Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
Russia's campaign against Kyiv's 'power ring': the capital's own CHP generation is out and strikes on 330/750 kV substations raise the prospect of 8-20 hour daily blackouts this winter
2026-10-24
In an analysis for Ukrainska Pravda (24 October 2026, translated from Ekonomichna Pravda), energy journalist Mykola Topalov describes how Russia is systematically attacking Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast with two aims: to destroy the city's combined heat and power (CHP) plants and to break the so-called 'power ring'. That ring is the system of high-voltage lines and 330 kV substations linking the capital to the national grid from several directions, with the 750 kV Kyivska substation as a key node through which power from the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear plants reaches the city. Kyiv normally uses 1-1.2 GW (12-15% of national demand), rising to 1.8-2 GW in winter. Before the large-scale winter attacks of 2025, local generation from CHP-5, CHP-6 and Darnytsia CHP (CHP-4) supplied up to about 1.3 GW, according to an energy-company source. Those plants can no longer generate electricity, yet all three were hit again on the night of 13-14 October.
The article explains the tactical logic. Russia does not need to destroy the whole ring: damaging a few critical nodes that carry a large share of the flow is enough. Power may then exist in the system but cannot be delivered to Kyiv in sufficient volume, forcing dispatchers into emergency or scheduled cuts. The ring's key components have been under constant attack for more than a month. Repairs are slowed by repeat strikes, long air-raid alerts, risks to repair crews, and government plans to cut the share of energy workers exempt from mobilisation. Replacing a large transformer takes much longer if no spare is held in reserve. The article does not give numbers of missiles or drones per strike. It stresses that protection of these sites against ballistic missiles depends mainly on air defence, that the engineering protection built at most substations cannot guarantee equipment survives a direct hit, and that Patriot interceptors are in short supply.
The article sets out three winter scenarios. If repairs keep pace and new strikes cause no critical losses, outages would be about 8-10 hours a day. With continued attacks and lingering damage during moderate cold, they would be 12-16 hours. The worst case, regular large-scale strikes on key substations during severe frost, would mean up to 20 hours a day. Energy-sector sources nevertheless do not expect Russia to 'plunge Kyiv into darkness' entirely. Critical infrastructure (water pumps, heating, transport, hospitals, communications) needs about 200 MW. According to Ekonomichna Pravda's sources, 150 MW of distributed generation is already running, rising to 180-185 MW by the end of 2026, and private plants could add another 55-60 MW before winter, about half of which are ready. The scenarios are the outlet's assessment based on unnamed energy-sector sources.
Ukraine strikes Tolyattikauchuk synthetic-rubber plant and an aircraft at Yeysk; Russian MoD claims 616 drones downed
2026-10-24
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, as reported by Ukrainska Pravda, Ukraine's defence forces struck the Tolyattikauchuk plant in Tolyatti (Samara Oblast) and an aircraft at the Yeysk airfield in Krasnodar Krai on 23 October and the night of 23–24 October. At Tolyatti an explosion and fire were recorded near the facility; photos and videos shared by monitoring Telegram channels showed a major fire, and locals reported continued drone sightings and a possible evacuation at carmaker AvtoVAZ. The plant makes synthetic rubber, monomers, fractions and high-octane petrol additives; the General Staff says its synthetic rubber is used, among other things, in solid rocket propellant for tactical and ballistic missiles. It was previously attacked on the night of 11–12 September. The same strike package included the Proton-Electrotex plant in Oryol (components for S-71 Kovyor and Iskander-M missiles, Pantsir-S1), already reported earlier, where a hit on the main production building is now described as confirmed.
At Yeysk, home of Russian naval aviation training, the General Staff reported only that "an aircraft" was struck and that the extent of the damage is being assessed. Neither the aircraft type nor any imagery-based damage assessment has been published so far; no independent confirmation of the Yeysk hit was found.
The Russian Ministry of Defence, via TASS, claimed that air defences destroyed 616 Ukrainian fixed-wing drones between 20:00 Moscow time on 23 October and 08:00 on 24 October over 22 regions (including Samara, Oryol, Krasnodar, Moscow region, Tatarstan and Crimea) and the Sea of Azov and Black Sea, without a regional breakdown. Both the Ukrainian General Staff's strike claims and the Russian MoD's interception figure are official claims by a warring party and have not been independently verified; the MoD statement does not mention any damage on the ground.
Russia fields two new Geran-5 derivatives with optical navigation, aiming for cruise-missile speeds
2026-10-23
Russia has begun using two new jet-powered small cruise missiles that appear to be derivatives of the Geran-5, Militarnyi reported on 23 October, citing its own sources in the Ukrainian Defence Forces and a post by Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, adviser to the Ukrainian president on defence technology, who published a photo of the second type on 22 October. The first, referred to as the Geran-5 K5-K, has a smaller swept-back wing, a tail without the vertical wingtip surfaces, and an engine moved from the external dorsal nacelle into the fuselage (first seen in interceptor-drone footage in mid-September). It reportedly uses autonomous optical navigation that corrects its route by matching images of the ground, without satellite navigation, which makes jamming largely ineffective. According to Ukrainian officials quoted by Militarnyi, the design goal is a speed of up to 900 km/h, comparable to the Kh-101 and largely beyond the reach of interceptor drones; there are no measured speed or range figures yet, and range may suffer from the higher fuel consumption. Use is still described as sporadic.
The second type, which Beskrestnov also calls a K5-K, looks markedly different: a box-shaped fuselage with flat sides, a diamond-shaped wing, a V-tail and an air intake moved from the top to the side. Militarnyi assesses that the flat sides simplify production and, together with the V-tail, may reduce radar cross-section. Beskrestnov credits it with optical navigation and greater range, speed and flight altitude; its engine type is not stated. Neither source gives details of the warhead or the launch method.
For reference, the baseline Geran-5 first appeared over Ukraine in January 2026. Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR) described it then as structurally close to Iran's Karrar, powered by a Chinese Telefly turbojet, with a Kometa-M12 jam-resistant satellite-navigation module and a cruise speed that Militarnyi gives as 450–600 km/h, a range of up to 950 km and a maximum take-off weight of up to 850 kg. Militarnyi adds that Russia's combined Geran-4/Geran-5 output has reached about 4,000 per month, mostly Geran-4. The new variants' performance has not been independently verified, and the designations come from Ukrainian sources.
«ВСУ нанесли ракетный удар по предприятию в Орле в час пик» (Bron: 'Ukrainian forces carried out a missile strike on an enterprise in Oryol at rush hour')
2026-10-23SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar reports that Ukrainian forces struck an enterprise in the Sovetsky district of Oryol with missiles on 23 October. Governor Andrei Klychkov reported damage and casualties, but did not give numbers, and stressed that the strike came at rush hour, when employees were heading home. Local residents reported at least four explosions, followed by flames on the site and smoke over the city. The governor did not name the facility and described it only as a 'civilian enterprise'; the article's URL, however, names it as 'Proton'.
Accounts differ on the weapon used: some sources name Ukrainian 'Flamingo' missiles, others Storm Shadow. Topwar recalls that Oryol oblast was hit by a combined attack on 18 October, when, according to the governor, air defence intercepted 15 drones and two missiles, and a telecom tower and a post office were damaged. The new strike followed a large overnight attack for which the Russian MoD claimed 443 Ukrainian UAVs destroyed over 22 regions and two seas.
This is a single source: Topwar (Voennoye Obozreniye), a Russian pro-government military-news site, relaying the regional governor's and Russian MoD's claims; the claims have not been independently verified.
«Перехват прошёл успешно»: США сбили цели ракетами APKWS с октокоптера TRV-150 (Source: ''Interception was successful': US shoots down targets with APKWS rockets fired from a TRV-150 octocopter')
2026-10-23SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar (author Yevgeny Yudzhin) reports that BAE Systems, after good results using the APKWS laser-guided rocket against drones from crewed aircraft, tested it from an uncrewed carrier: the TRV-150 octocopter fitted with a launcher for three APKWS rounds. According to BAE, 'the interception was successful': the drone downed several attack drones in a single sortie without landing to rearm. The article gives no location or date for the test, and notes that the company's footage did not show the actual interception.
The TRV-150 is based on the commercial Malloy Aeronautics T150 and was modified for US Army requirements; Topwar cites a mass of 35–40 kg, a payload of 68 kg, a top speed of up to 108 km/h, a range of 13–37.5 km with payload and an endurance of 36–40 minutes. The type is used by British forces and has been supplied to Ukraine. The article adds that Ukrainian sources credit APKWS with downing Shahed/Geran-type drones.
Commentators cited by Topwar see a TRV-150 armed with APKWS as a way to add a wide-coverage air-defence layer, but the article notes it is unclear how detection and guidance would work in such a set-up. The underlying claim of success comes from the manufacturer. This is a single source: Topwar (Voennoye Obozreniye), a Russian pro-government military-news site; the claims have not been independently verified.
