Single source — Display is not verification. The value lies in what the party itself publishes or claims: doctrine, self-image, announcements.
Russian combined strike on Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, 29-30 Sep: Zircon/Oniks, Iskander and 188 drones, energy infrastructure the main target
2026-09-30
According to Ukraine's Air Force, Russia attacked Ukraine on the night of 29-30 September (from 18:00 on 29 September) with Zircon/Oniks anti-ship missiles launched from Kursk Oblast, Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles launched from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts, and 188 drones: Shahed (86 of them jet-powered), Gerbera attack drones and Parodiya decoy UAVs. The drones were launched from Oryol, Millerovo, Kursk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, occupied Donetsk Oblast and, in occupied Crimea, Hvardiiske and Chauda. As of 08:00 Ukrainian air defence reported 160 aerial assets destroyed or jammed (5 ballistic/anti-ship missiles and 155 drones), with hits recorded at 18 locations. Aircraft, SAM units, electronic warfare assets, unmanned-systems units and mobile fire groups took part in the defence. Kyiv Oblast was the main target, and the Air Force said some drones were still in the air.
President Zelenskyy said the main target was energy infrastructure in the capital and Kyiv Oblast, that nearly 190 attack drones and ballistic missiles were used, that some of the ballistic missiles were intercepted, and that 5 people had been killed (including a child) and 14 injured across Ukraine. Kyiv Oblast governor Tymur Tkachenko reported the body of a child found under the rubble of a destroyed house in Vyshhorod, with three others pulled from the rubble (a child in shock, a man with shrapnel wounds to the head, a woman with a leg injury). Houses, cars and two warehouse buildings were damaged in the Bucha district, and infrastructure facilities were damaged in the Bucha, Vyshhorod and Obukhiv districts. In Kyiv, Mayor Klitschko said a Kyivteploenergo employee, a driver of a crew working at the site, was killed when a warehouse in Solomianskyi district was hit. In the afternoon a drone that MP Volodymyr Ariev identified as a jet-powered Geran-4 crashed into a playground in Obolon district without detonating, and bomb disposal experts reportedly removed it.
Meduza describes this as part of a shift in which Russia is wearing down Kyiv's air defences with near-daily drone attacks, now also in daylight, using jet-powered drones that are faster and harder to shoot down. It notes that Kyiv had civilian casualties on 16 of the first 24 days of September, which it calls unprecedented since the full-scale invasion, and that strikes between 22 and 28 September killed 13 residents and injured over 160 (including 23 September: 2 killed, 45 injured; 25 September: 7 killed, 59 injured in the city). The campaign intensified in late August with five consecutive days of strikes. All figures come from Ukrainian officials and Ukrainian/Meduza reporting and are not independently verified. The previous night (28-29 September) is covered in a separate entry.
Tu-95MS crash in Amur Oblast killed eight strategic aviation personnel, including officers linked to missile strikes on Ukraine
2026-09-29
A Russian Tu-95MS strategic bomber (NATO: Bear-H) crashed on 29 September 2026 during a training flight near the village of Krasnoyarovo in Amur Oblast, in the Russian Far East. The Russian Ministry of Defence (via TASS) said the aircraft carried no munitions and that, according to preliminary data, six crew members were killed and one was injured and hospitalised. New reporting contradicts that toll: the names and portraits of eight dead servicemen were posted in a local social-media group for Seryshevo, near Ukrainka strategic air base (first flagged by OSINT analyst duke garland), and published by Mikhail Piven, head of Amur Oblast's Mazanovsky district. The independent Russian outlet Mediazona verified the list and says all eight served in strategic aviation. Port Amur, cited by The Insider, reported nine servicemen on board and that two bodies were not found immediately. The gap between the MoD's 'six dead, one injured' and eight named dead has not been explained officially; the fate of the reported injured crew member is unclear. The cause also remains unconfirmed: Defence Blog cited an engine failure on takeoff, the channel Baza suggested a fuel explosion on board.
Based on the standard order of portraits, the OSINT analyst identifies six crew members, led by commander Maj. Andrei Lobanov, plus two likely passengers or inspectors: Lt. Col. Fedor Pavlyukov and Andrei Gerasimov. Three of the dead (Lobanov, Pavlyukov, Gerasimov) appear in the Ukrainian 'Book of Executioners' database, with entries made before the crash. According to that project, Pavlyukov was deputy commander for flight training of the 182nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment (Ukrainka) and earlier a Tu-95MS squadron commander; Gerasimov commanded a Tu-95MS squadron of the 121st Regiment, associated with Engels-2; Lobanov was a deputy Tu-95MS squadron commander, and according to 24 Kanal (via Militarnyi) on 29 May 2023 commanded a sortie that launched six missiles at Ukrainian infrastructure. Ranks differ between sources: Gerasimov is listed as a major by the Book of Executioners and Militarnyi, but as a lieutenant colonel by Mediazona and Meduza. The claim that these officers helped organise missile strikes rests on that Ukrainian database and has not been independently verified.
Context: Militarnyi notes that after Ukrainian strikes on strategic aviation airfields, Russia shuttles Tu-95MS bombers between Engels-2, where they are armed with Kh-101 cruise missiles, and remote Ukrainka, used for dispersal; individual combat sorties can exceed 12,000 km and approach 24 hours, accelerating wear on largely Soviet-built airframes and crews. Ukrainka was an intended target of Operation Spiderweb in June 2025, and Defence Blog recalls earlier engine-related Tu-95MS losses from the base in 2015.
Ukraine's F-16s credited with 3,150+ Russian aerial targets, incl. 666 cruise missiles and ~2,500 drones; partners add Belgian F-16s, NASAMS and interceptor missiles
2026-09-29
Ukraine's F-16 pilots have shot down more than 3,150 Russian aerial targets, including 666 cruise missiles and about 2,500 drones, according to Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Anatolii Kryvonozhko, speaking at a meeting with Lockheed Martin (reported by Defence Blog citing the Ukrainian Air Force). By those figures, drones make up roughly four in five of the stated tally, with cruise missiles most of the rest; the Air Force did not say over what period the kills were counted, and the numbers are Ukrainian claims that have not been independently verified. Kryvonozhko also cited more than 650 F-16 strikes on Russian ground targets and said pilots are stretching a limited weapons supply across several munition types. Since arriving in summer 2024, Ukraine's F-16s have mainly been used against the cruise missiles and Shahed-type drones aimed at cities and the power grid, often with guns and short-range missiles to save costlier weapons; Lockheed Martin and the Air Force also discussed a possible move to the F-16 Block 70/72.
The figures came alongside a Russian strike on the night of 28-29 September against Kyiv and several other regions. President Zelenskyy said a ballistic missile aimed at Kyiv was intercepted, and that the attack damaged the Kyiv-Pasazhyrskyi railway depot, data centres, business and residential buildings, energy facilities and substations, plus an educational institution and two foreign vessels in Odesa Oblast; nine further oblasts were hit. Euromaidan Press notes Russia is intensifying its aerial campaign, particularly with Shahed/Geran drones including faster jet-powered variants.
Partners responded on several fronts. Zelenskyy thanked the US and Norway for the NASAMS system and a missile package for it, and France and Germany for air defence packages 'specifically the missiles' delivered in recent days. He also announced that Belgium will deliver three F-16s by the end of 2026 through an accelerated procedure. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, speaking in Berlin on 29 September, called air defence Ukraine's 'weakest point' and said he is seeking replenishment through personal talks with heads of state and government, ahead of the 15-16 October European Council; European Pravda reported, citing sources, that EU states could transfer existing Patriot interceptors to Ukraine and backfill them with US orders financed from the €90 billion loan. TASS carried Merz's remarks with the standard Russian line that arms deliveries only prolong the conflict.
Ukraine Strikes russian Missile Fuel Plants, Drone Launch Sites, and Air Defense Radars in One Week
2026-09-29SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express summarises a General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine overview of strikes carried out on 21–27 September 2026. On the defence-industrial side, the list includes the Zavod Iskra research and production enterprise in Ulyanovsk (part of the Almaz-Antey concern, making electronic equipment and weapon components) and the Azov Optical and Mechanical Plant in Azov, Rostov region (Tactical Missiles Corporation, missile and artillery components). Two plants producing solid rocket propellant, including fuel for Iskander missiles, were also hit: the synthetic rubber plant in Yefremov (Tula region) and Voronezhsintezkauchuk in Voronezh.
The same week reportedly saw strikes on five refineries with a combined capacity of over 40 million tonnes per year (Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim, Kuibyshev, Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez, Novoshakhtinsk and Ilsky), on a drone storage and launch site near Tsymbulovo (Oryol region), where three buildings and five launchers were hit, and on a similar drone site near Donetsk. Air defence radars named as targets are the 35N6 Kasta, P-18, P-18 Terek and 64L6 Gamma-S1. The article does not say which units or weapons carried out the strikes, and gives no damage assessment beyond the General Staff's list.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express (Ukrainian defence outlet), based on claims by the Ukrainian General Staff; the claims have not been independently verified.
