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Glide bombs
22 tracked developments on Glide bombs in the Russian armed forces, 2026-08-22 to 2026-10-29, with sources.
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Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
Satellite imagery confirms Ukraine's Neptune strike destroyed two Su-34 bombers at Marinovka airfield, Volgograd Oblast
2026-10-29
On 29 October 2026 Ukraine's Navy said a coastal Neptune missile system had struck Marinovka airfield near Oktyabrsky in Russia's Volgograd Oblast and destroyed two Su-34 fighter-bombers of the 11th Mixed Aviation Regiment (4th Mixed Aviation Division, 4th Air and Air Defence Forces Army). According to Defence Blog, the Navy called it a "Long Neptune" strike, referring to the extended-range land-attack version of the missile, and President Zelensky later confirmed the result. NASA FIRMS detected a fire at the airfield on the night of the attack. The base lies more than 400 km from Ukrainian-controlled territory. Ukraine has not said how many missiles it fired or whether other aircraft were damaged.
Satellite imagery published on 30 October supports the claim. The AviVector account released an image taken that day showing the wreckage of two Su-34s in parking areas near the hangars. The OSINT group CyberBoroshno compared post-strike imagery with a Sentinel image from 28 October showing a Su-34 at the same spot, and concluded that the missiles hit the aircraft's regular parking positions "rather than random points on the airfield". Russia has not publicly confirmed any losses; the imagery comes from open-source analysts, not from an official Russian or independent government source.
The Su-34 is Russia's main carrier of the guided glide bombs (KABs) used against Ukrainian cities and frontline positions, and can carry up to 8 tonnes of weapons. Ukrinform put the Russian fleet at about 140 Su-34s as of 22 October, and Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) estimates Russian industry can build only 14 to 18 a year. Ukrainian drones hit Marinovka before, in June 2025, when the General Staff reported four Su-34s hit. This is the second Neptune strike on Su-34 parking areas in two weeks: on the night of 14-15 October the Navy struck Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh Oblast, where satellite imagery also showed destruction. Ukraine is thus repeatedly using its domestic cruise missile against the glide-bomb carrier fleet at bases hundreds of kilometres behind the front.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Euromaidan Press · Defense Express · Defence Blog · Ukrainska Pravda (EN)
Ukrainian intelligence: Russia can probably add 10–15 Su-34s a year, but builds no new Tu-95s, Tu-22M3s or Su-24s
2026-10-26
In a reply published by the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN on 23 October, Ukraine's military intelligence agency HUR said Russian aircraft plants still produce modern fighter-bombers and fighters, enough to partly cover losses. Older bombers are different: Russia has no serial production of new Tu-95s, Tu-22M3s or Su-24s and keeps them flying through repairs and upgrades, so every permanent loss leaves a lasting gap. HUR estimates Russia can probably deliver 10–15 Su-34s a year now; deliveries rose from eight in 2022 to 11 in 2023 and 12–14 in 2024, though HUR says that trend does not confirm the same pace today. For the Su-35S it cites an average of about 11–12 a year in 2021–2025 as a rough benchmark, not an established 2026 output. Su-30SM2 and Su-57 production continues, but reliable rates cannot be determined, partly because Su-30 figures mix new builds with upgrades of older Su-30SMs.
By the end of 2025, HUR estimates, Russia had about 125 Su-34/Su-34M bombers, 140–145 Su-30s of various versions, 135–140 Su-35S and about 20 Su-57s. The agency stresses these are fleet estimates, not the number of jets available for combat at the same time, since some are in repair or upgrade, and it does not disclose the current fleet size. The Su-34 is one of the main carriers of Russia's glide bombs. Ukraine's Navy said Neptune missiles hit six Su-34Ms at Borisoglebsk airbase (Voronezh Oblast) overnight into 15 October; Zelenskyy later said four were destroyed and two damaged.
HUR also listed 2026 losses: a Tu-22M3 crash in Irkutsk Oblast on 15 June; two Tu-95MS hit at Engels on 17 July and 28 August (the first with critical tail damage, the second a probable irrecoverable loss); a Su-35 Ukraine says it shot down on 8 July; a Su-57 crash in Moscow Oblast on 23 July; and a collision of two Su-35S over Kursk Oblast on 7 September. Strikes on several Su-57s and a Su-34 at Shagol on 25 April and on a Su-24 in Crimea on 7 September were reported, but HUR says counting them as destroyed would be premature. Euromaidan Press notes the published list omits the Borisoglebsk Su-34s and a Tu-95MS that Russia's defence ministry said crashed on takeoff in Amur Oblast in late September. All figures are Ukrainian intelligence estimates and have not been independently verified.