Starlink and Starshield speeds restored for Ukraine's military; Musk says Kyiv violated terms of service
2026-10-23
Since 14 October, Starlink and its military version Starshield stopped working on Ukrainian drones and other unmanned systems moving faster than about 160 km/h (100 mph). This hit Ukraine's interceptor drones against jet-powered Shaheds, as well as front-line logistics; according to AP, commanders reported lost drones and disrupted missions. On 14 October, Mykhailo Fedorov wrote that removing the Starshield speed cap had become critical, and Musk replied that day that Starshield is owned and controlled by the US government and that any limits "are decided by the US military and ultimately POTUS". On 23 October, Zelensky (at the Hudson Institute) said the limits were still in force despite Trump's claim that Musk had "put it back", and that deliveries of interceptor missiles against Russian ballistic missiles were still delayed.
On 24 October, Zelensky said restoration had begun overnight and that by the morning speeds were where the military needs them. He thanked members of Congress, the media, the State Department and the US president — according to Euromaidan Press, not Musk or SpaceX. Ukraine's Defence Ministry said its monitoring recorded stable connections at speeds above 400 km/h; Defence Minister Yevhen Khmara credited direct dialogue with the president. These figures come from Ukrainian officials and have not been independently verified. The Wall Street Journal and CBS News reported that Musk himself was behind the slowdown; the WSJ (as cited by the Kyiv Independent) also reported that Trump ordered Musk on 21 October to lift it. Accounts of Trump's own statements differ: according to AP he said he had not made the call, while Euromaidan Press reports he said on 24 October that he had spoken to Musk about Ukraine, without giving details. Rubio and Hegseth denied administration involvement, Vice President Vance hinted at coordination with Musk, and Senator Richard Blumenthal has asked the Pentagon who ordered the restrictions.
On X on 24 October, Musk wrote that Ukraine's military "violated Starlink terms of service and used it for offensive drone strikes to kill people" and that the "loophole was closed last week"; he called Starshield "a different system" controlled by the US government. He added that if Starlink were turned off, "the Ukrainian front line would collapse immediately", calling this "NOT a threat" but a statement of fact, and described Starlink as the only system that cannot be jammed or destroyed "at least for now". Overnight he added: "We simply enforced our terms of service when they were bypassed. There has been no change to our terms of service." He gave no evidence, cases or time frames. TASS, a Russian state agency, presented this as Musk confirming access was restricted over the violation. Ukrainian figures reject the claim: presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov says that since February 2026 every Starlink terminal over Ukraine, occupied areas included, has been capped at 70–90 km/h and does not work over Russia, so commercial Starlink "physically" cannot be used for deep or mid-range strikes. Serhii Sternenko, a former adviser to Fedorov at the Defence Ministry, says any terminal used on the move has had to be whitelisted and connected to Starshield since February, so drone missions were only possible via Starshield, and that Ukraine did not violate the terms. European governments help pay for the service: Germany under a contract running to April 2027, and Poland around $50 million a year. Who ordered the restrictions, and their removal, has not been publicly established.
Proton plant in Oryol, supplier of Iskander-M, Pantsir-S1 and S-71 Kover components, reportedly struck by missiles
2026-10-23
On 23 October 2026 a missile strike likely hit the Proton joint-stock company in the Sovetsky District of Oryol (Orel), about 160 km from the Ukrainian border, according to the monitoring channel Exilenova+ and the OSINT projects Supernova and Astra, citing local reports. Proton makes optoelectronic equipment, semiconductor devices and electronic components. According to Exilenova+, its products include diode modules, switch-inverters and onboard electronics that go into the 9M723 missiles of the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile system, the S-71 Kover air-launched cruise missile and the Pantsir-S1 air defence system.
Oryol Oblast governor Andrey Klychkov first declared a missile threat. He then said that missiles had hit a factory in the Sovetsky District (reported via Liga.net). Residents reported explosions, a fire in part of the city and columns of smoke. Exilenova+ said Storm Shadow cruise missiles were used, but neither the weapon type nor the exact time of the strike has been independently confirmed. Ukraine has not officially claimed the attack, according to both sources. A photo published by Exilenova+ shows heavy damage to a plant building. The full extent of the damage and any casualties are still unclear, and the sources give no geolocation.
Oryol has been hit several times before: the Ukrainian Navy said it struck the city's thermal power plant with Neptune missiles on 31 October 2025, and drones hit the Bolkhov semiconductor plant in the same region in May 2025. Defence Blog places the strike in a wider Ukrainian campaign against Russian missile production. Recent examples are the Flamingo strike on the Progress Rocket and Space Center in Samara (August 2026) and the strike on the Redkino Experimental Plant in Tver region earlier in October, which the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed.
«Украинские морские дроны вооружились ракетами. Смогут ли они заменить боевые корабли?» (Topwar: 'Ukrainian sea drones have armed themselves with missiles. Can they replace warships?')
2026-10-22SINGLE SOURCE
A long analysis piece on Topwar asks whether Ukraine's uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), now armed with missiles and air interceptors, could replace warships. The author recounts the Magura V7 boats with two AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles that, according to Ukrainian intelligence, engaged Russian Su-30s on 2 May 2025; citing Janes, the article says Russian sources acknowledged losing one Su-30 about 50 km west of Novorossiysk (the crew was rescued), while a second claimed kill is unconfirmed. It also mentions the April 2026 interception of a Shahed/Geran by an air interceptor launched from a naval carrier, attributed to the 412th Nemesis brigade and later linked to the 'Delfin' boat, and UFORCE's Magura MV11 shown in August 2026 with 18 containers for Sting interceptors and a claimed seven-day endurance.
The author concedes that USVs have proven effective at sea denial in the Black Sea, citing the 2024 losses of Ivanovets, Tsezar Kunikov and Sergey Kotov and the Black Sea Fleet's partial relocation from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk. He argues, however, that two missiles and an optical system do not make a ship-based air-defence system, that manufacturers' claims on endurance and swarming are self-interested, and that persistent surveillance, ASW, repair at sea, ammunition stocks and the cost of continuous patrol remain unproven. Black Sea geography, with short distances and shore support, is said to flatter the results and not to transfer automatically to ocean operations.
The piece concludes that there is no reason to expect warships to be abandoned soon, and that the Russian Navy must both harden ships and bases against uncrewed threats and develop its own uncrewed systems. This is a single source: Topwar (Voennoye Obozreniye), a Russian pro-government military-news site; the claims have not been independently verified.
After a Putin–Witkoff meeting in St Petersburg, the US, Russia and Ukraine discuss resuming trilateral peace talks in November while missile and drone strikes continue
2026-10-22
According to Meduza, US special envoy Steve Witkoff met Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on 21 October 2026. Afterwards, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said Russia was ready to resume negotiations on “the main issue”, which he described as a security framework for Russia and Ukraine after the conflict. He said talks could begin in mid-November, immediately after the US congressional midterm elections. Ushakov also said the “new approaches” Witkoff brought contained “not all that much that was useful” for resolving the crisis. Asked later whether the war was nearing an end, he suggested that “things are heading that way.” On 22 October Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov named Abu Dhabi as a possible venue. He rebuffed a question about whether Russia would prepare documents for signing.
President Zelensky confirmed late on 21 October that Russia supported a three-way meeting of the negotiating teams and that Washington wanted to hold it as soon as possible, “no later than early November” in his estimate. He said the talks’ main task would be to prepare a meeting of leaders. Kyiv would support any ceasefire, full or partial. Witkoff flew on to Oslo to brief allies and wrote that the trilateral talks would “continue at the technical level.” President Trump said an end to the war was “perhaps closer than ever” and that he had recently spoken to Putin himself.
The diplomatic signals did not halt the fighting. Overnight, Russia struck Kyiv with ballistic missiles, killing one person and injuring more than 20. Zelensky said this showed no real change in Moscow’s attitude. Ukraine launched drones at several Russian regions, including Moscow and Moscow Oblast, where two people were injured in the Novaya Moskva district. No dates or agenda have been formally agreed, and Russia’s readiness to discuss substance beyond the “security framework” remains unclear.
Bipartisan group of 23 US House members urges Trump to ask Elon Musk to let Ukraine use Starlink to hunt Russian ballistic missile launchers inside Russia
2026-10-22
A bipartisan group of 23 members of the US House of Representatives, seven Republicans and 16 Democrats, has written to President Donald Trump urging him to ask Elon Musk to let Ukraine use the Starlink satellite internet system to hunt for missile launchers inside Russia. The letter, sent on 21 October, was obtained by The Hill and reported by European Pravda and Ukrainska Pravda. 'If Ukraine cannot reliably intercept Russian "arrows", it must be able to shoot the "archer",' the lawmakers wrote, arguing that with one phone call Trump could save lives and give Vladimir Putin greater incentives to negotiate.
The Republican signatories are known supporters of Ukraine: Joe Wilson, Brian Fitzpatrick, Don Bacon, Carlos Gimenez, Jeff Hurd, Andy Harris and Max Miller. According to Ukrainska Pravda, the letter comes as a growing number of Republicans express anger over disruptions to Starlink and its military version, Starshield, in Ukraine. President Zelensky has also called for more US help in striking launchers on Russian territory.