Night of 28-29 Sep: Russia strikes Ukraine with a Zircon, two ballistic missiles and 152 drones; Air Force claims 109 downed, two unexploded ballistic warheads defused in Kyiv
2026-09-28
Russia attacked Ukraine overnight on 28-29 September 2026 with one Zircon/Oniks anti-ship missile, two Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles (launched from Kursk Oblast) and 152 drones, according to Ukraine's Air Force. The drones were Shahed types (82 of them jet-powered), Gerbera attack drones and Parodiya decoys, launched from Oryol, Millerovo, Kursk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, from occupied Donetsk and from Hvardiiske and Chauda in occupied Crimea; the attack started at 18:00 on 28 September. As of 08:00 the Air Force claimed 109 of 155 aerial assets destroyed or jammed: the Zircon, both ballistic missiles and 106 drones (about 70% of the drones). Hits were recorded at 24 locations and debris from downed assets at 16. These are Ukrainian Air Force figures and have not been independently verified.
In Kyiv, the Air Force warned of ballistic missiles from Kursk shortly after midnight and reported missiles heading for the capital at 01:21; after 02:00 the threat shifted to jet-powered drones, with further explosions around 02:45 and 04:40. Mayor Vitali Klitschko and the city administration reported an office building at an infrastructure facility and an educational institution hit in the Solomianskyi district, a damaged three-storey non-residential building in Pecherskyi, and a rooftop fire on a five-storey residential building in Holosiivskyi after debris fell on it; one person was injured in the city. President Zelenskyy said the depot at Kyiv-Pasazhyrskyi railway station, data and business centres and residential buildings were damaged; strikes were also reported on energy facilities and businesses in eight other oblasts, and in Odesa Oblast on an educational institution, student housing and two foreign commercial vessels. In the Bucha district of Kyiv Oblast, a drone set fire to a house, injuring two people.
Kyiv police bomb squads later neutralised the warheads of two ballistic missiles that crashed near residential buildings in the Solomianskyi district without detonating; each warhead weighed about half a tonne, according to the National Police. Ukrainska Pravda does not explain how this relates to the Air Force's claim that both ballistic missiles were shot down, and Zelenskyy spoke of only 'a portion' of the ballistic missiles being intercepted. On the evening of 29 September a further drone strike hit a non-residential area in Kyiv's Podilskyi district and caused a fire (Klitschko). This night follows the 28 September attacks on Kyiv that killed two people and injured 26.
russia Restricts Airspace Over Kapustin Yar Test Range, Potentially Ahead of Ballistic Missile Tests
2026-09-28SINGLE SOURCE
According to Defense Express, Russia has issued a NOTAM restricting airspace over the Kapustin Yar test range in Astrakhan region from 28 September to 3 October 2026, daily between 09:00 and 19:00 local time. Kapustin Yar is a major Russian range for developing and testing missile systems, and such closures are imposed to ensure safety during launches or other activities with potentially hazardous flight paths.
Defense Express notes that similar restrictions preceded earlier launches of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, which were followed by its use against Ukraine. It stresses, however, that the available information does not confirm what type of missile, if any, will be launched in this window. The article also links to separate reporting on activity at the site involving 51P6A launchers and RM-48U missiles from the S-400 system.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express (Ukrainian defence outlet); the claims have not been independently verified.
Russian jet-powered drone hits Kyiv's Academy of Sciences; Kremlin says Ukraine must "pay a price" as strikes also hit Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv Oblast
2026-09-28
On 28 September 2026 Russia struck central Kyiv in daylight. A jet-powered drone hit the main building of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in the Shevchenkivskyi district and set it on fire. Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported one woman killed and four injured, three of them hospitalised; Euromaidan Press says people fled through windows. She was Nataliia Bukalo, assistant to Volodymyr Horbulin, a former secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council and now a vice-president of the Academy. Horbulin was slightly hurt by broken glass; an unnamed source told BBC News Ukraine the strike hit the room one floor above his office. Another drone hit a non-residential site in Kyiv's Darnytskyi district.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Ukraine "will have to pay a price" for actions of recent months and called Russia's intensified strikes "part of this price". Euromaidan Press reports that he framed this as a response to Ukrainian deep strikes, including drone attacks on Moscow during the parliamentary elections and on St. Petersburg during an economic forum. Russian pro-Kremlin outlets (TopWar, the milblogger channel Dva Majory) justify the target by claiming that the Academy helped develop missiles. This is only their claim; the sources reviewed do not confirm it, and the Academy is a civilian scientific institution.
The same day, a strike at about 04:00 hit a nine-storey apartment block in Kharkiv's Saltivskyi district: 43 injured, including 11 children, 18 buildings damaged and over 1,500 windows broken. Officials were still checking whether it was a KAB glide bomb, a UMPB-5 or a Banderol cruise missile. At about 11:15 a jet-powered drone hit a business centre in Dnipro: three killed, 12 injured per the State Emergency Service (Euromaidan Press gives 15 injured), with about 47-49 people rescued. In Kyiv Oblast a strike on warehouses in the Brovary district caused a fire and a slight excess of ammonia at the site; officials said there was no excess in Brovary and no threat to health. Ukraine's Air Force figures cited by Euromaidan Press: 165 drones launched overnight, 112 downed or suppressed. Zelensky promised a response. Casualty figures come from Ukrainian officials and media and may change.
Hwasong-11Ma-1 Details Reveal 9.8-Ton "Classical" Hypersonic Missile, Key Question Is Whether Pyongyang Transfers It to russia
2026-09-28SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express reports new details on North Korea's Hwasong-11Ma-1, which Pyongyang first presented in October 2025 and then waited almost a year to launch. It was first tested on 20 September 2026 over 908 km, with the warhead-glider covering most of the distance. Citing Janes estimates, the article gives a body length of 9.6 m, a diameter of 1.1 m and a launch mass of 9.8 tons; it is carried on a six-axle mobile launcher holding one missile.
The outlet calls it a "classical" hypersonic missile because of its warhead-glider configuration, as opposed to a conventional ballistic missile. It notes that North Korea already fields the Hwasong-16B, a medium-range missile with a hypersonic glider known since 2024.
The central question posed is whether Pyongyang will transfer this missile to Russia; the author describes it as essentially a hypersonic Iskander variant. The article does not report a confirmed transfer.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Defense Express (Ukrainian defence media); the claims have not been independently verified.
Удар российской баллистической ракеты остановил производство украинских дронов
2026-09-27SINGLE SOURCE
TopWar (Voennoe Obozrenie) reports that the Ukrainian defence manufacturer Pegasus Arms (LLC "PEGAS ARMS"), which develops and builds medium- and long-range unmanned aircraft systems for the Ukrainian armed forces, has halted production after a Russian ballistic missile strike. TopWar quotes the company as saying that on the night of 23–24 September 2026 a missile strike caused significant damage to its UAV production workshop. Production has been suspended indefinitely and no recovery timeline has been given. Pegasus Arms' own statement was published on 26 September, according to open-source monitoring of the war.
According to the company, this is not the first hit on its operations: Russian strikes on 2 September had already damaged the workshop it was using before, forcing it to stop production and move to a new site. That new site was then hit on 23–24 September. TopWar dates the earlier strike to September 2025, but other reporting on the company's statement places it on 2 September 2026. TopWar links the strike to the Russian Ministry of Defence's report for the same night. The ministry claimed strikes on Vodafone data centres in Kyiv, logistics hubs, drone storage sites in the Mykolaiv and Odesa regions, and port infrastructure in Kiliya. The article shows how Russia deliberately targets Ukraine's dispersed drone industry with ballistic missiles, and that relocating production gives only limited protection.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from TopWar (Russian pro-Kremlin defence media); the claims have not been independently verified.
Russia reportedly fields Geran-5 'K5' variant with autonomous optical (scene-matching) navigation and redesigned fuselage
2026-09-27
Russian forces have reportedly begun using a new modification of the jet-powered Geran-5 strike UAV with an autonomous optical navigation system and a modified fuselage. The report comes from the monitoring Telegram channel Colonel GSh ("Polkovnik GSh"), which calls the variant the Geran-5 K5 and published a photo comparing the old and new airframes. According to the channel, the drone has an electro-optical correction system that navigates by matching images of the ground below. It works on the same principle as DSMAC-type (Russian: OEKS) scene-matching systems, which let a weapon correct its course without satellite navigation. The channel also says the K5 is faster than the standard Geran-5 and may therefore be misidentified in flight as other jet-powered strike weapons such as the Dan-T. Militarnyi stresses that Ukrainian sources have not officially confirmed either the K5 designation or the presence of a DSMAC-class system.