Sources: Euromaidan Press
Ukraine confirms missile strike on Energiya plant in Yelets, sole Russian maker of glide-bomb guidance batteries and supplier for Iskander and Kinzhal
2026-10-25
On the afternoon of 25 October, missiles struck the Energiya plant in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, about 250 km from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian OSINT community Exilenova+ said the strike most likely involved UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Lipetsk Governor Igor Artamonov confirmed a strike on Yelets's industrial zone and said one person was injured, without naming the facility. On 26 October Ukraine's General Staff confirmed a 'successful strike' on the plant's workshop producing power-supply elements for Russian weapons, carried out on 25 October or in the early hours of 26 October. It said a fire broke out on the premises and that the strike complicates Russia's production of power sources for missiles, guided aerial bombs and other armaments. New photos published by Exilenova+ on 26 October show at least seven hits on the plant's premises; after examining them, the Dnipro OSINT analyst Harbuz concluded that both buildings that may be critical to production were hit, one physically destroyed and the other gutted by fire from the inside.
Energiya PJSC develops and manufactures electrochemical power sources: accumulators, power cells and batteries. According to the General Staff it is the sole Russian manufacturer of batteries for the glide and correction modules fitted to aerial bombs, and it also produces batteries for Iskander-M missile systems and sea-launched cruise missiles. Citing the War&Sanctions project of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR), Ukrainska Pravda earlier listed Iskander-M, Zircon, RM-48U, the 95Ya6 missile of the Pantsir air-defence system and the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal as users; Dnipro OSINT adds Iskander-K and power sources for UMPB D-30SN guided bombs. According to the Kyiv Independent, Energiya also makes UAV batteries and is under sanctions from the US, EU, UK, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Australia and Ukraine.
The plant has been hit before: in May and July 2025 and in January 2026, according to the Kyiv Independent (Dnipro OSINT counts at least four earlier attacks). In the same statement the General Staff reported damage from the 23 October strike on Proton-Electrotex in Oryol (main microchip workshop destroyed, server building damaged) and the 24 October strike on Tolyattikauchuk in Tolyatti (a process pipeline, two butyl rubber units and a fractionation column damaged), both covered earlier. The damage assessment and the 'sole producer' claim come from the Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian OSINT channels; the weapon type has not been officially confirmed, and none of this has been independently verified.
Sources: Kyiv Independent · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Euromaidan Press · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Kyiv Independent
«Володимир Зеленський закликав партнерів розблокувати постачання ракет до Patriot і продовжити підтримку України» (ArmyInform: 'Volodymyr Zelensky called on partners to unblock Patriot missile deliveries and continue supporting Ukraine')
2026-10-25SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform reports that on Sunday 25 October President Zelensky called on partners to unblock deliveries of Patriot interceptors that Europeans have already agreed to supply. He also asked them to keep supporting Ukraine's combat aviation, which he said is needed against jet-powered Shahed drones. Defence packages like these save lives, especially ahead of winter, he said, and support for Ukrainian forces should not drop while negotiations continue.
According to Zelensky, Russia used about 1,600 guided aerial bombs, 48 missiles of various types (including ballistic missiles) and almost 2,300 strike drones against Ukraine over the past week. ArmyInform lists the consequences of individual strikes. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast four people were killed and 22 injured, among them an 11-year-old girl. In Vinnytsia a drone hit an apartment block and injured six people. In Kharkiv a building-materials hypermarket was struck, followed by a second strike on the emergency crews, which injured rescuers. In the latest night attack, Russia targeted thermal power plants, substations, coal mines, grain stores, shopping centres and a postal terminal, with damage in nine oblasts.
This is a single source: ArmyInform, the news agency of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, relaying the Ukrainian president's figures; the claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: ArmyInform
«Логистика и энергетика: новые удары по целям в Харькове и на Западной Украине» (Topwar: 'Logistics and energy: new strikes on targets in Kharkiv and Western Ukraine')
2026-10-24SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar (Voennoye Obozreniye) author Maxim Svetlyshev claims that Russian forces carried out an evening wave of strikes on 24 October across almost all Kyiv-controlled territory. The weapons named are Geran attack drones, 'Dan-T' drones and FAB bombs fitted with UMPK glide-and-correction kits. He says logistics and energy facilities were destroyed 'from Kharkiv to Western Ukraine', but gives no numbers of drones or munitions.
Citing unnamed Ukrainian sources, the article reports a strike on another shopping centre in Kharkiv, which it claims Ukraine routinely uses for logistics. It also reports a water outage in Kovel (Volyn oblast) after a power cut, and explosions in Rivne oblast, on the outskirts of Kyiv, in Korosten (Zhytomyr oblast), Synelnykove (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Vapniarka (Vinnytsia oblast) and Kyiv-held Zaporizhzhia. Large fires were reported at the Burshtyn thermal power plant (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast). The article quotes Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Ukrainian Energy Research Center: repair equipment (transformers, grid components) is delayed because Western money went into a European energy support fund while equipment contracts have not yet been signed. The author concludes that repairs and outages will last longer.