The request reflects a shift in emphasis from interception to striking the launch platforms themselves (so-called 'left of launch'), at a moment when Ukraine reports a shortage of Patriot interceptors against Iskander-M and Kinzhal missiles. The letter is a request only; there is no indication yet of a response from the White House or SpaceX, and the source does not specify how Starlink would be used in the targeting process.
HUR: Russia keeps missile stocks steady at up to 700 ballistic and several thousand cruise missiles, produces 200+ missiles a month, and has ordered over 100,000 Geran-type drones and decoys for 2026
2026-10-22
According to figures Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) gave the Ukrainian outlet NV, published on 20 October 2026 and reported by Euromaidan Press, Russia holds up to 700 ballistic missiles and several thousand cruise missiles in reserve, roughly the same level HUR reported in July despite the autumn mass strikes. Russia can produce more than 200 missiles a month, 110 of them ballistic. About 115 of the ballistic missiles in stock are Iskander-Ms, produced at up to 65 a month, and a modernised Iskander with a projected range of 550–700 km is in development. Russia also holds up to 400 S-300PM/S-400 air-defence missiles adapted for ground strikes, making about 40 a month. Kinzhal production has reportedly been paused over poor accuracy, with the capacity shifted to conventional ballistic missiles.
For cruise missiles, HUR says Russia plans more than 80 Kh-101s a month and is exceeding that, although defects in release from aircraft have sent some batches back to the factories. Russia has over 450 Kalibrs and makes about 29 a month, but because Ukrainian air defence downs them effectively most new ones go to the strategic reserve and the fleets. It also holds more than 600 Oniks anti-ship missiles upgraded for land attack and more than 120 Zircons.
Russia's 2026 state order for Geran-type drones and decoys such as the Gerbera exceeds 100,000 units. It holds about 6,200 Gerans in reserve and produces about 10,000 drones a month, mainly at the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan. Since summer production has shifted to turbojet drones, which HUR attributes to Ukraine's mobile fire groups downing slow targets en masse: about 4,000 jet drones a month, mostly Geran-4 and Geran-5 flying at 400–500 km/h, plus about 2,000 cheaper propeller-driven Geran-2s used to wear down air defence and locate its positions. Ukraine says Russia plans to strike 60 infrastructure sites this winter. These are Ukrainian intelligence estimates and cannot be independently verified.
«Российские "гуманисты" нанесли три волны баллистических ударов по Киеву» (Fighterbomber: 'Russian "humanists" carried out three waves of ballistic strikes on Kyiv' — mocks the contrast between Ukraine's 808 drones and Russia's 21 missiles)
2026-10-22SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian air force community, juxtaposes two claims from the night of 21–22 October. It quotes Ukrainian President Zelensky as saying that Russian 'humanists' carried out three waves of ballistic strikes on Kyiv since the evening, using 21 missiles. Next to that it places the Russian MoD claim that duty air-defence forces destroyed 808 Ukrainian UAVs between 20:00 on 21 October and 08:00 on 22 October.
The channel's own comment is a single sarcastic line: a thousand drones counts as 'humane', 21 missiles does not, 'don't mix them up'. The post thus rejects Ukrainian criticism of Russian strikes by pointing to the scale of Ukraine's own drone attacks on Russia.
The post contains no own information on the strikes or their effects; both figures are taken from the respective governments. It is mainly an indication of the tone in which pro-war Russian channels discuss the strike exchange. The same night's MoD figures and target list were also relayed by Dva Mayora. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
Ukraine's 1039th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment receives Finnish ItO 90M (Crotale NG) short-range air defence systems
2026-10-22
Ukraine's 1039th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, named after General Mykola Kapustianskyi, has received Finnish ItO 90M air defence systems, Militarnyi reports. The delivery became known through a video on the regiment's Facebook page showing the systems in operation. The number of systems and the delivery route were not disclosed.
The ItO 90M is Finland's version of the French Thales Crotale NG short-range system, mounted on the Sisu XA-181 6×6 armoured personnel carrier instead of a French vehicle. Finland ordered 21 Crotale NG systems in 1988 and upgraded them in the 2000s with modern thermal imagers, improved daylight cameras and fire control, hence the M (Modernisoitu). Crotale NG combines a detection radar, electro-optical tracking and an eight-missile launcher on one turret and was designed against cruise missiles, UAVs and low-flying aircraft.
According to Militarnyi, the ItO 90M detects aerial targets at up to 20 km. Its VT-1 missile reaches about Mach 3.5 (around 1,200 m/s), with an engagement range of up to 11 km and altitude of up to 6 km, and the reaction time from detection to launch is about five seconds. The system adds another short-range layer against Russian Shahed/Geran drones and cruise missiles.
Ukraine's HUR unveils Filin, a new low-cost Russian ground-launched cruise missile with up to 1,200 km range, built with 35 US and 22 Chinese components and a Russian R500 turbojet
2026-10-22
On 22 October 2026 Ukraine's military intelligence agency HUR published an interactive 3D model, an assembly breakdown and an electronic-component database of a new Russian cruise missile, the Filin ("eagle owl"), on its War&Sanctions portal. According to HUR, Russia began firing the missile at Ukraine in late summer 2026. It is developed by AO NPO Molniya, part of the state-owned Tactical Missiles Corporation, and HUR describes it as the latest step in a Russian trend towards cheap, jet-powered, ground-launched strike weapons. HUR did not say how many Filins have been launched, what they hit or how the examined parts were obtained.
Per HUR's data, the Filin has a carbon-fibre and fibreglass composite fuselage 3.5 m long with a 3 m wingspan; Defence Blog cites a maximum launch weight of 210 kg. Some parts are 3D-printed. It is fired from a ground launcher with a solid-fuel booster, after which a Russian R500 turbojet made by OOO Reynolds takes over (the same engine HUR previously found in the S-71K Kover and S-71M Monokhrom cruise missiles). Russia claims a top speed of 800 km/h; HUR's specification gives a range of 600–1,200 km depending on configuration, flight from ultra-low altitude up to 6 km, and versions with 50 kg or 100 kg warheads. Defence Blog reports that HUR lists high-explosive fragmentation, penetrating and thermobaric warhead types. These performance figures are Russian claims relayed by HUR and have not been independently verified.
The onboard equipment is made by PLAZ LLC, which also produces equipment for the Garpiya ("Harpy") drone, a Geran-2 derivative built by the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol; HUR says Filin and Garpiya units share a similar layout and markings. Guidance combines a Chinese-made inertial navigation system with a 16-channel Kometa anti-jamming satellite-navigation module (CRPA) from Russia's VNIIR-Progress. Of 81 identified components, 35 are American and 22 Chinese, a larger Chinese share than in earlier Russian missiles and drones. Named suppliers include Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, NXP and STMicroelectronics plus the Chinese firms WinChipHead and Mornsun; some parts carry 2021–2022 production dates, including an Ethernet switch chip made in May 2022. Euromaidan Press notes that Ukrainian adviser Serhii Beskrestnov warned in September that cheap Russian cruise missiles such as the Banderol, Dan-T, Dan-M and Gerbera-5 would soon outpace Ukraine's jet-powered interceptor drones.
«На фоне переговорного трека: ночью сбито 808 украинских БПЛА» (Dva Mayora: 'Against the backdrop of the negotiation track: 808 Ukrainian UAVs shot down overnight' — relays MoD strike list including Antonov plant and Kyiv's Southern Bridge)
2026-10-22SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Dva Mayora frames the night of 21–22 October with the line 'against the backdrop of the negotiation track' and reports that 808 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down overnight. It then lists targets that Russian forces are said to have hit, in wording that mirrors a Russian MoD briefing; the post adds no own sourcing or analysis.
In Kyiv, the list names the Antonov state aviation enterprise (described as an assembly plant producing long- and medium-range UAVs, FP-5 'Flamingo' cruise missiles and FP-series operational-tactical missiles; the post literally says 'FP-9 and FP-9', apparently a typo), a warehouse complex ('Kholodokombinat No. 3') allegedly used for production of fixed-wing long- and medium-range UAVs and 'Hornet' loitering munitions, another UAV and robotic-system component plant, a UAV and booster storage site, and, highlighted with an alarm sign, the 'Southern' road-rail bridge, described as used for transit of military cargo by road and rail.
In Odesa region it names port infrastructure at Kiliia said to receive and store foreign military supplies, and it claims a dry-cargo ship carrying cargo for the Ukrainian armed forces to Chornomorsk was hit at sea. The sarcastic negotiation framing signals the channel's view that strikes continue regardless of talks. Damage to these sites, and the 808 figure, are not shown in the post. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
«russia Could Produce Fewer Than 40 Oreshnik Missiles Year Compared With Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer: What Is Plan for This Missile?» (Defense Express)
2026-10-22SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express reports on a new report by the UK-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. According to the outlet, RUSI notes that the Soviet Union could build at most 40 RSD-10 Pioneer intermediate-range ballistic missiles a year, and assesses that today's Russian defence industry has much less capacity and can produce only a 'limited number' of Oreshnik IRBMs. The report argues that IRBMs have an advantage over subsonic cruise missiles because Europe has very few systems able to intercept ballistic missiles, and suggests that, given their scarcity, it would be more rational for Russia to treat Oreshnik as a nuclear delivery system than as a long-range conventional weapon.