Russian sources partly corroborate the claim. Russian military correspondent Andrei Filatov (via Gazeta.ru) said that Geran-series drones already use an autonomous optical navigation system called "Susanin", which navigates by terrain imagery and lets the UAV continue on its route without radio beacons. He did not say which Geran modification carries it or describe it as DSMAC. Rossiyskaya Gazeta (27 September), citing military Telegram channels, reports that Susanin compares terrain imagery with a map loaded before flight, similar to the "Otblesk-U" optical correction option of the Kh-101 strategic cruise missile. The Russian channel Voyenny Osvedomitel said the jet Geran is "increasingly becoming a full-fledged cruise missile".
For comparison, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR) gives the baseline Geran-5 as 6.5 m long, with a 3.2 m wingspan, a maximum take-off weight of up to 850 kg, a warhead of about 90 kg, a cruising speed of 450–600 km/h, a range of about 950 km and a ceiling of 6 km. HUR's teardown of a baseline Geran-5 found a Kometa-M12 jam-resistant satellite navigation receiver, an inertial navigation system, a tracker with cellular modems, a mesh modem and a Chinese TELEFLY TF-TJ2000A turbojet. The public HUR component list includes no separate DSMAC system. Russia had already moved the turbojet from an external nacelle into the fuselage to cut drag, which may add speed and range. If confirmed, terrain-image navigation would give the drone a way to find its route that does not depend on GNSS or radio links. GNSS jamming and spoofing, which the baseline already partly counters with the Kometa-M12 receiver, would then do less against the final route correction. The K5 and Susanin claims come from Telegram channels and Russian media and have not been independently verified.
Euromaidan Press (28 September) repeats the K5 claim and adds two pieces of context. It attributes the identification to analysis of wreckage by the Ukrainian channel Polkovnyk GSh, and it places the drone in a recent operational pattern: on 25 September a jet Shahed-type drone reportedly filmed and relayed targeting data to a Geran-5 that hit the Inkom business centre in Kyiv, killing four people. Presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov called this a complex operation requiring precise coordination. The outlet also cites a roughly 55% Ukrainian interceptor kill rate against jet drones and says Ukrainian firms are developing jet-powered interceptors, although officials note that speed alone is not enough and machine-vision guidance is needed. The article confirms that Ukrainian officials have not confirmed the K5 designation or a DSMAC system, and that HUR's component list mentions none. These additions come from a single outlet and Telegram and official statements and are not independently verified.
Ракета или дрон: в польской прессе оценили «Герань-5»
2026-09-26SINGLE SOURCE
Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru) relays an assessment by the Polish outlet Defence24 of Russia's jet-powered Geran-5, asking whether it is a drone or a cruise missile. According to Defence24, the Geran-5 is not a Shahed-136/238 derivative but is based on the Iranian Karrar jet drone, powered by a commercial Chinese Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet, with a reported top speed of up to 650 km/h, a range of about 1,000 km and a ceiling of up to 6,000 m. At about 850 kg total mass it carries a roughly 90 kg warhead (versus 250 kg for Scalp Naval and 450 kg for Tomahawk). Its electronics reportedly include a 12-channel Kometa-M12 satellite-navigation receiver, a US-made Tracker V3 telemetry unit and a Chinese Xingkai Tech XK-F358 mesh modem; Defence24 puts the unit cost well above $100,000, giving up the low cost that made earlier Gerans attractive. Topwar adds that MANPADS (ceiling roughly 3,500–4,000 m) cannot reach it, forcing Ukraine to use SAMs or fighters, and that first footage of Ukrainian drones intercepting Geran-5s has appeared.
A separate topwar.ru analysis by Anatoly Blinov examines whether Ukrainian interceptor drones can catch the jet-powered Geran-3/Geran-4 (claimed 300–350 km/h). It cites manufacturer claims such as Vluchnyk's Zorelit v5 (416 km/h, 47 km range, about $2,000, factory tests completed 21 September), Wild Hornets' Sting (280 km/h), Quantum Systems' STRILA (350–415 km/h), F-Drones' LITAVR (350 km/h), SkyFall's JetKiller (370 km/h, 9,000 m ceiling) and General Cherry's BULLET (310 km/h), plus the turbojet Alexa Spatium codified in August. The author stresses that none of these speeds or hit rates is independently verified and that no confirmed interception of a jet-powered Geran by an interceptor drone has been publicly documented.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from Voennoye Obozreniye (topwar.ru), a private Russian military news and opinion outlet, partly relaying Polish press and Ukrainian manufacturers' own claims; none of the technical figures has been independently verified.
Investigation: Russia has been rebuilding Facility 1335 in the Urals, the bunker linked to the 'Dead Hand' (Perimeter) nuclear command system
2026-09-26
A joint investigation by the Danish outlet Danwatch, The Sunday Times and the Dossier Center reports that Russia's Ministry of Defence has been carrying out a large modernisation of Object 1335 (codename 'Grot') since 2018. The facility is an underground complex inside Mount Kosvinsky Kamen near the village of Kytlym in the Sverdlovsk region of the Urals. According to the reporting it serves as a command post of the Strategic Missile Forces and is linked to Perimeter (Perimetr), the Soviet-era backup command system known in the West as 'Dead Hand'. Perimeter was built in the mid-1980s to make sure a retaliatory nuclear strike could still be launched if the leadership were killed or communications cut off. Militarnyi describes the complex as having at least 24 rooms, with the main and emergency exits about 2.5 km apart.
The evidence consists of two parts. The first is Russian defence procurement records: the investigators searched about 2.5 million records from 2018 to 2024 and found thousands of tenders naming Object 1335. These cover more than 22,000 tonnes of reinforcing steel, about 56,500 tonnes of cement, 600 km of electrical cable, 182 ventilation units, 5 MW of refrigeration capacity (bought in 2019), 14,000 lamps, heavy machinery, rock-drilling equipment, blast-resistant equipment and filters against radioactive, chemical and biological contamination. The records also list Western-made components such as Rockwool insulation and Danfoss and Belimo fittings. The second is satellite imagery, which shows extensive earthworks at the mountain's entrances and work on about six new access points. A Danish construction professor, Per Goltermann, called the quantities an 'enormous' construction project.
These records and images establish that there has been a large construction and hardening effort at Object 1335. The link to a revived and more automated Perimeter comes from interpretation and from Russian testimony. Retired Major General Viktor Khalin, who says he worked on developing Perimeter in 2005–2010, wrote in a Russian veterans' magazine in January 2026 that the system was reactivated in 2023 and can now work 'not only in an automated mode but also in a fully automatic mode'. Western experts such as Jeffrey Lewis and Andy Weber think reactivation is the most likely explanation. Tom Røseth describes the digging and reinforcement as a defensive measure to protect a retaliatory capability. Experts stress that claims about fully autonomous nuclear launch must be qualified, because Perimeter's operational details remain classified. The Kremlin did not respond to the investigators.
Zelensky says Trump has made a 'final decision' to license Patriot interceptor production to Ukraine; Poland offers to host the plant
2026-09-25
On 25 September 2026 President Volodymyr Zelensky told journalists, in a voice note, that Donald Trump had personally assured him during their meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York that Ukraine will receive licences to produce Patriot interceptor missiles. He quoted Trump as saying: "Yes, I have made a final decision. Ukraine will receive licences for the production of Patriot missiles". Zelensky added that "there are specific agreements in place", but gave no timeline and did not say which interceptor is covered. Kyiv has been negotiating with both RTX/Raytheon (maker of the PAC-2 GEM-T) and Lockheed Martin (maker of the PAC-3 MSE). PAC-2 missiles are built in the US and under licence in Germany, while the more advanced PAC-3 MSE is built only in the US and Japan. The claim follows months of back-and-forth. In July Trump called a licence "pretty cool", but on 31 July he said Washington was undecided and had to be "very careful" with the technology. In early September Secretary of State Marco Rubio said talks were continuing and warned that production would take years to set up. According to Reuters figures cited by Militarnyi, mass production of components could take 3 to 7 years after a licence is granted.
Washington has not confirmed the decision. On 26 September CNN asked Trump directly. He said the two leaders had discussed "a lot of different subjects" with "very strong agreement", then switched to urging Zelensky to "make a deal" with Russia. He did not address the licence, and the White House has made no statement. On 27 September Polish Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka proposed that, if Ukraine gets the licence, the factory be built in Poland rather than Ukraine, so that it would sit on "safe territory" out of reach of Russian strikes. She added: "We'll see if that happens."
This matters because Patriot is one of the few systems in Ukraine's inventory that can reliably intercept Russian ballistic missiles. This applies above all to the hit-to-kill PAC-3 MSE, and to a lesser degree the GEM-T. Kyiv faces an acute shortage of these interceptors: supplies were diverted after the US and Israel entered the conflict with Iran in February 2026, and Zelensky has asked for 5% of US Patriot interceptor output to get through the winter. Even if a licence is approved, licensed production would not ease the shortage this winter. It is a medium- to long-term way to depend less on US deliveries.