This is a single source: Topwar, a Russian pro-war military website; the claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: Topwar
«Демонтаж логистики: кратно возросло число ударов ФАБами по целям в Запорожье» (Topwar: 'Dismantling logistics: the number of FAB strikes on targets in Zaporizhzhia has multiplied')
2026-10-24SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar author Alexey Volodin claims that Russian aviation has sharply increased ('many times over') its strikes on Kyiv-held Zaporizhzhia city with FAB high-explosive bombs fitted with UMPK glide-and-correction kits. He gives no figures. According to the article, the glide-bomb strikes alternate with drone attacks, including jet-powered Gerans and 'Dan-T' drones. He says this combination stretches Ukrainian air defence and makes movement in the city harder.
The article presents the Dnipro crossings between the city's right and left banks as the main target. After a series of strikes on the bridges, including the cable-stayed bridge (the 'Vantovy' bridge), traffic was reportedly restricted on some sections, and Ukrainian authorities reported damage to transport and the need for better protection; the article names no specific Ukrainian source. Citing unnamed 'intelligence data', the author claims that most night-time traffic over the crossings consists of Ukrainian troops and military cargo. He argues that cutting the bridges would hamper supply, troop rotation and the movement of reserves, including towards Orikhiv. He links the air campaign to Russian ground pressure on the city's approaches: from the south near Stepnohirsk (citing 'Russian sources') and from the east, west of the Ternuvate heights near the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border. The article gives no casualty figures, bomb counts or damage assessments, and itself says the real effect depends on the damage done and how the front develops.
This is a single source: Topwar, a Russian pro-war military website; the claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: Topwar
«Системная работа» (Rybar: 'Systematic work' — Russia's methodical strike campaign against Ukraine's railways)
2026-10-20SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Rybar calls Ukraine's railways the sector Russia is destroying most methodically, beyond data centres, warehouses and ports. According to the post, most strikes hit Kirovohrad, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts: port infrastructure in Odesa, and metallurgy-linked facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad, where plants were halted both by direct hits and by strikes on the traction rolling stock needed to ship their output. Rybar describes a shift in targeting: after a large part of the rolling stock was put out of action, Russian forces began hitting locomotive depots and railway stations more often — at least some twenty such attacks since early September. An electric-locomotive repair plant in Zaporizhzhia was damaged; according to Rybar it is one of only two such plants in Ukraine.
Further claims: systematic strikes on traction substations have resumed after a pause, with about fifteen hits this autumn in open sources, increasingly by jet-powered Geran drones. In the port of Pivdennyi (Odesa Oblast) at least seven locomotives used to haul grain to loading terminals were targeted, plus four in Odesa itself. Missiles are being used more often against stations — railway infrastructure in Kyiv was hit at least twice — and the VKS struck the station at Mezhova (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) with guided glide bombs. Whereas earlier attacks concentrated on the border regions, attention is now shifting west, to Volyn, Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and Ternopil oblasts, where depots and traction substations are hit because they are easier to disable than moving targets.
Rybar argues the campaign must continue despite Ukrainian complaints of a looming locomotive shortage, claiming Kyiv may be exaggerating and still has 'donor' locomotives for spare parts, and frames the goal as economic: without railways Ukraine cannot export oil, grain or iron ore in volume, hitting budget revenue. The post offers a useful Russian-side picture of target selection (stock, then repair capacity and power supply), but the figures are Rybar's own open-source counts. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: Rybar (Telegram)
«Возможная остановка Вашингтоном закупок оружия для Украины в США на европейские деньги» (Fighterbomber: 'Possible halt by Washington of US arms purchases for Ukraine with European money')
2026-10-16SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
This is the personal/editorial voice of the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Fighterbomber, not a position of the Russian MoD; milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the content has not been independently verified. The channel cites reports by The Economist (a possible US halt of European-funded PURL purchases would leave Kyiv unable to protect its infrastructure), CNN (Ukraine has run out of Patriot interceptors) and Bloomberg (the UK is sending extra Storm Shadow missiles). It calls the conclusion drawn from these reports strange. In its view Patriot never protected Ukraine's rear infrastructure anyway, and a shortage would mainly push back the range at which Ukrainian tactical aircraft can use cheap glide-bomb kits.
The author claims, without sources and in mocking language about the 'fashionable' missiles of Ukrainian Mirages and F-16s, that the Ukrainian air force has achieved zero air-to-air victories in five years. He says Su-24s carrying Storm Shadow are hidden and prepared in Soviet-era hardened aircraft shelters and can only be caught right after landing. He openly criticises the Russian side: reconnaissance of rear airfields has not improved and the reaction time is still too long.