Defense Express adds that in early September 2026 Ukraine's military intelligence chief Oleh Ivashchenko told Ukrinform that units of the 101st Missile Brigade, equipped with Oreshnik, were being deployed in Belarus. The outlet argues that Russia thus appears to have a whole brigade dedicated to Oreshnik, which by Russian standards would mean up to 10-12 launchers and a matching number of missiles. In its view, the Belarus deployment shows that Oreshnik is at least partly a tool of pressure on Europe, in both a nuclear and a 'kinetic' (conventional) role, while further conventional strikes on Ukraine cannot be ruled out. This is a single source: Defense Express, a Ukrainian defence outlet; the claims have not been independently verified.
Russia hits Kyiv with Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Oniks missiles and 210 drones, including cluster-armed Iskanders in the historic centre, hours after the Putin–Witkoff meeting; at least 9 killed across Ukraine
2026-10-22
Russia launched a combined missile and drone attack on Ukraine from 18:00 on 21 October 2026 into the morning of 22 October, with Kyiv as the main target. According to Ukraine's Air Force, Russia fired Iskander-M ballistic missiles, S-400 missiles, Zircon and Oniks missiles from Kursk, Bryansk and Rostov oblasts, together with 210 drones: Shahed (110 of them jet-powered), Gerbera and Italmas attack drones and Parodiya decoys. The drones were launched from Millerovo, Oryol, Kursk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and Shatalovo in Russia and from occupied Donetsk and Hvardiiske in Crimea. By 09:00, air defences had shot down or jammed 181 drones. Ukrainska Pravda quotes the Air Force as saying 63 of these were jet-powered, while the Kyiv Independent reports 87. Hits were recorded at 32 locations and debris fell at eight more. The Air Force did not give the number of missiles. The Monitor Telegram channel counted at least 25 Iskander, Oniks and Zircon missiles fired at Kyiv and its outskirts; this figure is unverified.
In Kyiv, city authorities reported one person killed and 24 injured, 16 of them taken to hospital. Among the injured were five teenagers and two children, according to prosecutors. Damage was reported in the Holosiivskyi, Obolonskyi, Pecherskyi, Sviatoshynskyi, Dniprovskyi and Darnytskyi districts. In Pecherskyi, an ambulance station and six ambulances were damaged. Metro infrastructure on the Pivdennyi Bridge was also hit, which restricted traffic and split the Green Line. Presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov said an Iskander carrying a K5 cluster warhead struck the historic centre. He said the warhead bursts above the ground and scatters 58 submunitions over an area of about 400 by 400 m. President Zelenskyy said three ballistic missiles with cluster warheads were used against Kyiv. According to Zelenskyy, one of them hit Pechersk between the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and the Holy Presentation Monastery, damaging monastery buildings, homes, shops and cafés. He called the choice of weapon and target area deliberate. These accounts come from Ukrainian officials and have not been independently verified. The Russian Defence Ministry said it struck "military-industrial facilities" and transport infrastructure; this is an unverified Russian state claim. Meduza notes that the attack came hours after US envoy Steve Witkoff met Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg for talks on ending the war.
Across Ukraine, regional authorities reported at least nine killed and 56–57 injured over the day, according to the Kyiv Independent. In Kharkiv Oblast, one person was killed and 15 were injured, and on the afternoon of 22 October a drone hit a passenger train in Kharkiv, setting the lead carriage on fire without causing casualties. In Chernihiv, two strikes with Banderol drone-launched missiles on a business killed a 61-year-old man and injured another; a Geran drone also set an agricultural business in Semenivka on fire. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, three people were killed and three injured. Governor Ivan Fedorov counted 862 Russian strikes on 48 settlements, including 633 mostly FPV drones, 28 airstrikes, four MLRS attacks and 197 artillery strikes. Drone attacks continued during the day: a Shahed hit a house in Zhytomyr hromada, injuring nine people including two children, and a 59-year-old man was injured in the Bucha district of Kyiv Oblast. Odesa Oblast, Sumy Oblast (one killed) and Donetsk Oblast (two killed in Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk) were also hit.
«Россия накопила до 700 баллистических ракет…» (Dva Majora: 'Russia has stockpiled up to 700 ballistic missiles, several thousand cruise missiles and over 6,000 strike drones' — relaying a Ukrainian intelligence claim)
2026-10-21SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Dva Majora posted that Russia has stockpiled up to 700 ballistic missiles, several thousand cruise missiles of various types and more than 6,000 strike drones. The channel attributes the figures to Ukraine's military intelligence directorate (HUR), which it calls 'terrorists', and does not link to the original statement or give a date for it. A search found no HUR publication with exactly these figures from October 2026. The ballistic-missile and 'several thousand' figures match what President Zelensky said in Kyiv on 4 October, presented as Ukrainian intelligence data (up to 700 ballistic missiles and several thousand other missiles, with production of 130–140 ballistic missiles a month; see entry e-20261005-02). The figure of more than 6,000 strike drones has not appeared in earlier entries; a June 2025 HUR count put Russia's stock of Shahed-type drones at over 6,000, so it may be an older number.
The channel adds one line of its own: in the absence of surface-to-air missiles, it calls this 'a very interesting factor for negotiations'. It does not say whose shortage of SAMs it means, but in context this refers to Ukraine's and its partners' shortage of air-defence interceptors, which other recent entries also cover.
The post adds no new data of its own. Its value lies mainly in how a pro-war Russian channel presents a Ukrainian estimate of Russian strike potential as leverage in talks. The figures themselves remain Ukrainian intelligence claims that cannot be independently checked, with no breakdown by missile or drone type. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
Russian drone and missile attack on the night of 20-21 October and daytime strikes on 21 October kill at least five: Kyiv high-rise, Korotych (Kharkiv Oblast), a double-tap strike in Chernihiv, universities in Kremenchuk and Uman, children injured in Chortkiv
2026-10-21
Russia attacked Ukraine overnight on 20-21 October, starting at 18:00 on 20 October, with Iskander-K cruise missiles launched from airspace over Rostov Oblast and 186 attack drones, 88 of them jet-powered Shaheds, plus S8000 Banderol/Dan-T, Gerbera and Parodiya-type decoys, according to Ukraine's Air Force as reported by Mezha. The drones were launched from Oryol, Kursk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Russia, occupied Donetsk Oblast, and Hvardiiske and Chauda in occupied Crimea. By 08:30 air defence had shot down or suppressed 150 drones, including 63 jet-powered Shaheds; 10 were still airborne. Hits were recorded at 27 locations and falling debris at 13. This is the night after the 165-drone wave of 19-20 October and the daytime strikes of 20 October covered in separate entries.
In Kyiv a drone hit a 24-storey residential building in Sviatoshynskyi district at the level of the 19th floor around 07:00, setting an apartment on fire over about 70 m². Rescuers found two bodies in the rubble; Mayor Vitali Klitschko confirmed two dead and two injured, among them a 46-year-old man hurt while walking past, according to the National Police. DTEK cut power in the district. Elsewhere in the capital a drone set parked cars on fire in Desnianskyi district and another hit a transport infrastructure facility in Solomianskyi district. In Korotych, Kharkiv district, an 81-year-old woman and an 83-year-old man were killed and 11 people injured, according to regional governor Oleh Syniehubov, as reported by Meduza. In Kremenchuk (Poltava Oblast) a drone hit an academic building of the Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi National University, starting a fire on the fourth floor; three people were injured, including a 16-year-old with a mild traumatic brain injury, governor Vitalii Diakivnych said. Fires also broke out at an office building and a warehouse in Poltava.
The attacks continued into the day. In Uman (Cherkasy Oblast), which jet-powered Geran drones struck again in the morning according to governor Ihor Taburets, a drone crashed at Uman National University around 08:00, damaging windows of student housing and a residential building; by 13:30 the State Emergency Service counted five injured, two of them hospitalised. An Epicentr superstore in Uman had been hit during the night. In Chernihiv a drone attacked a business in the morning; after one person was concussed, a repeat drone strike killed a person standing near the blast site, said city military administration head Dmytro Bryzhynskyi. In the afternoon a drone struck Chortkiv (Ternopil Oblast), injuring a woman and three children, two of whom were hospitalised, according to governor Taras Pastukh. Ukrainska Pravda also reported that 21-year-old Mariana Tokarchuk from Derazhne (Rivne Oblast) was buried on 21 October; according to her mother she died of shrapnel wounds in the Russian attack on Kyiv of 19 October, not in this night's strike. The reported figures leave about 26 drones unaccounted for, and roughly 72% of the jet drones (63 of 88) were downed, in line with the trend of jet-powered Shaheds also striking universities, shops and businesses by day. All figures come from Ukrainian officials and have not been independently verified.