Ukraine hits two Russian missile-component plants in two nights: Almaz-Antey's Iskra in Ulyanovsk (Kh-59, Pantsir parts) and the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant, which leaked files tie to at least seven missile programs including Kh-101 and Oreshnik
2026-09-25
Ukrainian long-range drones struck JSC NPP 'Iskra Plant' in Ulyanovsk overnight on 24–25 September 2026, as part of a wider drone barrage on Russia. The plant belongs to the Almaz-Antey defence conglomerate and makes semiconductor devices, microwave components and electronics. According to Militarnyi and an identification by the independent Russian outlet ASTRA, it supplies components for Kh-59M2/M2A air-launched guided missiles (via the Yaroslavl Radio Plant) and diodes used in Pantsir-S1 air defence systems. Ulyanovsk governor Alexei Russkikh confirmed the attack, reporting damage to industrial and civilian infrastructure and eight people injured, including a child.
On the night of 26 September Ukraine hit the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant (AOMZ) in Azov, Rostov Oblast, which President Zelensky and the General Staff confirmed. The plant is part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV) and makes opto-mechanical and optoelectronic equipment and electronics for artillery, missile and anti-tank weapons. According to the SBU, its Alpha special group and the Navy used Neptune cruise missiles and Ruta, Palianytsia and Bars jet-powered drone-missiles. The SBU said the strike started a fire at the foundry and damaged equipment in five production buildings, including optical production, an assembly section, an electroplating workshop and a printed-circuit-board facility. OSINT and NASA FIRMS fire data indicated a fire near the site. The same night Ukraine also hit the Ilsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai. After the strike, the private analytical group Dallas Analytics published internal AOMZ, KTRV and supplier correspondence, state-contract data and cooperation schedules covering April 2023 to March 2025. According to these files, the plant is part of the production chains of at least seven missile programs. For the Kh-101 cruise missile it makes the Otblesk navigation lidar, which fixes the missile's position when satellite navigation is jammed, and the flight-control automation unit, for which no alternative supplier reportedly exists. The files also list guidance elements for the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, seekers for the Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, and electronics and seekers for the R-74 air-to-air missile. For the R-37M air-to-air missile the plant makes power, switching and battery-activation units, harnesses and housings. It also makes flight-control automation for the Kh-35U, Kh-59 and Kh-69 missiles, plus seekers for the Kh-38ML missile and the KAB-250L guided bomb. A March 2025 request asked whether the plant could supply 500 sets of electronic components and 1,000 housings a year from 2026, as the Aerospace Forces sought larger deliveries.
The two strikes show Ukraine targeting the electronics and seeker supply chain behind Russian missiles and air defence, not only launch platforms and fuel. The Azov documents suggest single points of failure, notably for the Kh-101. The damage claims rest on Russian regional officials, statements from the SBU and the Ukrainian military, and OSINT indicators. The leaked documents come from a Ukrainian-aligned private group and have not been independently authenticated. The extent of production disruption has not been independently verified.
Update 7 October: Ukrainska Pravda reports, citing OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint, that satellite images have revealed the consequences of the 25 September attack on the Zavod Iskra research and production company in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk. According to the analyst, most of the strikes hit the building's facade rather than the roof. As a result, around 80% of the strikes were not captured by the satellite: only two of the 11 confirmed strikes caused visible damage in the imagery. Dnipro Osint believes that facade hits could cause significantly more serious internal damage than roof hits, particularly if production facilities and equipment are located behind the walls. This is the analyst's assessment; the extent of internal damage is not confirmed.
В КНДР испытали новый управляемый снаряд 240-мм РСЗО
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
Citing North Korea's state news agency KCNA, the Russian milblogger channel WarGonzo reports that the DPRK has tested a guided rocket for an upgraded 240mm multiple rocket launcher. The channel says the rocket has a self-guided precision system. It gives the range as 100 km on a ballistic trajectory and up to 115 km on a combined glide trajectory. WarGonzo compares the munition to the precision rockets fired by the US HIMARS.
The post repeats KCNA's claim that the test confirmed the rocket's accuracy and its superiority over most foreign equivalents. The matter is relevant to Russia because North Korean 240mm MLRS systems have been supplied to Russia. If a guided round with a range of more than 100 km reached Russian units, it would add a longer-range precision option to that system. The post gives no information on whether the new round will be exported or when it will enter service.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal, editorial Telegram channel. It does not represent a position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD. The performance figures are North Korean state-media claims passed on without independent verification.
russia May Have Moved 51P6A Launchers From Kapustin Yar Test Range to Launch RM-48U Missiles From S-400 Systems
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express discusses a theory from the OSINT analyst AS-22, posted with imagery on X. The theory holds that Russia took 51P6A launchers from the Kapustin Yar test range and uses them to fire RM-48U missiles from S-400 systems against ground targets in Ukraine. It builds on a report from Ukrainian Defence Intelligence in August 2026, which said up to 17 S-400 launchers had been adapted to fire the RM-48U. The article says 30 51P6A launchers were at Kapustin Yar in early 2022 and only 14 by early 2025, but it does not say where these counts come from. It also says 51P6A launchers were seen exercising near the Ukrainian border without their radars, and that footage from autumn 2023 shows launches from 51P6A launchers at Kapustin Yar.
The 51P6A is a heavy S-400 launcher built for the long-range 40N6 interceptor, which has a stated range of 380–400 km. It can be told apart from the standard S-400 launcher by its chassis: the Belarusian MZKT-7930 instead of the Russian BAZ-64022. Defense Express describes the RM-48U only as an operational-tactical missile for the S-400, first announced by Russia in autumn 2023, and gives no range or other specifications. The article hedges throughout ('may have moved', 'may indicate'). Defense Express calls the theory 'reasonable' but does not present it as confirmed.
This is a single-source report from the Ukrainian outlet Defense Express, a party-aligned source, and has not been independently corroborated.
SBU: FSB-recruited soldier passed coordinates of Ukrainian drone repair battalion for Russian missile strike
2026-09-24
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) says it has detained a mobilised serviceman of a motorised infantry brigade in Kharkiv region who worked for Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). According to the SBU, the FSB recruited him before he was called up, making contact through a female relative living in Russia. In the army he served as an electrician repairing unmanned aerial systems in a battalion that restores Ukrainian drones.
The SBU says he collected the locations of his own and neighbouring units and passed the coordinates of the drone repair battalion to his FSB handler to prepare a Russian missile strike on it. He reportedly rotated five smartphones for encrypted communication with his handlers and planned to leave the unit shortly before the strike, using a hospital visit as a pretext.
SBU counterintelligence says it detained him in a service vehicle after he left the unit. He has been charged with high treason under martial law (Art. 111(2) of the Criminal Code), which carries up to life imprisonment. These are the SBU's claims; they have not been independently verified and no strike is reported to have taken place. The case illustrates the Russian targeting pattern of using recruited insiders to locate drone repair and maintenance sites.
Русская армия ударила по предприятию с двигателями для ракет «Фламинго» в Борисполе
2026-09-24SINGLE SOURCEMILBLOGGER
WarGonzo reports, citing the Russian Ministry of Defence, that on the night before 24 September Russian forces carried out a massive strike on Ukrainian drone production, telecommunications and logistics. According to the post, a Kyiv enterprise making components for long- and medium-range drones was hit, as were the 'Kyivstar' and 'Parkovy' telecommunications centres, which it says provided communications and computing capacity to the Ukrainian armed forces. Two logistics centres in Odesa, allegedly storing and distributing military and dual-use cargo from European countries, were also reportedly struck. The post does not say which weapons were used.
In a second post on 25 September, again citing the Russian MoD, WarGonzo claims a strike on a drone assembly and storage site of the company Fire Point at Boryspil, Kyiv oblast. According to the post, Honeywell TFE731 engines — the powerplant of the long-range 'Flamingo' cruise missile — were stored there, and a large fire broke out after the strike. The post also claims strikes on two logistics centres in Odesa oblast and on berthing infrastructure and three military-equipment storage facilities in the port of Reni. No weapon types are named.
Caveat: this is single-source reporting from a personal, editorial Telegram channel. It does not represent a position of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and milbloggers may contradict each other and the MoD. The claimed strike results have not been independently verified.
Danish intelligence (DDIS) sees 'low but growing risk' of a limited Russian military attack on a NATO border state in the coming months, alongside escalating hybrid warfare
2026-09-24
Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS/FE) published an unclassified update, 'Assessment of the Threat from Russia', on 24 September 2026, supplementing its February 2025 assessment. It states that Russia will further escalate its hybrid war against NATO and the West in the coming months, citing intensified sabotage, destructive cyberattacks and drone attacks on European targets — including a foiled drone plot against Leipzig/Halle Airport that German authorities say Russia planned over several months — and Russian drones and in some cases missiles hitting NATO countries bordering Ukraine. It names the 14 September incident in which a Russian frigate off Gedser fired flares at a Danish military helicopter as the most serious recent example of aggressive Russian conduct towards NATO units in the Baltic; Denmark's security service PET has separately warned of sabotage planning against Danish defence companies.
