same picture of a defence that leaned heavily on drones for surveillance and fires and gave way once they were blinded. All figures are claims by the 3rd Army Corps and Ukrainian media, a party to the conflict, partly relayed via ISW; none has been independently confirmed and the reporting does not describe Russian countermeasures.
Sources: euromaidan · pravda-en · euromaidan · euromaidan · euromaidan · euromaidan · militarnyi · euromaidan · militarnyi · kyivindep · pravda-en · euromaidan · militarnyi · euromaidan