Ukrainians get near-real-time maps of Russian drones: volunteer 'monitor' map and Defence Ministry's Air Alert app now show approximate positions and headings
2026-10-20
Two new tools let Ukrainians see roughly where Russian attack drones are flying, Euromaidan Press reports. A Ukrainian air-threat project called monitor announced a free, ad-free beta map on X on 13 October. It does not use radar: it aggregates posts from regional Telegram channels that report drones and missiles over their oblasts, cross-checks them algorithmically to estimate each target's type, approximate position and heading, and overlays official air-raid alerts from alerts.in.ua (areas shown red or yellow). A target log lists each drone's district and course, the map refreshes about every 20 seconds while targets are airborne, and it works in a browser or on Telegram on a weak connection. The beta focuses on drones, though cruise and ballistic missiles are already listed as target types. The developers warn that the dots are estimates that appear late, that some targets are never tracked and that "an empty map does not mean you are safe".
On 17 October Ukraine's Defence Ministry said its Air Alert app now shows the approximate position and heading of some targets, namely cruise missiles, Banderol drone-launched missiles and Shahed-type drones, using data from the Air Force over secure channels. For security reasons it shows no exact coordinates and no true real-time tracking and may lag; ballistic missiles and anything faster than 2,000 km/h are not shown. Both the ministry and the monitor developers tell users to go to shelter first and check the map from there.
The tools respond to the changing Russian strike campaign: nightly raids of over a hundred drones, jet-powered Shaheds that can cut their engines and glide in, and the fact that since September drone-only (yellow) alerts in some oblasts no longer shut everything down, so many people stay at work during drone alerts. Publishing approximate tracks is a trade-off between public safety and giving Russia feedback on its routes, which explains the deliberate delays and coarseness in the official version.
«Щойно зайняли позицію — тієї ж ночі збили вісім цілей: перший бій екіпажу ЗРК IRIS-T» (ArmyInform: 'Had just taken up position, and that same night shot down eight targets: an IRIS-T SAM crew's first battle')
2026-10-20SINGLE SOURCE
Citing Ukraine's Air Command 'West', ArmyInform profiles Denys, commander of a launch battery operating an IRIS-T surface-to-air missile system (the photo shows an IRIS-T SLM). His unit had just received the system and taken up position when Russia launched a massed missile-and-drone strike. That same night, the crew shot down three cruise missiles and five attack drones and, by Denys's account, destroyed all targets in its area of responsibility. The battalion then adopted the motto 'Straight into battle', which now appears on its patch. The unit has since destroyed more than 50 aerial targets, mostly cruise missiles and jet-powered drones. The article does not say when this first engagement took place.
The article also describes Denys's background. Before switching to IRIS-T, he commanded a 'Raven' air-defence platoon for more than two years, and that platoon destroyed more than 50 targets, mainly reconnaissance UAVs and Shaheds. He first retrained as an air-defence specialist on the Buk system and then trained abroad on IRIS-T. ArmyInform's figure that the battery's kills are mostly cruise missiles and jet drones fits the wider pattern of Western medium-range SAMs being kept for higher-value targets, while cheaper means handle the bulk of the slower Shahed traffic. No location, battery designation or missile expenditure is given.
This is a single source: ArmyInform, the news outlet of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence; the claims have not been independently verified.
The milblogger channel Rybar calls Ukraine's railways the sector Russia is destroying most methodically, beyond data centres, warehouses and ports. According to the post, most strikes hit Kirovohrad, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts: port infrastructure in Odesa, and metallurgy-linked facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad, where plants were halted both by direct hits and by strikes on the traction rolling stock needed to ship their output. Rybar describes a shift in targeting: after a large part of the rolling stock was put out of action, Russian forces began hitting locomotive depots and railway stations more often — at least some twenty such attacks since early September. An electric-locomotive repair plant in Zaporizhzhia was damaged; according to Rybar it is one of only two such plants in Ukraine.
Further claims: systematic strikes on traction substations have resumed after a pause, with about fifteen hits this autumn in open sources, increasingly by jet-powered Geran drones. In the port of Pivdennyi (Odesa Oblast) at least seven locomotives used to haul grain to loading terminals were targeted, plus four in Odesa itself. Missiles are being used more often against stations — railway infrastructure in Kyiv was hit at least twice — and the VKS struck the station at Mezhova (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) with guided glide bombs. Whereas earlier attacks concentrated on the border regions, attention is now shifting west, to Volyn, Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and Ternopil oblasts, where depots and traction substations are hit because they are easier to disable than moving targets.
Rybar argues the campaign must continue despite Ukrainian complaints of a looming locomotive shortage, claiming Kyiv may be exaggerating and still has 'donor' locomotives for spare parts, and frames the goal as economic: without railways Ukraine cannot export oil, grain or iron ore in volume, hitting budget revenue. The post offers a useful Russian-side picture of target selection (stock, then repair capacity and power supply), but the figures are Rybar's own open-source counts. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
«Польша больше не может передавать Украине ракеты для Patriot» (WarGonzo: 'Poland can no longer hand Patriot missiles to Ukraine' — relaying Sikorski interview with PAP)
2026-10-20SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel WarGonzo reports that Poland no longer has spare Patriot interceptor missiles to hand over to Ukraine. It cites an interview by Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski with the Polish news agency PAP. According to the post, Sikorski said the interceptor situation became noticeably harder after the strikes on Iran: stocks are shrinking and production cannot quickly make up the shortfall. WarGonzo quotes him as saying that the shortage of interceptors grew after the attacks on Iran, that Russia produces more missiles than there are means to neutralise them, and that this is 'a real problem'.
Sikorski stressed, according to the post, that some NATO allies still have such resources and could give Ukraine more Patriot munitions, but that Poland is no longer one of them. WarGonzo relays the interview without its own commentary. The interview date and the original PAP text were not checked.
This is a different story from e-20261021-s09, in which Rybar relays a Washington Post report that the Pentagon is delaying the approval of allied Patriot retransfers to Ukraine. Here the bottleneck is physical stocks rather than US approval. Together they point to Patriot interceptors becoming scarcer for Ukraine on two fronts, and the interview fits Zelensky's earlier complaint that the US supplies only about 12 Patriot interceptors a month. The underlying statement is Sikorski's as reported via WarGonzo. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
«Patriot в режиме ожидания» (Rybar: 'Patriot on standby' — Pentagon reportedly holding up allied Patriot transfers to Ukraine)
2026-10-20SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Rybar relays a Washington Post report that the Pentagon is delaying deliveries of Patriot interceptors that allied countries pass on to Ukraine. According to the post, because these are US weapons, retransfer requires approval from US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth; he has not banned the deliveries but has not completed the approval procedure either, while continuing to approve other aid. The Pentagon says there are 'no changes' in intelligence sharing or in the programme of US arms deliveries via NATO countries. Rybar adds that Trump increasingly blames Zelensky for high energy prices and his falling chances in the midterm elections.
Rybar's own reading: a typical piece of US bureaucracy — no formal refusal, but no missiles — comparable, it claims, to earlier unacknowledged cuts in intelligence flow and Starlink restrictions; without intelligence and interceptors, Ukrainian air defence lets through ever more strikes. The channel links the pressure to the US midterms, to expensive fuel hitting Trump's voters, and to Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and Kyiv's public criticism of a 'diesel deal'. It cautions against overrating the move, calling it a demonstrative action like last year's pause in intelligence sharing that will likely end once Kyiv tones down, and says Washington's softness towards Russia will last only as long as the global diesel shortage.
The post fits a wider pattern in recent entries: Zelensky's claim that the US supplies only 12 Patriot interceptors a month and is withholding paid-for missiles, and reports of missing US launch warnings before ballistic strikes on Kyiv. The underlying facts come from the Washington Post via Rybar; the political interpretation is Rybar's own. This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not a Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims have not been independently verified.
«Poland Receives New Batch of HOMAR-K Ammunition with 290-km CTM-290 Ballistic Missiles» (Defense Express)
2026-10-20SINGLE SOURCE
According to Defense Express, the Polish Armament Agency has confirmed delivery of another batch of ammunition for Poland's HOMAR-K multiple rocket launchers. The batch includes CTM-290 ballistic missiles and CGR-080 guided rockets. HOMAR-K is Poland's version of the South Korean K239 Chunmoo. It is mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks and uses the Topaz fire-control system. The CTM-290 is a 600 mm ballistic missile with a stated range of 80–290 km, satellite-aided inertial guidance and a reported CEP of up to 9 m. The CGR-080 is a 239 mm guided rocket with a range of up to 80 km and a warhead of about 90 kg, broadly comparable in role to the US GMLRS. Each launcher carries two pods, and each pod holds either one CTM-290 or six CGR-080s.