DDIS assesses a 'low but growing risk' that Russia will carry out a limited military attack on one or more NATO countries bordering Russia in the coming months — even while the Ukraine war continues and without having built the capability for a regional war — as a potential 'desperate move' to divert European resources from Ukraine and divide NATO. Possible forms it names: isolated long-range strikes on infrastructure supporting Ukraine (with Moscow possibly claiming the weapons strayed because Ukraine jammed them), a false-flag operation using Ukrainian-made drones, or a limited, possibly unmarked troop contingent — the latter requiring a months-long, hard-to-hide build-up. An outright invasion is judged 'highly unlikely' but 'cannot be ruled out' and would need at least six months of preparation.
The February 2025 timelines remain valid according to DDIS: about six months for Russia to be able to fight a local war against a neighbour, about two years to pose a credible regional threat to the Baltic Sea NATO states, and about five years to be ready for a large-scale war in Europe — assuming the Ukraine war ends or freezes, Russian forces grow faster than the West's and Moscow judges the US would not back European allies. DDIS says Russia sees a 'window of opportunity' before European military capability grows towards 2030, and that its behaviour hinges on whether it believes it can stay below the threshold for a collective NATO response — a threshold Russia itself is likely unsure about.
Russia strikes Kyiv with drones by day, then Zircon and Iskander-M missiles overnight; Zelensky claims 60% of ballistic missiles intercepted
2026-09-23
Over roughly 24 hours on 23–24 September 2026, Russia struck Kyiv first with a daytime drone attack and then overnight with a combined missile and drone strike. On the morning of 23 September, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported drone hits on petrol stations in Holosiivskyi and Darnytskyi districts, a transport infrastructure facility, a four-storey business centre, a shop building and a nine-storey non-residential building in Solomianskyi. The former Railway Market at 1 Mokra Street, next to the Central Railway Station, burned down. It was a 1973 modernist landmark that had been saved from demolition in 2021. Ukrzaliznytsia said the station building was not damaged, but its chairman Oleksandr Pertsovskyi warned that railway facilities were still under attack and that a railway worker had been wounded. According to the Kyiv City Military Administration, one man died in hospital; Ukrainska Pravda put the number injured at eight.
Between 18:00 on 23 September and 08:00 on 24 September, according to Ukraine's Air Force (via ArmyInform), Russia launched Zircon missiles from Russia's Kursk, Rostov and Orel regions, and Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Bryansk regions. It also launched 282 drones: Shahed types (including jet-powered versions), Gerbera, Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and Parodiya decoys. The main target areas were Kyiv and Odesa oblasts. The Air Force said 227 targets were shot down or suppressed by 08:00: 4 Zircons, 3 ballistic missiles, 1 Banderol/Dan-T and 219 drones. It recorded hits at 13 locations and falling debris at 10. President Zelensky said air defence intercepted 60% of the ballistic missiles fired at Kyiv in three waves. He noted that earlier this year there had been moments when the figure was zero. The State Emergency Service (SES) reported two dead and at least eight injured in Kyiv; the city administration had earlier reported one man killed. Company owners said a ballistic missile struck the main production facility and logistics warehouse of textile maker TK-Domashnii Tekstyl, and that a missile completely destroyed the jewellery company Dukachi. Both companies said no staff were hurt. SES bomb disposal teams removed Iskander-M debris from a Kyiv district. Moldovan President Maia Sandu said four Russian drones violated Moldova's airspace on the morning of 24 September and that at least one exploded in the north of the country.
On the TTP side, Euromaidan Press cited the Ukrainian air-activity monitoring channel Nikolaievsky Vaniok the evening before the missile strike. The channel said Russian reconnaissance has been mapping ordinary urban targets in and around Kyiv, including traction and power substations, a trolleybus depot, shops in Obolon, Zhuliany airport, possible fuel depots near Borodianka and Bila Tserkva, and Vasylkiv airfield. It gave no evidence or method, and Euromaidan Press could not verify the list. Andrii Kovalenko of the NSDC Centre for Countering Disinformation warned at the time of signs that a ballistic strike was being prepared. The damage reported afterwards was at rail-adjacent, commercial and industrial sites; no military targets were named in the reporting. All reporting comes from Ukrainian and Moldovan officials and Ukrainian outlets. The interception figures are Ukrainian claims that have not been independently verified. Casualty and damage figures were provisional.
russia Has Two Cruise Missile Ships Left in Black Sea, but Struggles to Repair Damaged Vessels
2026-09-23SINGLE SOURCE
According to Ukrainian Navy spokesman Dmytro Pletenchuk, quoted by Defense Express, Russia's Black Sea Fleet currently has only two surface warships capable of carrying cruise missiles, plus two submarines that have seen little recent use. Among the vessels that have sustained earlier damage but remain in operation are the frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov and a Buyan-M-class small missile ship.
Pletenchuk said full-scale maintenance requires a ship to enter a dock, where it becomes stationary and more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes; as a result the fleet cannot carry out prolonged repairs at Novorossiysk on the scale normally required. The fleet's main repair infrastructure is in occupied Crimea, but Ukrainian strikes and the security situation have effectively restricted Russian access to it. Crimea nevertheless remains important as a launch base for missile and drone strikes on Ukraine; Pletenchuk named missiles, drones and aviation as the main Russian threat components in the region and said aircraft kept in the area give Ukraine opportunities to target them.
This is a single-source report from the Ukrainian outlet Defense Express, based on statements by the Ukrainian Navy (a party to the conflict), and has not been independently corroborated.
Ukrainian expert: Russia's best missile defences ring Moscow, leaving other strategic sites exposed to Ukraine's emerging ballistic missiles
2026-09-23
Vadym Kushnikov, a military analyst with the Ukrainian defence portal Militarnyi, argued on Ukrainian Radio (reported 23 September 2026 and picked up by Ukrinform, UNIAN and Euromaidan Press) that Russia cannot protect all of its strategic sites against Ukrainian ballistic missiles. In his assessment, Russia does have systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles — S-300, S-400 and the newer S-500 "Prometey" — but it has concentrated the most capable ones around the capital. He said the most modern S-500 complexes, with 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 interceptors derived from the Soviet-era A-135 Moscow missile-defence system, are deployed in Moscow Oblast.
Elsewhere, Kushnikov said, Russia suffers a shortage of air-defence complexes, including S-300 and S-400, relative to the size of its territory — a gap he said is visible in satellite imagery, although exact inventories are not public. According to UNIAN's account, he also pointed to Russia having spent down its interceptor stocks, and concluded that even a strong air defence cannot cover every strategic object across such a vast country, leaving regions outside Moscow more exposed to massed and combined Ukrainian strikes. This matters as Ukraine's deep-strike arsenal shifts from foreign-supplied to domestic weapons: alongside the Neptune and Flamingo cruise missiles, Ukraine now fields the Sapsan, an Iskander-class ballistic missile with a range of about 500 km that President Zelenskyy confirmed in combat use in late 2025. A domestic ballistic missile would allow deep strikes into Russia without Western approval.
Kushnikov was frank about the constraints on the Ukrainian side: production sites, many of them in eastern Ukraine, are direct targets of Russian strikes, and key components — notably solid-fuel rocket motors and guidance for a warhead travelling at over five times the speed of sound on a ballistic trajectory — are hard to manufacture; scaling up production is a separate challenge. He gave no concrete timeline for when Ukraine's ballistic missiles will be available in quantity. This is an expert opinion from a Ukrainian analyst, not an official assessment, and the claims about Russian deployments and shortages have not been independently verified.
Unknown North Korean KN-23 Variant Can Reach 60–70 km Altitude, Posing New Challenge for Patriot Systems
2026-09-22SINGLE SOURCE
Defense Express analyst Ivan Kyrychevskyi, citing Janes, reports that North Korea launched two KN-23 ballistic missiles on 20 September 2026. The first flew 440 km and reached an altitude of about 60 km; the second flew 590 km and peaked at about 70 km. Janes assessed that this may be a new KN-23 variant, possibly with a changed flight trajectory or warhead.
According to Defense Express, earlier KN-23 tests typically reached ranges of up to 690 km at maximum altitudes of roughly 37–60 km, while a test on 12 August 2026 went as high as about 90 km. The outlet interprets the current experiments with flight altitude as an attempt to make the missile harder for Patriot systems to intercept. That matters for Ukraine because Russia has fired North Korean KN-23s at Ukrainian targets, and Patriot is Ukraine's main defence against ballistic missiles.
Defense Express also argues that the KN-23 relies heavily on Russian technology and documentation, calling North Korea's defence industry effectively a 'branch' of Russia's military-industrial complex, and refers to a 2024 RUSI study on Russian deliveries of materials, components and blueprints for KN-23 production. The link to Patriot evasion is the outlet's own analysis, not a stated North Korean aim. This is a single-source report from Defense Express (a Ukrainian defence outlet, i.e. a source from a warring party, drawing on Janes), not independently corroborated.