According to the channel, the small Ukrainian air force combined with fixed-wing drones forces Russian fighters to fly around the clock. It claims thousands of flight hours per aircraft per year, leading to failures, repairs and a chain reaction of extra load on the remaining aircraft. Its conclusion, in crude wording, is that Russia has plenty of aircraft but still too few available. Single source: this is a post by the Russian milblogger channel Fighterbomber that has not been independently verified.
Sources: Fighterbomber (Telegram)
Ukraine's Navy says it hit six Su-34M bombers at Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh Oblast with Neptune missiles; Zelensky claims four destroyed
2026-10-14
On the night of 14-15 October 2026 the Ukrainian Navy struck the Borisoglebsk military airfield in Russia's Voronezh Oblast, roughly 400 km from the front line, with its Neptune coastal missile system. According to the Navy, six Su-34M bombers were hit, aviation support equipment was destroyed, and secondary explosions and a fire were recorded; it said further details were still being established. Ukraine's General Staff later said the six Su-34s had sustained varying degrees of damage. President Zelensky went further, saying on X that four Su-34s were destroyed and two more hit, and that the aircraft were loaded with aerial bombs and ready for new attacks. These are claims by a warring party that have not been independently confirmed.
Open-source imagery partly supports the claim. Exilenova+ published a satellite image dated 13 October showing six Su-34s parked in the area later struck, and the aviation Telegram channel AviVector posted post-strike imagery showing damage there; the GEOINT project CyberBoroshno and the channel Litachky ta Shyzopost shared comparison images. Based on those images Exilenova+ concluded that four aircraft were totally destroyed and two significantly damaged. Monitoring channels and residents filmed a large fire at the base. Voronezh governor Aleksandr Gusev declared a missile alert shortly before 22:00 local time on 14 October and the next morning claimed 33 drones and several jet-powered aerial targets had been downed, without mentioning the airfield; no Russian MoD statement on the base was reported.
The Su-34M is one of the key aircraft the Russian Aerospace Forces use for guided glide-bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions and frontline towns, released from outside the range of some Ukrainian air defences. Borisoglebsk hosts the 783rd training aviation centre (Yak-130) and has been used by combat aircraft including Su-34s and Su-35s; according to Militarnyi, it served mainly as a refuelling and rearming stopover in summer 2026. Ukrainian drones previously struck the base in October 2024, July 2025 and on 7-8 July 2026 (destroying a fuel depot). Early October reports said the Russian Aerospace Forces had received a new batch of Su-34s.
Sources: Defence Blog · Kyiv Independent · Euromaidan Press · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Militarnyi
Russia keeps striking Ukraine's energy grid with Shaheds, glide bombs and missiles as Trump announces an "energy ceasefire"
2026-10-11
On 11 October, the day US President Donald Trump claimed Ukraine and Russia had agreed to an immediate energy ceasefire, Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure continued. In his evening address President Zelenskyy said Ukraine was ready to stop striking Russian energy facilities if Russia did the same, but that Shahed drones had been in Ukrainian skies all day, glide bombs had been used, and Kharkiv's CHP-5 combined heat and power plant had just been hit. According to Zelenskyy, Russia carried out more than 200 strikes on power generation and transmission facilities and another 17 on gas and oil facilities in the past week alone. Russia had not yet commented on Trump's statement. A Russian drone attack on the Sarny district of Rivne Oblast overnight and into 11 October injured three people, while an emergency outage left parts of the Rivne and Dubno districts, including the regional centre, without power.
The strikes also reached deep into western Ukraine and hit civilian sites. In Ivano-Frankivsk, a Russian strike drone killed three people in the city on the evening of 11 October; Ukraine's Air Force had earlier warned of a jet-powered UAV heading towards the city. Near Kharkiv, a Russian missile hit a suburban grocery store, killing three people and injuring nine, including two children, according to the head of the regional military administration. In Kyiv's Obolonskyi district, bomb disposal teams recovered the warhead and debris of a ballistic missile that had fallen in a courtyard between apartment buildings after the 10 October strike, which also hit a restaurant; on 8 October two unexploded ballistic missiles from the 7 October attack on Kyiv had been defused. Taken together, the reports show Shahed-type and jet-powered drones, ballistic and other missiles, and glide bombs being used against energy targets and cities alike.