Defense Express notes that the CTM-290 was fired from a HOMAR-K in April 2024, but from a launcher in South Korea. The new deliveries indicate that Poland now holds the missiles in its own inventory. The outlet presents the CTM-290 as an alternative to US-supplied ATACMS, whose deliveries it says have reportedly been suspended while the US replenishes its stocks. It also stresses that HOMAR-K gives Poland a precision-strike capability that does not depend on American ammunition. Poland signed a framework agreement in 2022, received its first launchers in 2023 and has since contracted domestic production of 10,000 rockets and missiles. A factory is under construction, and the first Polish-made CTM-290s are expected in 2028.
For this tracker, the relevance lies on NATO's eastern flank: a 290 km reach from Polish territory covers the Kaliningrad exclave and western Belarus, which adds to the deep-strike options opposite Russian and Belarusian forces. Defense Express does not say how many missiles were delivered.
Single source: this is a report by the Ukrainian defence outlet Defense Express, based on a Polish Armament Agency statement, that has not been independently verified.
«Кто ещё стоит на страже неба» (Rybar: 'Who else guards the sky' – the Tsitadel 30 mm gun complex against drones)
2026-10-19SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The Russian milblogger channel Rybar highlights the Tsitadel (ZAK-30) anti-aircraft artillery complex as a less publicised part of Russia's defence against Ukrainian drones. While the role of Pantsir systems and mobile fire groups is widely known, Rybar writes, Tsitadel usually stays 'behind the scenes'. The post is based on a report by the Russian state broadcaster Vesti, which it says showed the system's work 'from the inside' for the first time.
According to the post, several remotely operated gun mounts are tied to a single control point and detect targets automatically using AI technology. This and other technical features reportedly let Tsitadel bring down targets with a few individual shots instead of bursts. The crew in the Vesti report claims to have destroyed not only drones but also a Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. Rybar acknowledges the system's limits: the 30 mm guns have a short range, so blanket coverage would require placing them 'at literally every step'. It therefore presents Tsitadel as an irreplaceable last line of defence for strategic sites and expects more of them to reach the troops. The channel ends by calling Russian air defence 'advanced' despite 'objective problems', citing the large daily number of missiles and drones and the impossibility of achieving high defensive density even across European Russia.
This is a single source: the personal/editorial Telegram voice of a pro-war Russian milblogger, not an official Russian MoD position. Milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD, and the claims (including the Flamingo intercept) have not been independently verified.
«Змінилися обставини, в основному — погодні умови»: відсоток збиття ворожих реактивних дронів і далі зростає (ArmyInform: 'Circumstances have changed, mainly the weather': the share of enemy jet drones shot down keeps rising)
2026-10-19SINGLE SOURCE
Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said on the national telethon that the weather shaped Russia's tactics in the overnight missile and drone attack on 19 October, ArmyInform reports. Kyiv was hit in two waves of missile strikes with Iskander-M and S-400 missiles. On warnings from partners, Ihnat said the earlier pattern roughly repeated: information did not arrive the first time but did the second time, adding that Ukraine also has its own sources reporting launches and a radar picture that is tracked "within what is possible".
Across the country Russia used more than two hundred drones. Ihnat stressed that this week Russia had actively been launching drones with internal combustion engines, a shift he attributed mainly to rainy and foggy weather: "Circumstances have changed, mainly the weather conditions." According to Ihnat, 269 attack drones were observed overnight, including up to ten "Banderol" weapons; 247 were shot down or suppressed. Of the drones, 59 were jet-powered, and 43 of those were shot down or suppressed (roughly 73% by the tracker's own calculation; the source gives no percentage). Ihnat called this "a fairly large percentage compared with previous months" and said the figures are moving upward.
This is a single source: Ukraine's MoD news outlet ArmyInform, quoting the Ukrainian Air Force, and its claims have not been independently verified.
«Куда били наши этой ночью. Минобороны России» (Dva Mayora: 'Where ours struck tonight — Russian MoD')
2026-10-19SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
The milblogger channel Dva Mayora relayed the Russian MoD's list of targets claimed in the strike of the night of 18–19 October. In Kyiv, the MoD lists: the "Data Group" data centre; a logistics hub of Fire Point that it says produces and stores components for long-range fixed-wing strike drones and engines for the ground-launched FP-5 "Flamingo" cruise missile; the Khimvolokno industrial plant, said to make components for warheads of long- and medium-range drones; and the Kyiv locomotive depot, allegedly used to store FP-5 Flamingo missiles and components for FP-9 ballistic missiles.
In Kyiv region, the MoD claims a hit on the "Planeta Plastik" plant in Irpin, described as producing polymer materials for the defence industry. It further claims that a dry-cargo ship carrying military and dual-use cargo was struck at sea about 130 km south-west of the port of Odesa. The list shows the MoD explicitly framing the strike as targeting Ukraine's domestic long-range strike industry (Fire Point's FP-series drones and missiles), alongside civilian-economy infrastructure such as a data centre; the post gives no information on weapons used or damage.
This is a single source: a pro-war Russian milblogger relaying Russian MoD claims, without independent assessment. Milbloggers and the MoD are parties to the conflict; the target descriptions and claimed hits have not been independently verified.
Ukraine still waiting almost a month for Hegseth's sign-off on allied-funded Patriot and NASAMS interceptors, now the last remaining US hold, as Kyiv also presses Lockheed Martin for PAC-3 MSE and F-16 repairs
2026-10-18
On 26 October President Zelensky said Ukraine has been waiting 'almost a month' for US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth to sign off on missiles for its Patriot and NASAMS systems, and that he had instructed his team to raise the matter with Washington once again, Ukrainska Pravda and Euromaidan Press report. He spoke after a coordination meeting with the defence minister, the foreign minister and the commander-in-chief on interceptor supplies, above all for Patriot; Kyiv is working with the US, European countries and other partners holding PAC-2 and PAC-3 stocks, and talks with other countries continue. The meeting also prepared November's Ramstein-format meeting, where Zelensky wants decisions already on the table implemented faster. According to Euromaidan Press, the other two US holds Zelensky raised after his Oslo talks have been lifted: full Starlink speeds returned on 24 October and US missile warnings resumed after his 20 October call with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, leaving the interceptors as the last one. Progress on Patriot missiles is 'very slow', Zelensky said in an interview aired on 25 October, 'slower than the flight of Russian missiles'. Euromaidan Press, citing Radio Svoboda's diplomatic sources, adds that he told EU leaders Ukraine needs 300 interceptors to get through the winter. Russian state agency TASS, citing an interview with RBC-Ukraine, quotes Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat as saying Kyiv 'sometimes literally' has to ask partners for just a few missiles to protect a particular facility, for Patriot and other systems alike; TASS frames this as Kyiv having to beg, a characterisation that comes from a Russian state outlet.
The dispute dates from mid-October. In a Bloomberg interview on 18 October Zelensky said the US now supplies only 12 Patriot interceptors a month, roughly a quarter of the Biden-era rate, and that part of the weapons paid for via the NATO-coordinated PURL mechanism had not been authorised; CNN had reported on 15 October that Ukraine's Patriot stocks had run out. In a video call with US senators reported by Axios, he said Hegseth was withholding Patriot interceptors and AIM-9X missiles for NASAMS already paid for by NATO countries and spoke of 'some political decision' to slow support. Some of the transfers come from friendly countries and need Hegseth's approval because the US must sign off on any re-transfer of its missiles, a US official and three people familiar with the matter said on 19 October; Hegseth has neither approved nor refused them. A US official called the claim of a stalled 'significant' batch untrue, Hegseth has said the US wants its own forces to have the most possible interceptors, and Rubio insisted nothing was 'being deliberately denied to Ukraine'. Zelensky also offered US envoys a 30-day pause in strikes on Russian refineries in exchange for Patriots, which the envoys did not take up; President Trump has called those strikes a disgrace that pushes oil prices higher, ahead of the US midterm elections on 3 November. Patriot is, alongside the scarcer SAMP/T, one of only two Western systems in Ukraine that can intercept Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles, which Russia is using against the power grid.
Kyiv is meanwhile pressing Lockheed Martin directly. On 19 October Zelensky asked a company team to let Ukraine buy part of the growing PAC-3 MSE output and to service and repair F-16s inside Ukraine; no purchase has been announced. Defence Minister Evgeniy Khmara and Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi then met a delegation led by Lockheed Martin Aeronautics president Orlando Sanchez Jr. to press for steady deliveries, more PAC-3 interceptors and F-16 maintenance at more sites, partly through local production, to cut downtime and avoid concentrating jets at a few bases; according to Defence Blog the F-16 flies about 80 percent of Ukrainian Air Force sorties. Unnamed Lockheed Martin sources told Defence Blog the company is floating a Ukraine-specific F-16 with longer range, an AESA radar and deeper integration of European weapons; no formal negotiations are underway and any such programme would need Washington's approval. The figures and the claim of deliberate delay come from Ukrainian officials, a party to the war, are disputed by US officials and have not been independently verified.