Russia's real threat isn't a better missile — it's 14,000 cheap Dan-T cruise missiles built from a 1990s target drone
2026-09-21
Russia has adapted a decades-old aircraft-launched target drone into a mass-producible cruise missile called the Dan-T. According to RBC-Ukraine (cited by Euromaidan Press), the Dan-T began life as the Dan-M, a jet-powered target drone built by Russia's Sokol design bureau in the early 1990s to mimic US Tomahawk cruise missiles for air-defense training. To convert it into a weapon, Russia reportedly strips the recovery parachute and fits a warhead; the missile flies autonomously via satellite and inertial navigation over hundreds of kilometers.
The striking figure in the piece is that Russia reportedly aims to build 14,000 Dan-T missiles next year, with roughly 2,000 units expected by the end of the current year. This 14,000 figure is a stated production target/plan, not a confirmed existing stockpile — the article does not attribute it to a named official or analyst, only to RBC-Ukraine's own reporting, so it should be treated as an estimate pending independent confirmation. For comparison, the article also notes Russia is separately producing the S8000 Banderol — another cheap cruise missile — at roughly 80 units per month, and suggests the Dan-T could partly replace it as a cheaper alternative.
The article's core argument is that the danger from this weapon lies not in technological sophistication but in cost and volume: because the airframe design is over 30 years old and cheap to mass-produce, Russia can launch missiles "by the thousand," forcing Ukraine to expend scarce and expensive air-defense interceptors on comparatively low-cost targets — a saturation/cost-asymmetry tactic similar to that used with Shahed/Geran-series drones. Despite the "experts say" framing in the headline, no individual expert is quoted by name in the body of the article.
Ukraine claims over 45% of Russia's oil refining capacity knocked out after Moscow refinery strike
2026-09-21
Ukraine's General Staff stated on Facebook that, following the 20 September strike on Gazprom's Moscow Oil Refinery, Ukrainian forces have now knocked out more than 45% of Russia's total oil refining capacity — a cumulative figure covering the ongoing strike campaign, not just this week's attacks. The claim was triggered by three strikes in a single week: the Syzran refinery in Samara Oblast (14-15 September, hitting an AVT-6 distillation unit and tank farm), the Slavneft-YANOS refinery in Yaroslavl (16-17 September, ~15 million tonnes/year capacity, AVT-3 unit hit), and the Moscow Oil Refinery itself (20 September, hitting its AVT-6 unit, a comprehensive processing unit, and an isomerisation unit). The General Staff says the resulting fuel shortage includes a sharp drop in Euro-5/K5 standard petrol and diesel production, and frames the strikes as lawful self-defense under UN Charter Article 51.
No methodology for the 45% figure is disclosed — it is not clear what baseline "total capacity" is being measured against, nor from what date the cumulative tally starts. Some loosely corroborating context is noted: US President Trump separately said Russia has "lost control" of its oil refining industry, and Russian domestic diesel exchange sales reportedly fell sharply after three refineries went offline. Neither of these independently confirms the specific 45% figure.
This is a claim made by one belligerent (Ukraine's military) about the effectiveness of its own campaign, sourced only to its own social-media statement, with no independent analyst, satellite, or energy-market verification of the percentage cited in this article. It should be treated as an unverified Ukrainian assessment pending independent corroboration, even though the underlying strikes on named, specific facilities appear well-documented.
Russia widens strike campaign on Ukrainian industry and logistics: steel mills halted, Interpipe plant hit in Dnipro, 2.1 million m² of warehouses destroyed
2026-09-21
Russian ballistic missile strikes in early September 2026 knocked out three of Ukraine's largest steel plants — two operated by Metinvest in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions and one operated by ArcelorMittal — which together account for roughly 90% of Ukraine's steel output. According to Meduza's summary of Financial Times reporting, Metinvest's chief executive said Ukraine "doesn't have a steel industry any more"; repair timelines range from days to potentially years, and Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi put the cost to the state at up to $1.5 billion in lost tax revenue, with more than 15,000 workers affected. The FT-based report also mentions 17 workers killed, without making clear whether that figure refers only to the steel-plant strikes.
The campaign continued on the night of 21-22 September, when a Russian ballistic missile hit an Interpipe industrial plant in Dnipro. Interpipe said four employees were killed and seven injured, and that damage to the main production equipment and infrastructure forced it to suspend manufacturing while the damage and recovery timeline are assessed. On 22 September the Russian Ministry of Defence, via TASS, claimed a "massive strike" with land-, sea- and air-launched precision weapons — including Tsirkon hypersonic missiles — and Geran-4 drones against metallurgical and chemical-industry, energy, defence-industrial, port and logistics targets in the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava and Odesa regions. Named targets in that claim include the Interpipe Steel plant, the JTI tobacco factory in Kremenchuk (which the MoD alleges was used for ammunition production) and the Sofrakhim plant in Pavlohrad (alleged missile-fuel production). These are Russian MoD claims; the alleged military use of the tobacco and chemical plants is not independently verified, and the Interpipe strike is the one the target company itself confirms.
The strikes on heavy industry sit alongside a wider Russian campaign against Ukraine's civilian logistics. Euromaidan Press reports that Russia has destroyed more than two-fifths of Ukraine's modern warehouse space — some 2.1 million m² — hitting depots of retailers, food companies, drugmakers and couriers far from the front; the article does not attribute that figure to a specific source. The latest example is household-paper maker Snow Panda, whose warehouse complex was "completely destroyed for the second time" by a Russian strike on 22 September (no injuries, per the company), after a missile hit its main Odesa Oblast hub on 1 July. Euromaidan notes a pattern in which companies disperse stock to smaller sites that then become the next target; the headline refers to jet-powered drones, but the article body does not specify which weapon hit Snow Panda on 22 September.
Ukraine Produces More Than 2,000 Bars Missile-drone per Month: What to Make of the Jet-Powered Shahed Analogue?
2026-09-21SINGLE SOURCE
The Bars is a small, Ukrainian-developed missile-drone / compact cruise missile that Defense Express frames as a jet-powered analogue in the same weapon class as Russia's Shahed-type one-way attack drones. According to the (still-undisclosed) manufacturer, Bars has evolved from an initial configuration with a 22-kg warhead and 700-km range to current variants carrying a 60-kg warhead with a stated range of over 1,000 km. The manufacturer says its development goal is for 75% of launched systems to reach and hit their targets — explicitly described as a target to work toward, not a current success rate.
Citing the Ukrainian outlet NV, which quoted an unnamed representative of the manufacturer, Defense Express reports Ukraine is now producing more than 2,000 Bars units per month across various configurations, with over 200 deep-strike missions carried out using the weapon so far, a number said to be rising significantly. The author notes this is not the first time the same undisclosed manufacturer has released such figures through an anonymous spokesperson, and stresses the production claim originates with the manufacturer and has not been independently verified.
The article frames future Bars development around a production bottleneck: the availability of small turbojet engines. Even though European partners are reportedly increasing turbojet engine production, the author cautions this does not mean available capacity can multiply several-fold, suggesting future Bars variants may need to evolve toward larger, more conventional cruise-missile configurations to raise strike effectiveness within available propulsion supply. This is a single-source report from a Ukrainian defense-industry outlet, not independently corroborated, and production figures from defense-industry-adjacent media should be treated with appropriate caution — a caution that cuts both ways, as such figures could reflect optimistic messaging or could equally understate real output.
Norway's Nammo to develop engine for IRIS-T SLX air-defense missile
2026-09-20
IRIS-T SLX is the long-range variant of the German Diehl Defence IRIS-T SLM air-defense system already fielded by Ukraine. It roughly doubles the intercept range to about 80 km, targeting fighter jets, bombers, and long-endurance drones/support aircraft, and can be fired from the same launcher as SLM missiles for mixed loadouts, reusing existing SLM radar, tactical operations center, and software infrastructure.
Norwegian firm Nammo, at its Raufoss plant, has begun developing the SLX's new rocket motor — a "dual-pulse" design that splits the motor into two sections with a tailored thrust profile to extend range, described by Nammo as an essentially new development effort with little carryover from earlier motors. Diehl is targeting the first Safety Integrity Level (SIL) development firing test in 2027, with serial production planned to start around 2029.
Ukraine relevance: IRIS-T SLS/SLM systems already in Ukrainian service have reportedly destroyed over 1,000 Russian targets since 2022, with a claimed 95% hit rate against cruise missiles and drones. The longer-ranged SLX, once fielded, would extend that intercept envelope and could reduce Ukraine's/Europe's dependence on U.S. Patriot interceptors amid ongoing shortages — though fielding is still several years away. Note: the militarnyi.com article itself could not be directly fetched (Cloudflare protection); content was corroborated via Breaking Defense's reporting on the same Nammo/Diehl development, and the 1,000+ targets/95% hit-rate figures for Ukraine are as reported there, not independently cross-checked against a second primary source.