The Russian Defence Ministry, quoted by TASS, claimed that over the past 24 hours Russian forces had struck Ukrainian transport and energy infrastructure "used by the military", drone production facilities, launch sites and temporary deployment sites in 147 areas. The statement named no specific sites; it also claimed Ukrainian losses of more than 1,405 servicemen in a single day. These Russian claims, like the casualty figures from Ukrainian authorities, have not been independently verified.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · TASS · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN)
Ukraine says an intercepted Russian document plans up to 1,000 missiles, drones and bombs against 60 Ukrainian infrastructure targets this winter
2026-10-09
Ukraine says it has obtained a Russian plan for a winter strike campaign against its critical infrastructure. Euromaidan Press, citing The New York Times (2 October) and RFE/RL's Schemes project (8 October), reports that the Russian-language document is dated August and lists 60 key targets to be hit with up to 1,000 weapons. These reportedly include up to 770 Molniya and Geran drones, Dan-T/Banderol missile-drones, 170 FAB guided aerial bombs and 75 Kinzhal and Iskander-M ballistic missiles. The stated aim is to cut electricity, heating, water and sewage services in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Twelve other cities are named as priorities, among them Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv and Vinnytsia. According to sources cited by the NYT, Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal presented the document as an intercepted Russian plan.
The reported sequence begins with substations near the western border, through which Ukraine imports electricity from Europe. Hydroelectric plants would follow, then facilities whose loss would force a shutdown of Ukraine's three operating nuclear power plants. Substations, thermal plants and boiler houses are also listed. Water pumping, treatment and sewage pumping stations receive particular attention; the NYT notes that Russia has not previously attacked such facilities on this scale. Oleh Popenko of the Ukrainian Union of Utility Services Consumers says sewage systems are much harder to protect than district heating, and that only stronger air defence can realistically protect Kyiv's combined heat and power plants. ISW separately says jet-powered Gerans break through Ukrainian air defences more reliably and partly free Russia to concentrate its missiles, and it expects the same pattern in the winter energy campaign.
The document's authenticity has not been verified: the NYT could not confirm it, and it is not known how it was intercepted. A Ukrainian defence-industry representative who reviewed it told Schemes it reads more like a calculation than a finalised operations plan. The claim comes as Russia steps up strikes on the grid: blackouts have returned to Kyiv, and Russian strikes recently hit warehouses, a store and a farm, killing three people.
Sources: Euromaidan Press · Euromaidan Press
UAC delivers second 2026 batch of Su-34 fighter-bombers; number of aircraft not disclosed
2026-10-07
Rostec announced on 7 October that its subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) has handed a new batch of Su-34 fighter-bombers (NATO: Fullback) to the Russian Ministry of Defence under the state defence order. According to Defence Blog, it is the second Su-34 batch delivered in 2026. Rostec says the aircraft completed the full cycle of ground and flight factory tests and have gone to their permanent bases. Rostec did not say how many aircraft were in the batch. Defence analyst Guy Plopsky, quoted by Defence Blog, says the photos and video released by UAC show at least two jets and possibly four. The sources refer only to the Su-34 and do not mention the upgraded Su-34M.
Rostec quoted an unnamed Su-34 crew commander as saying the aircraft can strike ground, surface and air targets, including in bad weather and against active air defences. He said its large internal fuel tanks and fuel-efficient engines allow non-stop flights of up to 10 hours. Rostec added that the Su-34 is still being upgraded based on its combat use in Ukraine and that new batches are already in production. The type is built only at the Chkalov aircraft plant in Novosibirsk.
Defence Blog says the first 2026 batch was delivered on 9 July, together with Su-30SM2 fighters, after a final 2025 handover on 10 December. Rostec announced seven Su-34 deliveries in 2025. By the start of 2026 the Russian air force had received 212 Su-34s, including 18 in 2025 and seven prototype and pre-production aircraft. Russia has used the Su-34 heavily in Ukraine to drop guided glide bombs on positions and cities from standoff range, and it is among the Russian aircraft lost most often in the war. Caveat: the delivery claims come from Russian state sources (Rostec/UAC, TASS) and have not been independently verified.
Sources: TASS · Defence Blog
SBU drones hit Su-35 and Su-34 at Khanskaya air base in Adygea; satellite imagery shows destruction
2026-10-04
Drones of the Security Service of Ukraine's (SBU) Alpha special operations unit struck the Khanskaya military airfield in Russia's Republic of Adygea overnight on 4 October 2026, the SBU said. According to the agency, a Su-35 multirole fighter and a Su-34 fighter-bomber were hit, as well as an ammunition depot on the airfield. The SBU put the distance from Ukrainian territory at about 500 km, stressed that both aircraft carry guided glide bombs (KAB) used massively against the front line and Ukrainian cities, and estimated their export value at around $100 million (Su-35) and $50 million (Su-34). The airfield lies about 6 km northwest of Maykop; according to Militarnyi, drone alerts in the area ran from 01:42 to 05:34 local time.
Militarnyi reports that satellite imagery published by the AviaVector community, taken at 08:28 on 4 October, shows signs of destruction on the aircraft taxiways, and describes both jets as destroyed; a satellite image published by ExileNova+ shows the ammunition depot was hit. The Kyiv Independent, writing earlier the same day, noted that the extent of the damage could not be independently verified. Russia's Ministry of Defence claimed its air defences intercepted 559 Ukrainian drones between 20:00 on 3 October and 08:00 on 4 October, including over Adygea; that state claim has not been verified either.