US restores ballistic-missile launch warnings to Ukraine after a week of gaps that included Russia's 16-missile strike on Kyiv on 18–19 October, Zelensky says; Rubio calls 'no-warning' claims outrageous and blames a technical issue
2026-10-18
On 20 October President Zelensky said at a press conference broadcast by Suspilne that the United States had restored intelligence sharing with Ukraine, including advance warnings of Russian ballistic missile launches, after a call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Euromaidan Press reports. In a Telegram post Zelensky called the call 'constructive' and listed three issues: ballistic missile interceptors 'needed to protect lives', early warning of Russian ballistic attacks, 'which is vital', and the Starlink/Starshield situation, 'which needs to be restored'; he said the two would speak again within 48 hours. Speaking to journalists in India the same day, Rubio called the claim that Ukrainians were dying because the US was denying them information 'scandalous' and 'outrageous', and 'simply not true'. Referring to the attacks of 13 and 18 October, he said the problem may have been 'an internal issue' in Ukraine's ability to take the information provided, systematise it and react, that it was 'a technical matter' and not 'the result of any sort of US directive', that Washington was looking into it, and that the US is 'providing the same warnings to them now that we always have'. President Trump also denied that the US had stopped sharing intelligence. Euromaidan Press notes reports, including in the Financial Times, that the administration had threatened to suspend intelligence sharing and weapons supplies unless Kyiv stopped striking Russian oil refineries as part of efforts towards an energy truce, and that Ukraine temporarily paused those strikes.
The dispute followed a week in which, according to Ukrainian officials, Kyiv received no advance warning before Russian ballistic strikes on 12, 13 and 18–19 October. On the night of 18–19 October Russia fired what Zelensky said were 16 ballistic missiles at Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast in two waves (around 23:00 and 03:00), plus Iskander-K cruise missiles and 269 drones; the Air Force reported four Iskander-K and 243 drones downed and listed no intercepted ballistic missiles. Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said no partner warning came before the first wave, only hours after Zelensky had told NBC that US alerts were working again, while information arrived shortly before the second. In Kyiv a 21-year-old woman was killed and eight people were injured; an above-ground metro station, a 25-storey residential building, a medical centre, a school, the city's only ice rink and Datagroup's data centre (destroyed beyond repair) were hit. In Irpin one person was killed, 10 to 19 were injured and three were missing. Zelensky said energy facilities in 11 oblasts were hit and at least 550,000 families lost power; in Kryvyi Rih two men were killed by what officials called a drone-launched Banderol missile. TASS, Russian state media, citing the Russian Defence Ministry, said the Planeta Plastik plant in Kyiv Oblast, which it described as making polymer materials for military use, was badly damaged.
The restoration, if it holds, closes a gap that cut warning times for ballistic salvos to minutes or less while Ukraine reports few or no ballistic interceptions and a shortage of Patriot interceptors (see the related entry on Patriot deliveries). The two governments still give different explanations: Kyiv framed the gaps as political, Washington as a technical problem on the Ukrainian side, and neither account can be independently verified. Casualty, launch and interception figures come from Ukrainian officials; the Planeta Plastik claim comes from TASS and the Russian Defence Ministry.
Zelensky: Russia wants to deploy ballistic missiles in Belarus to strike western Ukraine, already placing drone relays there
2026-10-17
Speaking to journalists on 17 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia is preparing to step up strikes on western Ukraine and wants to use Belarusian territory to do so. According to Zelensky, Russia is already placing relays (repeaters) for drones on Belarusian territory so it can use that corridor to intensify drone attacks. He said this is not enough for Moscow: it needs the support of Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko to deploy other weapon types in Belarus, including ballistic missiles, which would threaten western Ukraine first and foremost.
Zelensky said deploying Russian ballistic missile systems would "directly drag Belarus into the war" and would be very dangerous for Belarus itself. He added that Ukraine will reinforce air defence according to the intensity of attacks on each region, and will increase production of turret-mounted air-defence systems, which the military will deploy where the threat is greatest.
Militarnyi notes as context that in February 2023 Belarus had likely received Iskander operational-tactical missile systems from Russia, one launcher showing fourteen red stars that may indicate combat launches, and that in February 2026 launchers for the Oreshnik system were reportedly being deployed at the former Krichev-6 air base. The claims about relays and Russian intentions come from the Ukrainian president, a party to the conflict, and have not been independently verified; no evidence was presented.
Russia strikes Zaporizhstal steelworks for the fifth time with six ballistic missiles
2026-10-17
Russia struck the Zaporizhstal steelworks in Zaporizhzhia with ballistic missiles at dawn on 17 October, Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing the plant's owner Metinvest. According to the company, six ballistic missiles hit the plant's internal energy and logistics infrastructure and caused further damage to blast-furnace production facilities. Metinvest said there were no casualties this time because employees reached shelters in time.
It was the fifth large-scale ballistic missile attack on the plant, after strikes on 11 and 27 August and 12 and 17 September. Metinvest says 23 ballistic missiles in total have been fired at Zaporizhstal over this period, killing eight employees and injuring 31. After the 11 August strike the entire production site was shut down; some technological processes were restarted to keep equipment safe and avoid industrial hazards, and these are kept at the minimum level needed. Normal production has not resumed.
The plant has expanded its shelter network and installed reinforced mobile shelters where staff repair damaged equipment, shortening the time needed to reach cover during ballistic attacks. The figures come from Metinvest, a Ukrainian company, and Ukrainian media; they have not been independently verified.
«ПВО ВСУ в ночь на субботу не смогла перехватить ни одной ракеты ОТРК «Искандер»» (Topwar: 'Ukrainian air defence failed to intercept a single Iskander missile on Saturday night')
2026-10-17SINGLE SOURCE
Topwar (author Yevgenia Chernova) describes the Russian combined strike on Ukraine in the night to 17 October. The figures come from the Ukrainian Air Force. Russia reportedly used Iskander-M ballistic missiles, plus KN-23 missiles according to the Ukrainian side, as well as Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles, four sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles and 332 strike drones, including Shahed types, jet-powered drones and Bandera-type UAVs.
According to the Ukrainian summary as of 08:00, 293 air targets were shot down or suppressed: all four Kalibrs and 289 drones. No interceptions of the ballistic missiles or the Kh-22/32 missiles were reported. Topwar draws the conclusion of the headline from this. The Ukrainian Air Force reported hits at 22 locations, several of them in Vinnytsia Oblast.
Single source: this is a report by the Russian military news portal Topwar, based on Ukrainian Air Force figures and framed by the portal, that has not been independently verified.
Russia strikes Ukraine overnight 16–17 October with Iskander-M/KN-23, Kh-22/32, Kalibr and 332 drones; no ballistic or Kh-22/32 missiles reported intercepted
2026-10-17
On the night of 16–17 October Russia carried out a combined missile and drone attack on Ukraine, according to Ukraine's Air Force as reported by Ukrainska Pravda. It used Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, four sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles and 332 Shahed (31 jet-powered) and Gerbera attack drones, plus S-8000 Banderol drone-launched missiles and Parodiya decoy UAVs. The report does not give the number of Iskander-M/KN-23 and Kh-22/32 missiles launched.
As of 08:00, the Air Force said 293 aerial assets had been destroyed or jammed: all four Kalibrs and 289 drones and drone-launched missiles (23 of them jet-powered). That is roughly 87% of the drones, but only 23 of the 31 jet-powered Shaheds. The tally and the accompanying infographic list no interceptions of the Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles or of the Kh-22/32 missiles. Aircraft, surface-to-air missile units, electronic warfare, unmanned systems units and mobile fire groups were involved in repelling the attack.
Hits were recorded at 22 locations, with debris from downed assets falling at three more. The report does not say which targets or regions were hit or what damage was caused. The attack was still ongoing at the time of reporting. All figures are Ukrainian official claims and have not been independently verified.
Militarnyi, citing the Ukrainian Air Force, notes that this was the first Russian use of Kh-22/32 supersonic cruise missiles against Ukraine since July. They were launched from aircraft over occupied Crimea. The last time the Air Force reported Kh-22/32 use was on 16 July, from the Black Sea; on 19 July Kh-22 launches towards Odesa region were also reported, but the next morning's summary did not mention them. As background, Militarnyi describes the Kh-32 as a major upgrade of the 1960s-era Kh-22 that entered service in 2018: it is carried by Tu-22M3 bombers, has a range of up to 1,000 km, flies at Mach 3.5 to 4.6 and dives steeply onto its target, which makes it hard to intercept. The article does not give the number of missiles fired or their targets.
Gerasimov reports to Putin on a strategic strike campaign against Ukraine, including the energy grid; Putin orders 'massive' strikes to continue
2026-10-16
On 16 October 2026 President Vladimir Putin visited an auxiliary command post of the Joint Force, Russia's joint grouping of forces for the war in Ukraine, where Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reported to him. According to the Russian state news agency TASS, Gerasimov said that, 'in accordance with the General Staff's plan', Russian forces are striking bridges of strategic importance, railway facilities and data centres that support the Ukrainian armed forces. He claimed these strikes have destroyed 76 logistics centres and warehouses, 203 port infrastructure facilities and 93 vessels delivering military cargo to Ukraine. He added that 'systematic strikes' on port and logistics infrastructure and vessels, presented as a response to Kyiv's attempts to halt Russian shipping in the Black Sea, have brought operations at Ukraine's main Black Sea ports to a halt. Ukrainska Pravda, citing TASS, reports that Gerasimov also said Russian forces have 'begun massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities'.