Ukraine's Largest Drone Attack on Moscow Strikes Oil Refinery on Election Day; Operations Halted for Weeks
2026-09-20
On the night of 19-20 September 2026 — the third and final day of voting in Russia's State Duma elections — Ukraine launched what Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin called the largest-ever drone attack on the Russian capital. Sobyanin said more than 1,600 drones were intercepted across Russia's defensive lines over the preceding 24 hours, with roughly 450 shot down as they approached Moscow itself; Russia's Defense Ministry separately claimed 1,110 Ukrainian drones downed across Russian regions, Crimea and the Black Sea. Two people were killed in the Moscow region (Orekhovo-Zuyevsky and Ramensky districts) and around 20 injured, including three children. Beyond the capital, strikes and falling debris damaged a residential building on Orekhovy Boulevard, combined heat-and-power plant No. 22 in Dzerzhinsky, and a 290,000 sqm logistics complex in Sofyino; four Moscow airports (Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo, Zhukovsky) saw roughly 100 flights delayed or cancelled. Sobyanin called the attack "clearly planned to disrupt the elections," adding "the enemy did not succeed."
Among the targets was the Gazprom-owned Moscow Oil Refinery in the Kapotnya district, one of Russia's largest, supplying about 40% of Moscow's fuel market and 70% of the region's petrol and aviation-fuel demand. President Zelensky said Flamingo cruise missiles were used alongside drones in the broader strike package on Moscow, including the refinery and logistics complex, though other weapon types (reportedly including Pelican missile-drones) were also cited. Militarnyi reported that residents near the refinery found missile wreckage visually resembling Ukraine's FP-5 "Flamingo" cruise missile, with a jet-engine sound audible in resident-recorded video — but stressed this is not confirmed: the fragments merely "resemble" the Flamingo, and no official source has confirmed that weapon was used in the refinery strike specifically.
On 21 September, Reuters reported — citing three industry sources — that the refinery had halted crude oil processing after both of its primary crude-distillation units (the AVT-6 unit, 53% of capacity, and the EURO+ combined unit, 47%) caught fire when drones crashed onto the site. Repairs are expected to take several weeks. The refinery processed 11.6 million tonnes of crude in 2024 (about 230,000 barrels/day), and no refinery fuel has been offered on the St. Petersburg Exchange since 21 September. The plant sustained comparable damage in a June 2026 attack and resumed operations sooner than initially predicted then, but sources say the current damage appears more severe.
North Korea has fired around 150 ballistic missiles at Ukraine and is learning from each strike, Ukrainian intelligence says
2026-09-19
According to Euromaidan Press, roughly 150 North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles have been fired by Russia at Ukraine since late 2023 (an estimate). Ukraine's military intelligence service HUR, announcing this via social media, states that each strike gives Pyongyang combat data that has sharpened its weapons. Wartime use in Ukraine thus effectively serves as a series of live tests for North Korea.
During a Japanese delegation visit to Kyiv, HUR showed Japan's parliamentary speaker, Eisuke Mori, components of a North Korean missile that Russia had fired at Ukraine. In HUR's framing, this demonstrates that the same missiles threatening Ukraine also endanger Japan and the wider Asia-Pacific. This is a Ukrainian interpretation; the article offers no independent confirmation of a concrete threat to Japan.
Radio Free Asia earlier reported on the origin of components found in the missiles. An unnamed analyst puts North Korea's earnings from the war at around 20 billion dollars. The figure of 150 and the learning effect are estimates and HUR claims that cannot be independently verified from this single article.
What are the "S-300 Clone" and GAM-67 missiles in the US's new $2.68B Ukraine aid package?
2026-09-19
The US State Department approved a $2.68 billion aid package for Ukraine on September 18, 2026, financed through European partners and unused US military aid funding, per Defense Express. Two line items in the paperwork caught analysts' attention for their unusual names: "S-300 Clone" missiles and "GAM-67." The package also covers sustainment items — spare parts, consumables, software, repair/return support, and engineering, technical, and logistical services.
Experts cited by Defense Express and Defense Mirror argue the naming is misleading: despite the "clone" label, the missile is not a replica of the Soviet 5V55 used in legacy S-300 systems, but a new US development with enhanced characteristics and a more modern guidance principle, intended to be fired from Ukraine's existing Soviet-era S-300 launchers (which have plenty of launchers but a dwindling missile supply, since Russia will not sell more). GAM-67 likewise reuses the designation of an unrealized 1950s American anti-radar missile project, but is described as a new development intended for medium-range systems. Notably, the US government itself did not disclose the index, technical characteristics, or manufacturer of either missile in its official statement, so these identifications are analyst inference, not official confirmation. The article links this to a September 2024 statement by then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin about "designing and building a substitute" for the Soviet S-300 and the R-27 air-to-air missile.
For Ukraine's air-defense posture, this matters because it would extend the operational life of Soviet-legacy S-300 batteries by feeding them Western-made replacement rounds. Given the lack of official technical disclosure, this should be treated as informed speculation about weapon identity rather than a confirmed capability announcement.
Wild Hornets' STING S interceptor claims ~10 Geran-4 and several Geran-5 kills and heads for mass production; Geran-5 seen with internalised turbojet
2026-09-19
According to Militarnyi, a crew (call sign 'Rubin') of the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment shot down a Russian Geran-5 small cruise missile around 19-20 September with a new interceptor drone, the STING S, by direct collision; the video was published by manufacturer Wild Hornets. Euromaidan Press, citing a Wild Hornets representative interviewed by NV on 22 September, now reports that the STING S has destroyed about ten Geran-4 jet drones and several Geran-5s during limited deployment. Wild Hornets calls it an entirely new product rather than an upgrade of its existing STING, developed from early 2026 specifically for jet interception, and says it plans to begin mass production about a month after combat tests are completed. Detailed specifications and the airframe's appearance have still not been disclosed.
Wild Hornets has also developed a remote-control system, Hornet Vision Ctrl, that lets experienced pilots operate interceptors across several sectors at once; it assists operators rather than intercepting automatically — the company says it knows of no fully automatic interception system proven in combat — and acknowledges that some control aspects still need refinement for future targets flying at 700-800 km/h. Faster jet drones cut the reaction time of Ukrainian mobile fire groups from about a minute to as little as six seconds. President Zelensky has said 67 companies are working on interceptors, two of which have completed combat tests. The Geran-5 is described as a jet-powered drone-missile about 6 m long with up to 5.5 m wingspan, a ~90 kg warhead, a range of roughly 950-1,000 km, 450-600 km/h cruise speed and a ceiling of around 6 km, powered by a Chinese TELEFLY TF-TJ2000A turbojet (200 kgf) with a jam-resistant 12-channel Kometa antenna and 3G/4G modems.
A second Militarnyi report, based on SBU and Wild Hornets interceptor footage, says Russia has moved the Geran-5's turbojet from an external nacelle into an internal fuselage bay, which could raise speed and range but costs internal volume for fuel or payload. The kill tallies and footage are Ukrainian and manufacturer claims and have not been independently confirmed. The STING S is a separate system from the SBU's catapult-launched jet interceptor (e-20260920-02) and Vluchnyk's Zorelit v5 (e-20260922-02), both also aimed at jet-powered Gerans.
US Approves $2.68 Billion Air Defense Sale to Ukraine, Including S-300 Clone and GAM-67 Missile Systems
2026-09-19
The US Department of State on 18 September 2026 approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Ukraine worth an estimated $2.68 billion, covering what the State Department calls 'Air Defence Development Upgrades and related equipment and services.' Congress was formally notified late Friday, the standard step required before such a sale can proceed, giving lawmakers a statutory window to object.
The package includes S-300 Clone missiles, GAM-67 missiles, Range-Extended Air Defence Laser Guided Rocket (ADALGR) missile systems, Improvised Transporter Erector Launcher (ITEL) 1.5 units with mobile launching system modification kits, and RPS 202 counter-drone radars, alongside spare parts, technical assistance and contractor logistics support. Notably, it does not include Patriot interceptors or NASAMS systems, which have featured in separate, earlier US notifications, including a Patriot launcher upgrade and sustainment package approved in November 2025.
Financing would combine European contributions with US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds appropriated under the Biden administration; the FMF portion would count as a US capital contribution to the Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on a 1:1 reimbursement basis — the fund created under the 2025 US-Ukraine minerals deal. The sale underscores Washington's continued reliance on Ukraine-funded, rather than US-gifted, arms transfers and on the reconstruction fund as a financing vehicle, as Ukraine braces for another winter of Russian strikes on its power grid and air defence network.
Ukraine unveils SBU jet-powered interceptor drone and reports kills on jet-powered Geran drones; Russian jet drone crashes near Chisinau
2026-09-18
On 19 September 2026 President Zelensky announced that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) has developed a new interceptor drone, already successfully deployed against jet-powered Shahed-type drones. According to Militarnyi, which picked up the report, the aircraft has delta-shaped wings and is launched from the ground by catapult. It would be the second publicly shown Ukrainian interceptor against jet drones, after the Alexa Spatium; four designs were reportedly field-tested by late August 2026.