Context: Khanskaya was already hit in October 2024, when Ukraine's General Staff said Su-34, Su-27 and Su-35 aircraft used in the war were based there. The strike fits a sustained Ukrainian long-range drone campaign against Russian airfields and KAB carriers; the Kyiv Independent points to the 16 September hit on a Su-24 at Saky in occupied Crimea.
Sources: Kyiv Independent · Militarnyi
«Су-35 та Су-34»: СБУ уразила два носії КАБів на військовому аеродромі в Адигеї
2026-10-04SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform reports that during the night of 3–4 October the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) struck the Russian military airfield Khanskaya in the Republic of Adygea. According to the SBU statement, drones of the SBU's Special Operations Center "Alpha" hit an ammunition depot on the airfield and two combat aircraft: a Su-35 multirole fighter and a Su-34 fighter-bomber. ArmyInform gives their export values as about $100 million and $50 million respectively.
The SBU says the target was about 500 km away and stresses that both aircraft carry guided glide bombs (KAB), which Russia uses on a large scale against the front line and Ukrainian cities. It presents the strike as part of a systematic campaign against Russian military facilities. No details were given on the extent of the damage, and no imagery is described in the article.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from ArmyInform (Ukrainian Ministry of Defence media outlet), relaying an SBU claim; the claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: ArmyInform
Киев перехватил секретный документ ГШ МО РФ о плане ударов по энергосистеме Украины
2026-10-02SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Dva Mayora mocks a Ukrainian claim reported by the NYT and DW. Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister and Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal says Kyiv has intercepted Russian plans to cut major Ukrainian cities off from electricity, heating and water through systematic attacks in the coming months with up to 1,000 missiles, drones and bombs on substations, hydroelectric plants, thermal power plants and boiler houses.
As quoted in the post, Shmyhal says the intercepted document describes three stages: first, substations near Ukraine's western border through which it imports electricity from Europe; second, hydroelectric plants; third, shutting down all three of Ukraine's operating nuclear power plants. The blogger does not deny the plan; he ridicules the 'intercepted secret plans' story as obvious and predicts Ukraine's collapse 'by the frosts', followed by a political argument about Western support.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from the Russian milblogger channel Dva Mayora (Telegram), relaying a Ukrainian government claim. It reflects a personal/editorial voice, not a Russian MoD position; milbloggers regularly contradict each other and the MoD. Neither the existence nor the content of the alleged document has been independently verified.
Sources: Два майора (Telegram)
Ухудшение на Славянском направлении
2026-09-30SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The Russian milblogger channel Rybar writes that, following problems on the Lyman direction, the situation is also deteriorating on the Sloviansk direction. According to the post, Ukrainian forces have gained a foothold near Dibrova and Ozerne, which complicates the position of Russian units near Kryva Luka and Piskunivka. Ukrainian formations are said to be attacking these villages from the north by crossing the Siverskyi Donets, while Russian units still hold the approaches to Mykolaivka, which small groups are entering, though the situation there is becoming harder.
Rybar states that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking to stop Russian troops from holding the approach to Mykolaivka from the direction of Rai-Oleksandrivka, and that the Ukrainian zone of presence is gradually growing: using a strongpoint west of the village, they have moved into it and are now consolidating on its outskirts. The situation has also worsened beyond the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, where Ukrainian forces are attacking near Yurkivka, Malynivka and Tykhonivka. Rybar says Russian presence there is very limited and that Russian troops cannot consolidate or reinforce because of problems crossing the canal.
The channel attributes this largely to increased Ukrainian activity on the Lyman direction and the transfer of additional drone operators there, which it says will force Russian units to rebuild their logistics under strikes from the Lyman side and to change the tempo of their advance on both Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Rybar adds that Russian aviation continues numerous, very heavy strikes on the cities of the agglomeration, including three-tonne FAB glide bombs with UMPK kits, which it says cause Ukrainian losses and limit Ukraine's ability to accumulate forces. The post does not mention Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps or Operation Vivaldi.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Rybar (Russian milblogger Telegram channel); it is a personal/editorial voice, not a position of the Russian MoD, and milbloggers regularly contradict each other and the MoD. The claims have not been independently verified.
Sources: Rybar (Telegram)
Засіб проти КАБів: ефективніше збивати не бомби, а літаки, які їх запускають
2026-09-21SINGLE SOURCE
ArmyInform, the information agency of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, reports comments by Colonel Artem Skuratovskyi, head of the air defence department of Ukraine's 7th Rapid Response Corps, made on Radio NV on 21 September 2026. He argued that the most effective answer to Russian guided glide bombs (KABs) is not to intercept the bombs but to shoot down the aircraft that release them.