Putin said he viewed Gerasimov's results 'positively' and praised the effectiveness of the strikes on Ukraine's military-industrial facilities and logistics centres. He ordered battlegroup commanders to keep carrying out their tasks 'in strict compliance' with the objectives of the 'special military operation', and called it necessary 'to continue massive and group strikes' against enemy defence enterprises and logistics centres. He also said Russian air defence crews are operating 'professionally overall' but that 'there is room for improvement': Russia must make its defence of civilian objects ('first and foremost civilian') and military objects more effective. That is an implicit acknowledgement of the effect of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia. Putin named no figures or deadlines.
All figures and claims of effect come from the Russian General Staff and the Kremlin, as reported by TASS, and have not been independently verified. Ukrainska Pravda notes that Russia's MoD said as early as 30 August that it was preparing large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. On 16 October Russian strikes caused power outages in Kyiv and eight regions, large-scale disruptions around Rivne and serious damage to the grid in Lutsk. According to the transmission operator Ukrenergo, strikes on thermal power plants needed for winter have worsened its winter outlook, though it does not consider the situation critical.
«Когда британцу делать нечего, он крылатые ракеты выдает» (Rybar: 'When a Briton has nothing to do, he hands out cruise missiles')
2026-10-16SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
This is the personal/editorial voice of the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Rybar, not a position of the Russian MoD; milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the content has not been independently verified. Rybar writes that President Zelensky's visit to London, where he met King Charles III and the prime minister (named by Rybar as Burnham), produced little. Its one concrete result is that the UK will send Ukraine additional Storm Shadow cruise missiles for strikes deep inside Russia, approved by the prime minister after the meeting.
According to Rybar, Ukrainian media presented this as a major win, but Ukraine's air-defence problem remains unsolved and the UK cannot help with it. The channel argues that missile deliveries are small compared with drone deliveries, that the missiles are expensive and hard to produce, and that their range of about 290–350 km limits them. It also claims that the promised transfer of Storm Shadow production technology has not led to any factory near Kyiv nearly two months later. Rybar's conclusion is that the missiles will not bring a turning point.
Single source: this is a post by the Russian milblogger channel Rybar that has not been independently verified.
Russian drone and Banderol waves of 15–16 October push west to Rivne and Volyn on NATO border; jet-powered Gerans dominate night strike
2026-10-16
According to Ukraine's Air Force, Russia launched 149 strike drones on the night of 15–16 October, 108 of them jet-powered Shahed types, alongside Gerbera drones and Parodiya decoys, from Oryol, occupied Donetsk Oblast and Hvardiiske in occupied Crimea. Air defence shot down or jammed 114 (77 of the jet-powered ones). Twenty-seven aerial assets struck 24 locations, and debris fell at 14 more. During daytime on 16 October (07:00–19:00) Russia kept up the pressure with 315 more drones, 78 of them jet-powered, and 15 S-8000 Banderol/Dan-T missiles, which UP describes as drone-launched cruise missiles. The Air Force reported 253 drones (49 jet-powered) and 9 Banderols downed or jammed, so roughly 80% of the drones but only 9 of 15 Banderols. The interception rate for jet-powered drones (about 63–71%) was markedly lower than for the slower types. These figures are Ukrainian official claims.
The attacks reached far west. Euromaidan Press, citing Volyn's regional head Roman Romaniuk, reports that drones hit civilian and critical infrastructure in Volyn Oblast, which borders Poland and Belarus, leaving 370,000 subscribers without power. Lutsk lost electricity, water supply and public transport. In Manevychi a drone hit an agricultural business, killing one and injuring eight, and residents were warned of a possible ammonia release. In Rivne, Ukrenergo reported large-scale power cuts after a strike on the main grid. Regional head Oleksandr Koval said seven people sought treatment, and a residential area and a major shopping centre (Equator, per local channels) were hit. Euromaidan Press counts more than 850 Shaheds launched in about a day and a half, including the earlier wave on Kirovohrad Oblast.
In the east and north-east, jet-powered Shaheds hit three districts of Kharkiv. The oblast administration reported two killed and 19 people affected, 12 of them injured. In Sumy a drone, reportedly a Molniya, damaged a shopping centre and injured three women. In Bakhmach (Chernihiv Oblast), two Banderol strikes hit a residential area and an office building, causing extensive damage, and four people sought medical help, according to regional head Viacheslav Chaus. Ukrenergo said earlier strikes on thermal power plants have worsened its winter forecast, though it does not consider the situation critical.
«Возможная остановка Вашингтоном закупок оружия для Украины в США на европейские деньги» (Fighterbomber: 'Possible halt by Washington of US arms purchases for Ukraine with European money')
2026-10-16SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
This is the personal/editorial voice of the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Fighterbomber, not a position of the Russian MoD; milbloggers can contradict each other and the MoD, and the content has not been independently verified. The channel cites reports by The Economist (a possible US halt of European-funded PURL purchases would leave Kyiv unable to protect its infrastructure), CNN (Ukraine has run out of Patriot interceptors) and Bloomberg (the UK is sending extra Storm Shadow missiles). It calls the conclusion drawn from these reports strange. In its view Patriot never protected Ukraine's rear infrastructure anyway, and a shortage would mainly push back the range at which Ukrainian tactical aircraft can use cheap glide-bomb kits.
The author claims, without sources and in mocking language about the 'fashionable' missiles of Ukrainian Mirages and F-16s, that the Ukrainian air force has achieved zero air-to-air victories in five years. He says Su-24s carrying Storm Shadow are hidden and prepared in Soviet-era hardened aircraft shelters and can only be caught right after landing. He openly criticises the Russian side: reconnaissance of rear airfields has not improved and the reaction time is still too long.
According to the channel, the small Ukrainian air force combined with fixed-wing drones forces Russian fighters to fly around the clock. It claims thousands of flight hours per aircraft per year, leading to failures, repairs and a chain reaction of extra load on the remaining aircraft. Its conclusion, in crude wording, is that Russia has plenty of aircraft but still too few available. Single source: this is a post by the Russian milblogger channel Fighterbomber that has not been independently verified.
CNN, citing an unnamed source, reports Ukraine has run out of Patriot interceptors, leaving almost all ballistic missiles in the 13-14 October strike unintercepted
2026-10-15
CNN reported on 15 October, citing a single unnamed source familiar with the situation, that Ukraine has run out of interceptor missiles for its US-made Patriot air defence systems. According to that source, almost all of the ballistic missiles in the most recent Russian strike, overnight into 14 October, were not intercepted because of the lack of interceptors. Ukrainska Pravda and Meduza relayed the CNN report; neither Kyiv nor Washington is quoted as confirming it, and the claim has not been independently verified.
In that attack, Russian ballistic missiles hit three power plants in Kyiv and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv; four people were killed and 25 injured in Kyiv. The report suggests Russia's ballistic missile salvos against the energy grid currently face little effective resistance, as Patriot is the main Ukrainian system able to engage such missiles.
Zelensky has warned for months that Ukraine is running short of Patriot missiles, especially ahead of an expected rise in winter strikes on energy infrastructure; in August he said Ukraine had only a tenth of the interceptor stock it needed. The report comes amid confusion over an 'energy ceasefire' that President Trump announced on 11 October and Zelensky said he knew nothing of. According to Meduza, Zelensky said on 15 October that Ukraine would resume strikes on Russian oil refineries after Russia kept attacking during a three-day pause Kyiv observed at US request, and suggested he could soften that stance in exchange for more Patriot missiles.
Satellite Images Reveal russian Tu-160Ms Being Armed with Kh-101 Missiles at Engels and Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3 Bomber Deployments at Olenya (Defense Express)
2026-10-15SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express reports on new satellite imagery published by the monitoring site AviVector showing Tu-160M strategic bombers being loaded with Kh-101 cruise missiles at Engels airbase. According to the outlet, the images suggest Russia brings its bombers to Engels one at a time and arms them with cruise missiles in the same sequence, so that the intervals between large-scale strategic-aviation strikes on Ukraine are set by the time needed to fly the aircraft between Engels and Olenya and complete the required technical procedures. The pace of deployments at Engels may also depend on shelter construction there: work started a year ago, but so far only three hangar frames are visible.
At Olenya airbase, according to the article, seven Tu-95MS strategic bombers and as many as 33 Tu-22M3 bombers were present as of 9 October 2026. Six Tu-95MS had returned to Ukrainka airbase in the Russian Far East, while one Tu-22M3 had been moved to Engels. Defense Express concludes that Russia keeps a number of Tu-95MS in European Russia but holds the most combat-ready part of the fleet at Far Eastern bases to avoid repeat strikes by Ukraine's Defence Forces.
The outlet further concludes that Russia is beginning preparations for a new large-scale strike on Ukraine using strategic aviation; this is the outlet's own assessment based on the imagery. Single source: this is an article by the Ukrainian defence outlet Defense Express that has not been independently verified.