Militarnyi reports that the interceptor downed a small Geran-5 cruise-missile-like system. Pravda reports that a second Russian jet-powered drone was shot down the same day, which Zelensky described as the second time in one day. These are Ukrainian claims; the sources contain no independent confirmation. Militarnyi describes the Geran-5 as roughly 6 m long, with a warhead of about 90 kg, a range of up to about 1,000 km, a cruising speed of 450-600 km/h and an altitude of up to 6 km. It is said to be based on the Iranian Karrar design, first documented in January 2026 and less numerous than the Geran-4.
Separately, Militarnyi reported on 18 September that a Russian jet drone crashed in a suburb of Chisinau, Moldova. The article text could not be retrieved; that item rests on the headline alone, so type, origin and cause are not established.
Russia demands Japan remove US Typhon missile systems deployed during Orient Shield
2026-09-18
According to Militarnyi, Russia has formally protested the temporary deployment of US Typhon missile systems in Japan during the Orient Shield exercise (8-24 September 2026, involving the US, Japan and Australia). Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova reportedly called the systems a threat to Russian security and the deployment absolutely unacceptable. Russia warned of compensatory countermeasures. The protest followed a visit by Putin to occupied islands that Japan claims as its Northern Territories.
The deployment took place on Japanese territory, including Hokkaido near the Russian Far East. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed it is purely temporary, with the systems redeploying to a US base by mid-October. It is the third Typhon deployment to Japan; earlier ones took place in 2025. China likewise condemned the deployment as evidence of Japan's accelerated remilitarization.
The Mobile Rapid Deployment Typhon (MRC Typhon) battery has four launchers with four cells each, able to fire subsonic Tomahawk cruise missiles for land strikes or SM-6 long-range air-defense missiles, packaged in standard shipping containers. The Russian position is a political claim; the source reports no concrete Russian military measures.
Neptune Missile Strike Destroys Production Buildings at Russia's Atlant Aero Drone Plant in Taganrog
2026-09-18
Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles inflicted heavy damage on Atlant Aero, a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle production facility in Taganrog (Rostov Oblast), in mid-September 2026. According to multiple outlets — Militarnyi, Ukrainska Pravda and United24 Media, all drawing on satellite-imagery analysis by the OSINT group Exilenova+ — three production buildings were completely destroyed. One warehouse suffered a roof collapse across roughly 60×40 meters, while another production building sustained severe damage over an estimated 70×40 meters. NASA's FIRMS thermal-anomaly satellite system detected a large fire at the site, and Ukraine's General Staff officially confirmed the strike.
Atlant Aero supplies unmanned systems to Russian forces and is known for producing the Molniya drone family: the Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 fixed-wing attack variants and the Molniya-2R reconnaissance UAV. The company is under sanctions from Ukraine, Canada and the EU. The missile involved is reported to be the modernized, land-attack version of the Neptune, with a range of roughly 1,000 km (up from 280 km in earlier variants) and a 260 kg warhead — substantially heavier than the anti-ship configuration's payload.
Sources diverge somewhat on the exact strike date: Militarnyi's account places the attack on September 15, describing it as the second hit on the facility in four days following a September 12 strike, whereas United24 Media dates the strike itself to September 12, with FIRMS fire detection confirming it on September 15. This discrepancy likely reflects after-the-fact reconstruction from satellite imagery. This is also not the facility's first hit: an April 2026 Neptune strike reportedly destroyed two production buildings and damaged four others. Independent, non-Ukrainian confirmation of the damage's full extent or of any resulting production disruption is not yet available; the claims rest on OSINT satellite analysis, thermal fire-detection data, and Ukraine's official statement.
Poland Joins Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition for Ukraine
2026-09-18
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on September 18 that Poland has joined the anti-ballistic missile coalition supporting Ukraine. He made the announcement at a joint press conference with President Zelensky, held on the sidelines of a summit of the new eight-country Carpathian grouping in western Ukraine. 'From today, Poland is part of this major project... we have agreed on the forms and frameworks of this cooperation,' Tusk said, making Poland the coalition's eleventh member.
The coalition was formed in mid-July 2026 by Ukraine together with Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Its goal is the joint development of a new, cheaper air-defense system against ballistic missiles, intended as a complement to or alternative for the US-made Patriot system, on which Ukraine and many European states currently depend for American supplies. A prototype, codenamed Freyja, is expected in the first half of 2027. Zelensky stressed that Ukraine has developed unique wartime technologies it is prepared to share with partners.
Poland was notably absent from the original July announcement, which drew domestic criticism at the time; Tusk described this as 'a certain misunderstanding' that has now been resolved. For the tracker, this development matters as part of the broader European response to the sustained Russian ballistic-missile threat against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, and signals a shift toward European (co-)production of air-defense capability alongside continued reliance on US-supplied systems.
Russia ramps up ballistic strikes on Ukraine using converted S-400 missiles
2026-09-18
Russia has driven its ballistic missile campaign against Ukraine to record intensity through mass use of the RM48U — a converted training/target missile originally built on decommissioned S-400 interceptor missiles (48N6DM family) and used to train air-defence crews — according to a Reuters exclusive based on official Ukrainian data. The missiles are now fitted with warheads and fired from S-400 launch systems on a high, ballistic trajectory toward ground targets. The RM48U is less powerful and less accurate than Russia's primary short-range ballistic missile, the Iskander, deviating from intended targets by roughly 300 meters on average.
The scale is substantial: RM48Us made up more than half of the 228 ballistic and hypersonic missiles fired at Ukraine in July and early August 2026, and the tempo has since increased further. Ukraine estimates Russia's stockpile at around 400 RM48Us against only about 100 Iskanders, and Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) reports Russia plans to raise RM48U production to 480 units in 2026, up from 200 in 2025. A RUSI analyst notes this lets Russia conserve its scarcer precision weapons — Iskanders, KN-23s, and Zircons — for winter use.
The shift has had measurable consequences, including a deadly strike on a railway platform near Brovary in early August that forensic analysis attributed to an RM48U, while Russia's defense ministry claimed a different target. Ukraine's stock of Patriot interceptors — its only system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles — is nearly exhausted, and July 2026 saw the highest monthly civilian death toll since the start of the full-scale invasion. Reuters was unable to independently verify Ukraine's forensic findings, and Ukraine's air force has stopped publishing regular interception statistics since August, citing concerns about aiding enemy propaganda.
Ukraine's 208th Brigade Intercepts Russian S8000 Banderol Missile-Drone over Odesa Region (Video)
2026-09-18SINGLE SOURCE
Ukraine's 208th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade shot down a Russian S8000 Banderol missile-drone over Odesa region during a nighttime engagement on 18 September 2026, according to Defense Express (defence-ua.com). The brigade released footage showing the target flying through the night sky before a bright flash marked its destruction; the specific interception method used this time was not disclosed in the footage.
The S8000 Banderol is a relatively new Russian weapon: a small, jet-powered cruise missile/missile-drone with a range of up to roughly 500 km and cruising speeds of 520-560 km/h (max 620-650 km/h), per Ukrainian Defense Intelligence figures cited by Defense Express. It has been described elsewhere as a hybrid between a drone, an aerial bomb and a cruise missile, and its compact size combined with long range makes it attractive to Russia for extended-range strikes at lower cost than standard cruise missiles.
This is the second publicly documented S8000 Banderol interception attributed to the 208th Brigade over Odesa region this month; on 2 September 2026 the same unit reportedly downed a Banderol using a MANPADS. Note: this item is based on a single, non-official Ukrainian source (Defense Express) and has not been independently verified.
Polish PM Tusk warns Russia is preparing 'accidental' drone and missile strikes on NATO states backing Ukraine
2026-09-17
In an address to the Sejm on 17 September 2026, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called this "the most probable scenario for the coming months": based on intelligence from NATO, Ukraine and the US (including the CIA), he said Russia's plans also include hybrid strikes with drones and missiles against countries supporting Ukraine, including Poland itself. He described this intelligence as "highly consistent and, unfortunately, persuasive."
Tusk set the warning against a string of recent incidents. On 13 September, Russian drones struck a gas station and a passenger train near the Polish-Ukrainian border, with a train carrying Western politicians narrowly avoiding a hit. On 15 September, NATO jets shot down a drone over Lithuania for the first time; Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda identified it as Russian. Estonia and Latvia have also seen drone incursions in recent months, and Poland alone recorded four incidents at border crossings in the past week targeting supply lines to Ukraine. Tusk also pointed to a new generation of fast, high-altitude Russian jet-powered drones that "hardly anyone is effectively prepared to counter," and to sustained heavy strikes on six Ukrainian cities plus the destruction of more than 300 railway locomotives.
The core of Tusk's warning is the distinction between a deliberately disguised "accident" and an actual incident: he assessed that Russia would deliberately make strikes on NATO territory look like accidents — a drone or missile "straying" into NATO airspace — to erode allies' resolve to invoke Article 5, without giving a clear trigger for a collective response. Importantly, this is Tusk's political threat assessment based on intelligence, not a confirmed or attributed incident in itself; he called for political unity and warned against pro-Russian framing of the threat.