According to Skuratovskyi, Russia uses KABs intensively against infantry positions, and in one month it directed about 120 KABs at the Sumy direction alone. In his view the situation will only improve once Ukrainian aviation can hit Russian aircraft at ranges comparable to the KAB release distance. For that, Ukraine needs long-range air-to-air missiles such as Meteor (for the Gripen), AIM-120 (for the F-16) and MICA (for the Mirage).
The argument reflects a long-standing Ukrainian view: glide bombs are released far outside the reach of most ground-based air defence, and the bombs themselves are hard and costly to intercept, so the carrier aircraft is the more practical target. The article gives no new data on intercepts or aircraft losses. This is a single-source report from ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD media, i.e. a party to the conflict), not independently corroborated.
Sources: armyinform
Новинки ВКС: больше бомб и новинка навигации
2026-09-21SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The Russian milblogger channel Dva Majora relays statements by Kirill Fedorov, made during a broadcast the previous day, that the Su-34 frontline bomber can now carry up to seven glide bombs. Fedorov is quoted describing a step-by-step increase: the aircraft started with one bomb, then two, then four, flew with four 'for quite a long time', after which two UMPB glide munitions were added under the air intakes and finally a seventh bomb on the centreline.
The post also says Russian aircraft and helicopters have begun to be fitted with 'Kometa' CRPA (controlled reception pattern antenna) antennas, which improve the accuracy of onboard satellite-navigation reception, i.e. make it more resistant to GNSS jamming. According to the post, their effectiveness decreases at high altitude. Dva Majora adds that Su-34s with such antenna fittings had been observed earlier and suggests this may be the Kometa system; that link is the channel's own inference.
This is a single-source report from the Russian milblogger channel Dva Majora, relaying one broadcast statement; it reflects a personal/editorial Telegram voice, not a position of the Russian MoD, milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims are not independently corroborated.
Sources: tg-dvamajors
Russia's glide bomb strikes hit new monthly record in August 2026
2026-09-10
According to figures from Ukraine's General Staff, compiled and circulated via the OSINT monitor Oko Gora, Russia dropped a record 8,766 glide bombs on Ukrainian positions and cities in August 2026 — the highest monthly total since the start of the full-scale invasion. That works out to an average of roughly 283 bombs a day.
The figure continues an upward trend that has run almost without interruption since early 2025 (when monthly totals were closer to 3,500), and it surpasses the previous highs of June (8,266) and July (over 8,300). Most of these weapons are Soviet-era FAB free-fall bombs fitted with a UMPK kit (pop-out wings plus satellite guidance), letting Russian strike aircraft — chiefly Su-34s — hit targets tens of kilometres away without approaching Ukrainian air defences. That standoff range has continued to grow in recent years through improved kits.
Ukrainian countermeasures cited include attempts to intercept Russian carrier aircraft before release using F-16s (armed with AIM-120 AMRAAM), ground-based GPS/EW jamming that can degrade UMPK guidance accuracy, and the anticipated arrival of Swedish JAS 39 Gripen jets carrying Meteor air-to-air missiles. Ukraine's Ministry of Defence describes countering Russian tactical aviation as "one of Ukraine's key challenges."
Sources: Defence Blog
Ukraine unveils indigenous Shershen SAM with R-120K missile and Ai-Petri anti-glide-bomb EW system at MSPO 2026
2026-09-09
At the MSPO 2026 defence exhibition in Kielce, Poland, Ukrainian company Radionix presented its modular "Shershen" (Hornet) air-defence system, built around the Perun command-and-control vehicle, the Athena surveillance/tracking radar (detection range roughly 85 km) and four Borei launchers per battery. A more detailed report from The War Zone (TWZ, 10 September 2026) confirms and sharpens the picture: the unit on display was the second operational prototype and is described as "close to its production configuration." The design's core feature is a deliberately open architecture — the manufacturer states the system is "deliberately open... to use different missiles from different manufacturers" — letting the launcher fire both Soviet air-to-air missiles (R-27/AA-10, R-73/AA-11, R-60) and Western types (AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM-132 ASRAAM), alongside the new, Ukrainian-developed R-120K. Manufacturer-claimed performance: engagement range up to 25 km, altitude up to 10,000 m, and up to six radar-guided missiles engaged simultaneously.
TWZ situates Shershen within Ukraine's broader pattern of "FrankenSAM" improvisation — earlier examples include Buk launchers paired with Sea Sparrow missiles, Osa systems adapted to fire R-73s, and the UK-Danish containerized Gravehawk system — but argues Shershen is the first to systematize this approach, building calibre-agnostic launching in as a core design principle rather than an emergency workaround. TWZ is explicit about the caveats, however: advertised performance figures "have not been independently verified," the R-120K's motor is still under development so its "eventual performance and production status remain uncertain," and actual performance "will vary widely depending on the type of interceptor" fired.
Separately, at the same exhibition, company Storkway showed the "Ai-Petri" electronic-warfare system (named after Crimea's highest peak), which jams both drone control links and the guidance of Russian glide bombs (KAB/UMPK). It operates across 300 MHz-6 GHz, scans a full 360 degrees, has a terrain-dependent range of 20-30 km, and draws 250 W in detection mode rising to about 2,000 W while jamming; the mobile pickup-mounted variant can be set up by a two-person crew in roughly 10 minutes. Unlike Shershen, Ai-Petri is not an exhibition concept: development began in 2014, tactical versions have been fielded since 2024, and the manufacturer claims around 400 systems delivered. As with Shershen, its claimed effectiveness against glide bombs remains independently unverified.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · The War Zone (TWZ)
Russia hammers Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities with drones, missiles and glide bombs, 8-10 September 2026
2026-09-09
Russia continued its intensive bombardment of Ukrainian cities through a second consecutive night, extending the heavy combined salvo of 8-9 September into the night of 9-10 September. On 8-9 September, Russian forces struck with Iskander-M ballistic missiles, S8000 "Banderol" missiles and roughly 196 Shahed-type attack drones (including jet-powered variants), alongside Gerbera drones and Parodiya decoys; Ukraine's Air Force reported 165 drones shot down or suppressed, with impacts at 23 locations. On the night of 9-10 September, the barrage continued at a slightly smaller but still substantial scale: 149 Shahed (about half jet-powered), Gerbera and Parodiya decoy drones were launched from Millerovo, Kursk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Russia as well as occupied Donetsk Oblast and Hvardiiske in Crimea, with air defence reporting 128 downed or jammed by 08:00 and hits recorded at 13 locations plus debris at nine more. The pattern fits the sustained, round-the-clock pressure on Kyiv flagged since 27 August.
In Kyiv on 8-9 September, a drone struck a 24-storey apartment block in Darnytskyi district overnight, injuring five, while a second, daytime strike hit a nine-storey building in Dniprovskyi district, killing a 70-year-old woman. Mykolaiv was hit by a combined missile-and-drone attack that killed an elderly woman and injured four, while Russian forces dropped five FAB-250 glide bombs with UMPK kits on a residential area of Kramatorsk. The following night and day (9-10 September) brought further damage: a large-scale drone attack on Kryvyi Rih hit five locations, damaging residential buildings, schools and businesses and leaving two people in surgery; Kyiv Oblast's Obukhiv, Bucha and Fastiv districts were struck on the morning of 10 September, killing one person and injuring two more.
In Sumy Oblast, two women died of wounds from an 8 September drone strike on the Kyiv-Sumy commuter train, and a drone hit the Starokozache vehicle checkpoint on the Ukraine-Moldova border, killing two. The 9-10 September night added an international dimension: a Russian drone attack on the tugboat Tedy in the Black Sea killed two Azerbaijani crew members and injured two others, according to Azerbaijan's foreign ministry. Across both nights, the common thread remains deliberate, continuous pressure on urban civilian life: high-rise towers, commuter trains, border crossings and now Black Sea shipping are all being drawn into the target set. Casualty and volume figures are Ukrainian and Azerbaijani statements and vary slightly between outlets.
Sources: Meduza (EN) · Meduza (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Meduza (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN) · Ukrainska Pravda (EN)
Germany's Cobra 600 Jet Drone Completes First Flight, Armed With IRIS-T Missile, Creators Hope It Can Shoot Down russian Su-34 KAB Carriers
2026-08-22SINGLE SOURCE
SINGLE SOURCE — Ukrainian publication (Defense Express), not independently corroborated. German defense contractor Diehl Defence, working with startup POLARIS Raumflugzeuge, has developed the Cobra 600, a reusable jet-powered interceptor drone with a takeoff mass of 600 kilograms. The first test flight took place in the second half of August 2026 over the Baltic Sea, covering roughly 20 kilometers; the flight carried no payload or missile simulator. Speed, range, and cost figures have not yet been disclosed by the manufacturer.
The drone is designed to carry and launch the IRIS-T air-to-air missile, functioning as a kind of 'missile taxi' meant to extend the reach of ground-based air defense systems. Developers hope that its small size, low observability, and sufficient flight range will allow it to intercept Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers carrying KAB glide bombs, one of the principal threats to Ukrainian troops and cities.
Defense Express itself stresses that this capability remains purely hypothetical for now: the initial flight involved neither a missile nor a payload simulator, and further tests with IRIS-T simulators and eventually the live missile are planned for coming months. Operational readiness and actual effectiveness against Su-34s are therefore entirely unproven at this stage.
Sources: Defense Express